



Ce document est le fruit d’un long travail approuvé par le jury de 
soutenance et mis à disposition de l’ensemble de la 
communauté universitaire élargie. 
 
Il est soumis à la propriété intellectuelle de l’auteur : ceci 
implique une obligation de citation et de référencement lors de 
l’utilisation de ce document. 
 
D’autre part, toute contrefaçon, plagiat, reproduction illicite de 
ce travail expose à des poursuites pénales. 
 









Code la Propriété Intellectuelle – Articles L. 122-4 et L. 335-1 à 
L. 335-10 
Loi n° 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992, publiée au Journal Officiel du  





En vue de l’obtention du 
 
 
DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITE DE TOULOUSE 
 
Délivré par l’Université Toulouse Capitole 
 
École doctorale : Sciences Economiques-Toulouse School of Economics 
 
 
Présentée et soutenue par 
GONNOT Jérôme 
 
le 21/10/2020      
 




Discipline : Sciences Economiques  
Unité de recherche : TSE-R (UMR CNRS 5314 – INRA 1415) 








Rapporteurs Monsieur Simone MORICONI, Professeur, IESEG School of Management  
 Monsieur Javier VAZQUEZ-GRENNO, Professeur, Universitat de Barcelona 
et Institut d'Economia de Barcelona 
 
Suffragants Madame Karine VAN DER STRAETEN, Directrice de recherche, CNRS-TSE 
 Monsieur François POINAS, Maître de conférences, Université Toulouse 1 
Capitole 
 
Essays in Political Economy




Before I close this five-year long chapter of my life, I wish to express a few words of gratitude
to the people with whom I shared the path to this accomplishment.
I am foremost thankful to my advisor Philippe De Donder for his continuous guidance and
encouragement, to Paul Seabright, who invested in our project, and François Poinas, without
whom I would not have been able to wrap up this dissertation in the past few months. I thank
them all for their support, indulgence, and kindness.
I am also grateful to Karine Van der Straeten for her advice from my very first year in Toulouse
as a Masters student, and to Micael Castanheira for his warm welcome in Brussels.
My work also benefited from valuable discussions with Michael Becher at the Toulouse School
of Economics and Gani Aldashev at ULB, as well as countless others at several conferences and
seminars.
I extend my gratitude to the doctoral school of the Toulouse School of Economics and the
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse for their financial and academic support, and to
Caroline Tejedor and Ludmila Namolovan for administrative help.
I am also thankful to Simone Moriconi and Javier Vazquez-Grenno for agreeing to be on my
jury, for their time and comments.
A special mention to all my fellow PhD colleagues in Toulouse, who made my time so much
easier. I am very grateful to these smart and friendly people for supporting me in these difficult
moments when I thought I was not up to the task.
Finally, I am thankful to my family who was always there when I needed them, with a special
thanks to my partner Dafne who believed in me, supported me and endured all the few ups and
many downs along the way.
1
Abstract
This thesis contains three essays that investigate the political integration and assimilation of
foreign-born immigrants and the rise of socially conservative, so-called ”populist” actors on the
political scene in Western Europe. The shared feature of all three chapters is that they directly
study the political transformation of contemporary Western European countries.
The first chapter examines natives’ decision to grant political rights to foreign residents based
on their contribution to a redistribution mechanism that finances a private and a public good. I
propose a model where agents’ preferences are determined by their skill level and cultural beliefs
about public spending, which vary across nationalities. In contrast with a standard prediction
of the political economy literature, I show that low-skill natives are willing to enfranchise rela-
tively skilled foreigners as long as these foreigners have sufficiently liberal beliefs towards public
spending. Moreover, I establish that the political rights that low-skill natives are prepared to
grant to foreign residents is a non-monotonic function of immigration’s skill level and cultural
taste for public expenditure. In particular, low-skill natives favor greater political integration
of less-skilled or more liberal foreigners if and only if these foreigners’ average relative prefer-
ences for the private and the public good are sufficiently close to their own. I provide empirical
support for some of the theoretical predictions of my model using an original municipality-level
dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. My results indicate that munici-
palities where a higher share of natives received social transfers were more likely to support
immigrant voting and that this effect was greater where foreigners were poorer and emigrated
from less economically conservative countries.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, Paul Seabright and I explore why voters might vote
for candidates who are outsiders to the political Establishment and are willing to tolerate can-
didate characteristics they dislike. We develop a model in which these outsiders are perceived
as more likely than Establishment candidates to implement economic policies that are congru-
ent with voters’ interests, and voters have imperfect information about candidates’ type. An
Establishment candidate seeking election may therefore choose a conservative social platform
for populist reasons - that is, as a way of signaling independence from the interests of the Es-
tablishment. This requires that the value of social policies as signals of future economic policy
outweighs their value as signals of future social policies. This populist strategy is more likely
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when voters’ trust in economic and social policy announcements is low, when the cost for can-
didates of breaking campaign promises once elected is low, and when there exist few alternative
ways for the voters to evaluate the likelihood that the candidate will implement policies that
run counter to the interests of the Establishment. Using survey data from several European
countries, we also successfully test the main prediction of the model that liberal voters are less
sensitive to ideological convergence with political parties, and thus more likely to vote for social
outsiders, when they have lower levels of trust in politicians.
In the third and final chapter, I study to what extent and at what pace immigrants adapt to
the political norms that prevail in their host countries. I use a cross-national research strategy
to compare and analyze attitudes of foreign-born individuals in 16 European countries and find
strong empirical support for assimilation over time: On average, the opinion gap between natives
and immigrants’ political preferences on redistribution, gay rights, EU unification, immigration
policies, and trust level in national governments is reduced by 40% after 20 years of residence
in the destination country. I also provide evidence that most of this assimilation is driven by
immigrants from non-developed countries, and that convergence in political preferences varies
significantly across immigrants’ economic and cultural background as well as with the size of
the immigrant group from their country of origin. Finally, I show that a substantial part
of assimilation on gay rights, immigration and political trust is driven by acculturation at
the national level where immigrants with longer tenure tend to adapt more to the political
preferences of natives in their destination country. These findings shed new light on the timing
and magnitude of the political assimilation of first-generation immigrants, with potentially
important implications for the political economy of immigration policy.
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Résumé
Cette thèse porte sur l’intégration et l’assimilation politique des populations étrangères dans
les sociétés européennes et la montée en puissance des mouvements conservateurs dits ”pop-
ulistes” sur la scène politique en Europe occidentale. Les trois chapitres de cette thèse traitent
ainsi directement des transformations politiques auxquelles font face les pays européens au-
jourd’hui.
Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’analyse la décision des populations autochtones - ou
natifs - d’octroyer ou non des droits politiques aux étrangers. J’utilise pour cela un modèle
d’économie politique qui s’appuie sur la contribution des agents à un mécanisme de redistribu-
tion qui finance un bien privé et un bien public. Dans ce modèle, les préférences individuelles
pour la redistribution dépendent à la fois du niveau de qualification des agents et de leurs
croyances culturelles, qui sont elles-même déterminées par le pays d’origine. A rebours de la
littérature existante, je montre que les natifs sont disposés à octroyer des droits de vote à des
étrangers plus qualifiés, à la condition que ces derniers soient suffisamment libéraux sur les
questions de redistribution. Par ailleurs, je démontre théoriquement que le niveau d’intégration
politique préféré des natifs les moins qualifiés est une fonction non-monotone du niveau de qual-
ifications des immigrés et de leurs préférences culturelles vis-à-vis de la dépense publique. Ainsi,
lorsque le niveau de qualification des étrangers baissent ou que ceux-ci sont moins conservateurs,
les natifs sont favorables à des droits de vote plus étendus si et seulement si les préférences rela-
tives des étrangers pour le bien public et le bien privé sont suffisamment proches des leurs. Dans
la deuxième partie de ce chapitre, je présente des éléments empiriques qui corroborent certaines
des prédictions du modèle. A l’aide de données inédites provenant de référendums municipaux
sur le droit de vote des étrangers en Suisse, je montre que les communes où une part plus
importante de citoyens suisses sont bénéficiaires des aides sociales d’Etat sont également plus
favorables à l’octroi de droits de vote local aux étrangers. De surcrôıt, cet effet est d’autant
plus important que les étrangers sont eux-même dépendants des aides de l’Etat et originaires
de pays où la culture en matière de redistribution et de dépense publique est plus développée.
Dans le second chapitre de ma thèse, Paul Seabright et moi-même tentons d’apporter une ex-
plication au choix de certains électeurs de voter pour des candidats qui n’appartiennent pas à
la classe politique traditionnelle - ci-après Outsiders - et dont ils ne partagent pas les opinions
politiques. Pour cela, nous construisons un modèle dans lequel (i) les Outsiders sont perçus
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comme étant plus enclins que les candidats de la classe politique traditionnelle à mettre en place
une politique économique qui correspond aux attentes des électeurs et où (ii) les électeurs sont
en situation d’information imparfaite et ignorent le type de candidat auquel ils ont affaire. Un
candidat de la classe politique traditionnelle qui cherche à être élu peut ainsi choisir de faire
campagne sur une plateforme dite populiste, ou conservatrice, afin de faire croire aux électeurs
qu’il n’est pas soumis aux intérêts de l’ Establishment. Pour que cela se produise, il est nécessaire
qu’aux yeux des électeurs, le signal que représente le programme social des candidats quant à
leurs intentions sur le plan économique ait plus de valeur que ce que ce même programme dit
de leurs intentions sur le plan social. Cette stratégie populiste est alors d’autant plus probable
que le niveau de confiance des électeurs dans les promesses de campagne des candidats est bas,
que le coût de renier ses promesses de campagne pour un candidat est faible, et qu’il est difficile
pour les électeurs de déterminer par un autre moyen quelle politique sera menée par un candidat
une fois élu. Dans la deuxième partie de l’article, pour apportons la preuve empirique de la
proposition principale du modèle en utilisant des données d’enquête issues de plusieurs pays
européens. Nous montrons que les électeurs libéraux sur les questions sociales sont d’autant
moins sujets à une convergence idéologique avec les partis politiques et d’autant plus disposés à
voter pour des Outsiders que leur niveau de confiance envers les institutions politiques est faible.
Dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, j’étudie de quelle manière et à quel rythme les immigrés
de première génération s’adaptent aux normes et à la culture politique de leur pays hôte en
comparant leurs opinions politiques avec celles des natifs de 16 pays d’Europe occidentale. Mes
résultats indiquent qu’un processus d’assimilation important est à l’oeuvre au niveau européen
sur les questions de redistribution, des droits des homosexuels, d’élargissement de l’Union Eu-
ropéenne, de politique migratoire, et de confiance envers les institutions politiques : en moyenne,
la différence entre immigrés et natifs est réduite de 40% dans les 20 ans qui suivent l’arrivée
dans le pays d’accueil. Par ailleurs, cette assimilation concerne principalement les immigrés
originaires de pays en développement, et cette convergence en termes de préférences politiques
varie de manière importante selon l’origine ethnique, le bagage économique et culturel des
étrangers, ainsi que la taille de la communauté des personnes venues du même pays. Enfin, je
démontre qu’une part importante de l’assimilation sur les questions de droits des homosexuels,
de politique migratoire et de confiance envers les institutions politiques est liée à un processus
d’acculturation au niveau national par lequel les immigrés de première génération qui ont passé
plus de temps dans le pays d’accueil sont davantages influencés par les préférences politiques
des natifs de leur pays hôte. Mes résultats apportent un nouvel éclairage sur l’assimilation
des populations étrangères et peut ainsi contribuer indirectement à la conception des politiques
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I took an interest in political economy long before I came to study at the Toulouse School
of Economics, but it is during my first year as a doctoral student, after I read Roemer, Van
der Straeten and Lee’s book “Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution”, which investigates how
conservative politicians in the last thirty years have capitalized on voters’ resentment of ethnic
minorities to win votes and undermine government aid to the poor, that I made the decision
to select immigration as a research topic. Immigration undoubtedly plays a crucial role in the
politics of modern states, but it has also been studied extensively by scientists from various
disciplines. In this context, my research asks questions that have not been answered yet by
the economic literature and with the potential to further our understanding of multi-cultural
contemporary societies. More specifically, Chapter 1 and 3 of this thesis deal with the political
integration and assimilation of foreign-born immigrants. In those chapters, I study respectively
public opinion on the right of foreigners to vote, and the opinion gap between first-generation
immigrants and European natives on several policy issues. The second chapter of this disserta-
tion had a somewhat different start. A year and a half into my PhD, I had the opportunity to
meet and collaborate with Professor Paul Seabright, who was in the first stage of a project on
the roots of populism. The topic may seem a bit at odds with the other two chapters of this
thesis. Yet, it has an important connection with them. In our joint work, we study the rise of
social outsiders - often referred to as populists -, on the far right of the political spectrum, whose
offensive behaviour and socially radical platforms are commonly associated with anti-immigrant
rhetoric.
All three chapters of this dissertation therefore study the political changes that affect the scope,
shape, and directions of the political life of European countries. They are presented hereafter
in chronological order from the moment of their inception.
Chapter 1 examines public opinion about the enfranchisement of foreign residents. Today,
a large share of the population remains fully or partially disenfranchised in countries where
many residents are non-citizens. Given the moral and economic shortcomings of a democratic
government where only a fraction of taxpayers have political representation, it is important to
understand the conditions under which voting rights are transferred to foreigners. At the same
time, when enfranchised, foreign residents have the potential to directly shape the future tax
and transfer systems chosen by governments, and the consequences of their enfranchisement is
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therefore highly relevant for public life and a sensitive issue for receiving communities. In this
chapter, I propose a model where natives’ opinion about foreigners’ political rights is influenced
by the consequences of these political rights on redistribution policies. The main contribution of
the theoretical analysis is to characterize the conditions under which natives support political
rights and the extent of this support when preferences for redistribution are determined by
individual skill level and cultural beliefs about public spending. This chapter also contains
empirical evidence in favour of the predictions of the model based on municipal-level data
collected from several Swiss cantons. More specifically, my results indicate that municipalities
where a higher share of natives received social transfers were more likely to support immigrant
voting and that this effect was greater where foreigners were poorer and emigrated from less
economically conservative countries.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Paul Seabright, analyzes political distrust as a key driver of pop-
ulism. The starting point for this project was to try and understand why voters belonging to
certain ethnic or gender groups might vote for candidates who behave offensively towards those
groups, such as the 53% of white women and 33% of Latino men who voted for Donald Trump
in the 2016 US Presidential election. In our paper, we propose an alternative explanation in
contrast with the conventional answer that the voters who behave in this way are those who do
not place very much weight on the extreme ideology or the offensive behavior. Instead, voters
who do not personally like an extreme ideology or an offensive kind of behavior may vote for
a candidate because of the ideology or behavior and not in spite of it when the willingness to
display the ideology or behavior is a signal to the voters that the candidate has other qualities
the voters value. We build a game-theory model in which these outsiders are perceived as more
likely than Establishment candidates to implement economic policies that are congruent with
voters’ interests. Our theoretical analysis predicts that a populist strategy is more likely when
voters’ trust in economic and social policy announcements is low, when the cost for candidates
of breaking campaign promises once elected is low, and when there exist few alternative ways
for the voters to evaluate the likelihood that the candidate will implement policies that run
counter to the interests of the Establishment. In an empirical section, we also provide sugges-
tive evidence for Proposition 1 of the model that liberal voters are less sensitive to ideological
convergence with political parties, and thus more likely to vote for social outsiders, when they
have lower levels of trust in politicians. We use the European Social Survey to collect informa-
tion about individual characteristics and voting behaviour, and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
data to identify social outsider parties. Focusing our attention on middle-of-the-spectrum voters
- i.e, socially moderate voters who do not espouse the same extreme ideologies as social outsider
parties, we show that the negative effect of social distance is substantially decreased among
those with lower levels of trust in political parties.
Chapter 3 contributes along with Chapter 1 to the study of concerns among public opinion and
political pressures associated with immigration flows. The overall aim of the paper is to provide
some insight into the political bloc that immigrant voters represent. To do this, I conduct an
empirical study of the political assimilation of first-generation immigrants in their host societies
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using data from several rounds of the European Social Survey. The main specificity of this
work is its dynamic approach, where I describe the adjustment of immigrants’ political and
policy preferences to European norms with the time spent in their host country. I find strong
assimilation of first-generation immigrants to European natives’ standards: On matters of redis-
tribution, gay rights, attitudes towards the European Union, immigration policy, and political
trust, the opinion gap between natives and immigrants is reduced by half within 20 years of
residence in the destination country. I also provide evidence that most of this assimilation is
driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, and that convergence in political prefer-
ences varies significantly across immigrants’ economic and cultural background as well as with
the size of the immigrant group from their country of origin. Finally, I show that a substantial
part of assimilation on gay rights, immigration and political trust is driven by acculturation
at the national level where immigrants with longer tenure tend to adapt more to the political
preferences of natives in their destination country.
10
Chapter 1
Taxation with Representation: The




This paper examines natives’ decision to grant political rights to foreign residents based on
their contribution to a redistribution mechanism that finances a private and a public good.
I propose a model where agents’ redistributive preferences are determined by their skill level
and cultural beliefs about public spending, which vary across nationalities. In contrast with
a standard prediction of political economy theory, I show that low-skill natives are willing to
enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as these foreigners have sufficiently liberal beliefs
towards public spending. Moreover, I establish that the political rights that low-skill natives
are prepared to grant to foreign residents is a non-monotonic function of immigration’s skill
level and cultural taste for public expenditure. In particular, low-skill natives favor greater
political integration for less-skilled or more liberal foreigners if and only if these foreigners’
average relative preferences for the private and the public good are sufficiently close to their
own. I provide empirical support for some of the theoretical predictions of the model using
an original municipality-level dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. My
results indicate that municipalities where a higher share of natives received social transfers were
more likely to support immigrant voting and that this effect was greater where foreigners were
poorer and emigrated from less economically conservative countries.
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1.1 Introduction
Recent history suggests that immigration plays a crucial role in the politics of modern welfare
states. An important, yet commonly overlooked aspect of this matter regards the consequences
of foreigners’ enfranchisement. When foreign residents are granted the right to vote, they have
the potential to directly shape the future tax and transfer systems chosen by governments,
which in turn face key political decisions about these voting rights. Against this backdrop, a
quick look at the data reveals that while improving from a historical perspective, foreigners’
political participation remains an area of weakness for integration policy. A growing number
of states have enfranchised foreign residents at the local level over the past decades1, but only
a handful of them grant foreigners the right to vote in national elections.2 Moreover, the
residence requirements to become eligible for naturalization amongst OECD countries range
from 3 years in Canada to 15 in Lithuania, leaving a large share of the population fully or
partially disenfranchised in countries where many residents are non-citizens. Given the moral
and economic shortcomings of a democratic government where only a fraction of taxpayers have
political representation, it is important to understand the conditions under which voting rights
are transferred to foreigners.
In this paper, I argue that the consequences of foreigners’ voting rights on redistribution policies
is a critical driver of natives’ attitudes towards the political integration of foreign residents. The
literature already provides a rich theoretical insight into the relationship between natives’ fiscal
concerns and immigrants’ political participation (see for instance Razin, 2002; Dolmas, 2004;
Mayr, 2007; Ortega, 2010; Mariani, 2013). However, these works suffer from two main caveats.
First, they assume that the implications of foreigners’ political rights are limited to matters
of income redistribution, and therefore fail to account for the fact that political choices may
reflect individual preferences about both the size and the composition of public spending. In-
deed, public social spending and income redistribution - individual cash benefits, direct in-kind
provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes - represent less than 40%
of EU government expenditures on average, while a more significant share of these expenditures
finances public goods and services that benefit society as a whole, or large parts of society.
In the paper, I choose to distinguish between public spending on private and public goods to
understand how the enfranchisement of foreign residents can influence a country’s spending
policy. A second major assumption of my theoretical analysis which is absent from previous
studies is that individuals’ redistributive preferences are largely determined by cultural beliefs
about public spending. The empirical literature has showed that economic welfare alone cannot
explain individual preferences for redistribution and that culture plays a very significant part
in driving these preferences (see for instance Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). More specifically,
immigrants’ views about public spending are strongly affected by preferences in their country
1In spite of considerable variation in the content of these voting rights (Earnest, 2015), over 60 countries in the
world granted local voting rights to their non-citizen residents as of 2012. This figure includes the enfranchisement
of EU-citizens in EU member countries under the Treaty of Maastricht.
2These countries are Uruguay New-Zealand, Chile, and Malawi.
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of birth, regardless of the economic context and sometimes decades after individuals emigrated
to their residence country (Luttmer et al., 2011). In this context, a political economy approach
to the enfranchisement of foreign-born residents should look into the redistributive implications
of immigrants’ cultural beliefs.3
In my model, I therefore account for both economic and cultural drivers of preferences for redis-
tribution and examine the incentives for domestic voters to support foreigners’ political rights
in an environment where the voting outcome reflects preferences for welfare transfers and the
provision of a public good.
I find that low-skill natives are more likely to grant political rights to foreign residents when
these foreigners are poorer and have greater cultural preferences for public spending. In par-
ticular, contrary to the commonly held view in the political economy literature that low-skill
natives would only support the enfranchisement of foreigners if they are poorer than natives
on average, I show that they are willing to enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as
these foreigners have sufficiently liberal beliefs towards public spending. Moreover, I establish
that the level of political integration that low-skill natives are prepared to grant to foreign res-
idents is a non-monotonic function of immigration’s skill level and cultural support for public
expenditure. Rather, low-skill natives favor greater political integration for less-skilled or more
liberal foreigners if and only if these foreigners’ average relative preferences for the private and
the public good are sufficiently close to their own.
This paper also contributes to the applied economic literature on the determinants of foreign-
ers’ enfranchisement by testing the predictions of the model using an original, municipality-level
dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. I proxy the skill level of natives and
foreigners using the share of welfare-dependent individuals and predict foreigners’ cultural be-
liefs about public spending at the municipal level with the average preferences in their country
of origin. I show that, consistently with the model’s predictions, municipalities where a greater
share of natives received social transfers were more likely to support immigrant voting, and
that this effect was greater where foreigners were poorer and emigrated from less economically
conservative countries.
My paper therefore adds to the political economy literature by proposing a new theoretical
framework and supporting empirical evidence to explore natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’
enfranchisement. It should be stressed that my approach represents only one possible way to
3More generally, cultural proximity between natives and foreigners is also a powerful enabler of integration.
In many countries, naturalization tests assess the desire to assimilate and the extent to which candidates to
naturalization respect and sometimes espouse the views and traditions of their country of residence. At the
European level, Portugal, the UK, and Spain have signed bilateral agreements with countries that they consider
culturally close to them and grant foreign residents from these countries the right to vote in local elections -
Brazil and Portugal, Spain and various Latin American countries, as well as England with several members of
the Commonwealth -. Such positive discrimination holds more generally across Europe under Article 22 of the
European Union, which grants exclusive local voting rights to citizens from fellow EU member countries.
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sketch conflicting political preferences between natives and foreign residents when addressing the
issue of foreign political participation. Also, I am aware that most immigrants often self-select
into naturalization or political integration, and that these policies can sometimes lead to sizable
economic perturbations which affect immigrants’ productivity and skill level. I leave those as
well as non-economic considerations outside of the model. In spite of these shortcomings, this
paper is the first to propose a theory of enfranchisement which builds on a two-dimensional, re-
alistic approach of redistribution, and accounts for cultural divergence in individual preferences
for redistribution.
This work is related to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the theoretical po-
litical economy literature on redistribution pioneered by Metzler and Richard (1981). Recent
work in this field presents various models linking immigration and income redistribution. In
some of these models, redistribution is endogenously determined while immigration is taken as
exogenous. Immigrants then influence redistributive outcomes through economic channels such
as labour market competition or fiscal leakage, and by adding to the size of different interest
groups, changing the political constituency of the native population (See Razin et al., 2002;
Dolmas and Huffman 2004; Roemer and Van der Straeten, 2006). For example, the median
voter model developed by Dolmas and Huffman finds that admitting poor immigrants that can
vote does not necessarily imply higher redistribution and may lead to a lower tax rate if the
fiscal leakage effect dominates the political effect on the position of the median voter in the
income distribution. A more recent strand of this literature studies the effect of varying po-
litical institutions and citizenship rules in a setting where immigration is endogenous. Ortega
(2010) presents a dynamic model where voters choose the degree of income redistribution in
addition to immigration policy under three citizenship regimes, and find that income redistri-
bution can be sustained indefinitely under permanent migration and jus soli. Romero et al.
(2016) investigates the attitudes of natives with different skill level towards immigrants based
on their impact on wages, tax collection and the quality of the public good. They find that the
higher the political weight of the rich, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward
immigration and the more demanding toward increasing public spending. Closer to my work,
two papers analyze more specifically the economic drivers of naturalization policies and the
incentives for native citizens to grant political rights to foreigners. Mayr (2007) examines the
effect of immigration on income redistribution via majority voting where the skill composition
of immigrants is endogenous and depends negatively on the income tax. She finds that natives
are at best indifferent towards immigrant voting and may be opposed to it when the native
majority is not too strong. On the other hand, Mariani (2013) inquires about the timing of
naturalization policies for immigrants whose values and political preferences are different from
natives.
My paper is also related to the broader political economy literature studying enfranchisement.
The issue of franchise extension has received considerable attention, with theoretical contri-
butions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby
(2005), and Jack and Lagunoff (2006). An interesting empirical counterpart to these works
is Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010), in which the authors assemble a large, comprehensive cross-
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country panel of citizenship laws and estimate the determinants of whether a country grants
citizenship based on bloodline (jus sanguinis), birth place (jus soli), or has a mixed regime.
Within this body of research, my paper is most related to the recent attempts to measure the
consequences of enfranchisement on redistribution and the size of the welfare state. In this
regard, recent work by Bertocchi (2011) finds that women’s suffrage increased the size of gov-
ernment over the 1870-1930 period in non-catholic countries. Abrams and Settle (1999) show
that women suffrage raised the overall size of the Swiss government, and that this occurred
through welfare spending but not government consumption. As my paper deals not only with
the size but also the composition of public spending, I should also mention the empirical work
of Funk and Gathmann (2005). They find larger differences regarding the scope rather than the
size of government at the cantonal level in Switzerland as a result of gender-specific preferences
for redistribution. To the best of my knowledge, few empirical papers investigate the causes
and consequences of franchise extension towards foreigners. One exception is Vernby (2013),
who shows that the effect of local enfranchisement of non-citizens on public spending policy was
large, causing spending on education and social and family services to increase substantially in
Swedish municipalities where foreigners made up a significant share of the electorate. Another
notable work by Stutzer and Slotwinski (2019) looks at power-sharing in the Swiss cantons of
Grisons and Zurich. They show that enfranchisement is less likely in municipalities with larger
shares of resident foreigners and a large language or cultural minority. I am also aware of a re-
cent unpublished manuscript by Koukal et al. (2019) which studies the willingness of natives to
enfranchise foreigners at the municipal level based on the same data on Swiss referenda as I use
in my paper. However, my focus is different since I am using this data to test specific economic
hypotheses based on a redistribution mechanism for which I provide theoretical intuition.
Third, my paper is related to the empirical literature studying the role of immigration in pol-
itics. A first strand of this literature explores individual attitudes towards immigration based
on theories of labour market competition (Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hain-
mueller and Hiscox, 2007) and fiscal leakage (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hanson et al., 2007).
It provides mixed evidence for both of these theories and suggests that the relative skill level
of immigrants does not necessarily plays out in the direction predicted by political economy
models. Another series of papers focus on the effect of the size and the skill level of immigration
flows on the political landscape of developed countries in terms of electoral behaviour (Otto
and Steinhardt (2014), Barone et al. (2016), Brunner and Kuhn (2018), Edo et al. (2017)).
While their findings varies according to specific national contexts, a recent paper by Moriconi
et al. (2019) generalizes voting responses to immigration at the European level and finds that
larger inflows of highly educated immigrants are associated with European citizens shifting their
votes toward parties that favor expansion of the welfare state while immigration of low skilled
individuals pushed political party agendas to reduce support for the welfare state.
Finally, because culture plays a crucial role in my theoretical and empirical analysis, my paper
speaks to the literature on the impact of culture on redistribution (Verdier and Bisin (2000),
and Tirole and Benabou (2006). My work also builds largely on the findings of Luttmer (2011),
who shows that immigrants’ preferences for redistribution are strongly affected by preferences
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in their countries of birth, and in particular that immigrants from high-preference countries are
more likely to vote for more pro-redistribution parties.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 solves the model
and analyzes redistributive policy preferences with and without immigrant voting. Section
1.4 studies natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’ political rights. Section 1.5 empirically tests
the predictions of the model, and section 1.6 concludes. Tables and proofs are located in the
Appendix.
1.2 Model
I consider a closed economy with a native population whose size N is normalized to 1 and an
immigrant population with size M < 1.4 The native population has a share λnl of low-skill
workers and 1− λnl high-skill workers, whereas the share of low-skill workers in the immigrant
population is equal to λml . I assume that foreign-born residents and natives provide inelastically
one unit of labor supply to a measure 1 of firms that produce a good with the linear production






l ))yh, with skill-specific wages yl < yh.
5 In this
economy, redistribution is financed via a proportional tax on wages at rate τ . The tax proceeds
G = τY are then used to finance a private transfer t to the exclusive benefit of low-skill workers
and a public good g in proportion µ (resp. 1− µ), such that the government budget constraint
writes τY = (λnl +Mλ
m








g = (1− µ)τY. (1.2)
I define the utility of an individual with skill i ∈ {l, h} and nationality j ∈ {n,m} as
ui,j = ln(ci) + α
j
i ln(g), (1.3)
where the benefits of redistribution vary across income class and nationality. Private consump-
tion writes cl = (1− τ)yl + t for low-skill workers, and ch = (1− τ)yh for high-skill ones. Only
low-skill agents receive the private transfer, which aggregates all cash expenditures paid out to
lower-income agents for welfare and social assistance purposes. On the other hand, αji ≥ 0 is an
4In what follows, I will refer to either immigrants or foreigners interchangeably.
5Our results would not be affected by assuming a non-linear production function and a labour market com-
petition effect on wages yl and yh. Indeed, as we shall see later in the paper, although income inequalities affect
the redistributive preferences of agents in my model, my main predictions do not depend on the level of wages,
neither in absolute nor in relative terms.
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income and nationality-specific taste parameter for the public good g, where αji = ψjαi. This
composite public good combines a variety of public expenditures including general public ser-
vices, environmental protection, defense and justice expenditures, and economic and financial
affairs which benefit all residents equally regardless of their skills and nationality. Moreover,
this public good covers public services to which skilled natives may prefer privately funded al-
ternatives, such as healthcare, education, housing and community amenities, leading to a lower
overall valuation of these goods for high-skill than low-skill workers (0 < αh < αl < 1). Also,
because individual preferences about the role of government in the provision of public goods
and services are to some extent the product of a national and cultural heritage beside economic
determinants, I make the assumption that the taste for the public good varies across nationality




Political rights w ∈ [0, 1] are modeled as a continuous variable to capture the various degrees
through which foreigners are able to gain political influence. Although political participation is
often understood as the right to vote and exercise electoral rights, there exist several distinct
ways to influence political decisions. I therefore propose a broader definition of political rights
which encompasses all political liberties and opportunities to participate in democratic life7.
Those include the presence of immigrant organisations and local consultative bodies, the right
to partake in political activism, lobbying and protesting, the right to vote in local, regional,
or national elections, and the whole set of criteria that governs access to citizenship and nat-
uralization, which are both sufficient conditions for immigrants to participate in the political
process. Alternatively, the variable w can be interpreted as the share of foreign residents in a
country which are entitled to political rights based on their duration of residence.8
Finally, the redistributive policy σ = (τ, µ) determines the size and composition of public
spending in the economy. This policy σ is the outcome of a political process described by
probabilistic voting in its simplest form (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000), where all types of
agents, whether natives or foreigners, have the same ideological dispersion towards a candidate
and the relative political weight of foreigners is equal to w. The redistributive policy outcome
therefore maximizes the following social welfare function:
W
(τ,µ)
= λnl ul,n + (1− λ
n
l )uh,n + wM(λ
m
l ul,m + (1− λ
m
l )uh,m) (1.4)
subject to the budget constraint: τY = (λnl +Mλ
n
m)t(τ, µ) + g(τ, µ), with (τ, µ) ∈ [0, 1]
2.
6The upper bound on ψj makes sure that public good consumption is valued less than or as much as private
consumption ( αji < 1 fo any (i, j) ∈ {l, h} × {n,m}). However, in practice, my results would hold if I were to
relax this assumption.
7This approach mirrors the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a set of over 160 policy indicators
describing migrants opportunities to participate in society in several countries.




1.3.1 Preferences for redistribution
Before solving for the redistributive equilibrium with and without foreigners’ political rights,
I look at individual preferences over τ and µ. Let γ = yh
yl





l and Lh = 1 + M − Ll the total low-skill (resp. high-skill) labour force in
the economy, and Fl =
ylLl
Y
the share of output produced by low-skill workers. The policy
preferences σ∗i,j of an individual with skill level i ∈ {l, h} and nationality j ∈ {n,m} are then

















where tl = t and th = 0.
Turning first to the spending policy, notice that a greater µ is equivalent in my model to spend-
ing more on private transfers. As a result, the benefit from spending more tax proceeds on
private transfers is represented by the positive term ti
µci
while the benefit from spending more




1−µ , which is negative. Notice also that because




1−µ and is always
trivially negative for high-skill agents regardless of the amount of income taxation in the econ-
omy. For low-skill workers, on the other hand, the marginal benefit of increasing the share of









Moving now to the tax-rate policy, the first term on the LHS of (1.6) corresponds to the net
gains from income redistribution. For high-skill workers, this simplifies to − 11−τ and is always
negative because they do no benefit from any private transfers. For low-skill workers, the first




, and the net gains from income redistribution are
positive provided µ > Fl, i.e when the spending policy redistributes a sufficiently high share






always positive and captures the marginal benefit of increasing public good provision through
a higher labour income tax for a given share µ spent on the financing of public goods.
As a result, the policy mix preferred by high-skill workers is trivial, so that µ∗h,j(τ) = 0 for any






for any µ ∈ [0, 1).10 Low-skill workers’ relative redistributive
9The strict quasi-concavity of u in both τ and µ is trivially satisfied.
10Note that τ∗h,j is in fact discontinuous at µ = 1, where τ
∗







because skilled individuals want
no redistribution at all when the tax proceeds finance exclusively private transfers. In the rest of the paper, I
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preferences, on the other hand, depend on the relative value of τ and µ. More specifically, when
τ < 1, i.e under partial redistribution, low-skill workers’ preferred spending policy µ∗l,j(τ) is an
increasing function of τ because the provision of public goods depends entirely on government
redistribution while individuals enjoy private good consumption in the form of labour income.
Therefore, when tax proceeds are smaller, a higher share of them must finance the public good in
order to ensure a minimal level of provision. Also, when the share of tax proceeds financing pri-
vate transfers µ is smaller than Fl
1+αj
l
, low-skill workers prefer partial redistribution (τ∗l,j(µ) < 1)
and their preferred tax rate τ∗l,j(µ) is an increasing function of µ. First, recall from the ex-
pression of (1.6) that when the share of government spending financing private transfers is low
enough, the net gains from income redistribution for low-skill workers are negative11, so that
increasing the tax-rate will decrease their private consumption. Thus, when µ is such that the
cost of a marginally higher τ on private consumption exceeds its marginal benefit from increas-
ing the provision of public good, low-skill workers prefer an interior solution τ∗l,j . Moreover, as
µ increases, the net marginal benefit from income redistribution increases as a greater share of
tax proceeds finances private transfers, while the marginal benefit from increasing public good
provision through a greater tax-rate remains constant12. Therefore, τ∗l,j(µ) increases with µ.
The former discussion is summarized in Lemma 1:






and µ∗h,j(τ) = 0. Moreover, µ
∗











, then τ∗l,j(µ) = 1,
and τ∗l,j(µ) < 1 and increases with µ otherwise.
I can also derive from FOCs (1.5) and (1.6) the bliss points of each type of agents in the economy.
In the absence of a distortionary effect of taxation, low-skill workers (resp. foreigners) prefer
that all labour income is redistributed and that government spending finances the public good
based on their relative taste for both goods, i.e such that the marginal benefit from consuming
public and private goods is identical under full redistribution (when τ = 1). On the other hand,
we already know from what precedes that high-skill workers prefer that redistribution finances







low-skill worker will always prefer a strictly higher tax rate τ and a weakly greater spending






















does not depend on µ.
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i,j) of an agent of skill i ∈ {l, h} and








































Individual policy preferences are corner solutions and are not affected by the size or the skill
composition of the native and foreign populations. Figure 1.1 below graphs the preferred policy
pair σ∗l,j and σ
∗




h in the policy space (τ, µ). The utility-
improving set of low-skill and high-skill workers is respectively located to the north-east and
the south-west of ICjl and IC
j
h, and the grey areas capture the parameter space over which the
indifference curve of high-skill workers, low-skill workers or both has a positive slope. Because






and they do not want redistribution to
finance private transfers, they will prefer to trade a lower tax-rate against a spending policy













, and downward sloping
otherwise. For low-skill workers, the grey zone on the right hand side of Fig. 1.1 corresponds
to the parameter space where (i) the spending policy µ is such that the net gains from income
redistribution are positive (analytically, both terms on the LHS of (1.6) are positive) and (ii)
the marginal benefit of spending more tax proceeds on public good provision is greater than the
marginal benefit of spending more on private transfers (the LHS of (1.5) is negative). For any
policy pair (τ, µ) located in this space, there is under-provision of public goods and low-skill
workers prefer a greater income-tax and that a greater share of tax proceeds finances the public
good. On the contrary, when the net marginal cost of labour taxation on private consumption
outweighs the marginal benefit from increasing public good provision through a greater tax-rate
(analytically, this is the case when the LHS of (1.6) is negative), low-skill workers benefit from
a reduction in the income tax and a greater share of tax proceeds financing private transfers.
This is represented by the grey zone in the upper left corner of Fig. 1.1 Finally, the white
zone in the middle corresponds to the parameter space where the policy pair (τ, µ) is such that
low-skill workers’ utility increases with τ and µ.
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I now turn to the preferences of workers based on their nationality j ∈ {n,m}. Analyzing the
redistributive policy preferred by natives and immigrants separately provides a more intuitive
grasp of the underlying mechanisms driving natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement. To do
this, I first describe in the next section the redistributive political equilibrium when only natives
have the right to vote.
1.3.2 Redistributive equilibrium without foreign voting
In this section, I characterize natives’ preferences by looking at the political outcome when
foreigners have economic rights but are excluded from the franchise (w = 0). The political
equilibrium defined in Section 1.2 then maximizes a weighted social welfare function where the
weight of each skill group of natives is equal to their share of the population. Let σn = (τn, µn)
be the policy pair solution to
max
σ
W = λnl ul,n(σ) + (1− λ
n
l )uh,n(σ)











































13The strict quasi-concavity of Wn in both τn and µn is trivially satisfied.
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where αn = ψn
[




is the average taste for the public good among natives.
First, notice that under my simple probabilistic voting framework, the political weight of the
low-skill group corresponds to the share of low-skill workers in the native population λnl . Second,
observe that the marginal benefit of a policy that spends more on private transfers will decrease




is an increasing function of γ (i.e is decreasing with income inequalities)
and the share of low-skill workers Ll in the economy. Therefore, in line with seminal models of
redistribution such as Meltzer and Richards (1981), the marginal value of income redistribution
is decreasing with the average wealth in the economy, which is captured here by Fl. A direct
consequence of this effect is that low-skill natives have less to gain from increasing the share
of public money spent on private transfers when Fl increases. In my model, this implies that
income redistribution, i.e spending more tax proceeds on private transfers, becomes relatively
less efficient and less valuable than spending those tax proceeds on the provision of public goods.
Furthermore, because only low-skill natives receive the private transfers, the marginal value of
income redistribution is always nill for high-skill natives. As a result, the social value of income
redistribution, or the value of income redistribution for society as a whole, decreases with Fl.
When the political weight of low-skill natives is too small with respect to Fl, the social value of
income redistribution becomes negative, and µn = 0.
Graphically, when λnl ≤ Fl, the redistributive equilibrium σn spends no money on private trans-




n on the contract curve
that runs from low-skill to high-skill natives’ policy preferences (the thick dark line). When
λnl = Fl, a marginal increase and a marginal decrease in µ have the same social value, and the
redistributive outcome is located at σ0n. When λ
n
l ≥ Fl, it becomes socially optimal to spend
some of the tax proceeds on private transfers, and µn > 0.
Moreover, observe that the electoral outcome σn is Pareto-optimal
14 (MRSl,n= MRSh,n) and
that the marginal rate of substitution of natives is positive at σn: The equilibrium tax-rate and
share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers is too low (resp. too high) for low-skill (resp.
high-skill) natives. Because I make the assumption that immigration is already present in the
country, the size and average wealth in the economy is fixed, and redistribution therefore boils
down to a zero-sum game between low-skill and high-skill natives. It is worth stressing that
symmetric results would hold for the redistributive preferences of foreigners σm = (τm, µm) if
the redistributive equilibrium was decided by a voting process in which only foreigners were
allowed to vote. In this regard, symmetric propositions to 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 derived hereafter
apply to the preferences of foreigners.
14This is a standard result of probabilistic voting (Coughlin (1982)
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Proposition 1.1: When λnl ≤ Fl, τn is increasing with ψn, αl and αh. When λ
n
l > Fl, τn is
increasing with αl and αh, and ψn, and µn is decreasing in ψn, αl and αh.
A greater intrinsic taste for the public good (captured through ψn, αl and αh) decreases the
share of tax proceeds financing the private transfer as natives’ relative taste for the public good
over the private good increases. Likewise, the equilibrium tax rate τn increases with ψn, αl, and
αh since natives then value the consumption of the public good more independently of their
support for income redistribution. Graphically, an increase in ψn shifts σ
∗
l,n to the left while
σ∗h,n and σ
0
n move up. As a result, the new policy equilibrium shifts up and left with the new
contract curve (see Fig 1.2.b).
Proposition 1.2: When λnl ≤ Fl, τn is increasing with λ
n
l . When λ
n
l > Fl, µn and τn are
increasing with λnl .
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I first describe what happens when λnl > Fl. The impact of an increase in the share of low-skill
natives λnl on the equilibrium policy µn goes through three distinct channels. The first one
is political: When the low-skill group has greater political weight, this pushes the spending
policy µn up as low-skill natives prefer that a greater share of tax proceeds finances private
transfers than high-skill natives (this is captured by the term λnl − Fl in the expression of µn
in (1.7)). The second and third channels are economic: A greater share of low-skill workers λnl
implies that the economy is poorer on average, and therefore that the social marginal value of
income taxation is lower, along the same intuition as the one developed in the previous section.
Therefore, µn goes down as it becomes socially optimal to spend a lower share of public funds
on private transfers. Also, because low-skill natives value the public good more than high-skill
natives (recall αl > αh), the average taste for the public good among natives will increase with
λnl : As a result, the social value of the public good increases, and µn decreases. The aggregate
impact of λnl on µn is positive because the political effect dominates the economic effect: The
additional political weight of low-skill native λnl outweighs the change in natives’ average eco-
nomic preferences.
In the same fashion, the impact of λnl on τn depends on the relative changes in the political
weight of low-skill natives with respect to the economic preferences of the native population:
When the political weight of low-skill natives λnl increases, the tax rate policy τn increases
as well because low-skill natives prefer a higher tax-rate than high-skill natives (recall that
τ∗l,n(µn) > τn > τ
∗
h,n(µn)). A greater share of low-skill workers λ
n
l also implies that the economy
is poorer on average, and therefore that the marginal social value of income taxation is lower,
which exerts a downward pressure on τn. Finally, because αl > αh, the average value of public
good for natives goes up with λnl . This increases their demand for the provision of public good
regardless of how much they value income taxation and increases τn. The effect of the two pos-
itive channels combined always dominates the adverse impact of a lower social value of income
taxation, and τn increases with λ
n
l .
When λnl ≤ Fl, the impact of λ
n
l on the equilibrium tax-rate τn only depends on the changes in
the political weight of low-skill natives and natives’ average taste for the public good. Indeed,
redistribution does not finance the private transfer (µn = 0) and therefore λ
n
l has no effect on
the social value of income redistribution. Since both of the former channels have a positive effect





Graphically, when λnl increases, σ
0
n moves up and defines a new contract curve (see Fig 1.2.c).
When λnl ≤ Fl, σn simply moves up along with this new contract curve. When λ
n
l > Fl, the
policy equilibrium σn moves in the north-west direction and shifts up and right alongside the
new contract curve.
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Proposition 1.3: γ has no effect on σn as long as λ
n
l ≤ Fl. When λ
n
l > Fl, τn and µn
increase with γ.
Income inequalities only affect σn through the average income in the economy and therefore
the social value of income redistribution. Therefore, as long as λnl ≤ Fl and redistribution
does not finance private transfers, a change in income inequalities will have no effect on the
redistributive equilibrium. On the other hand, when λnl > Fl and µn > 0, both τn and µn
will increase with income inequalities γ. The intuition is the following: Ceteris paribus, greater
income inequalities will increase the size of cash transfers received by low-skill natives. Because






), a higher γ will only affect low-skill natives’ redistributive preferences. As a
result, the marginal social value of greater income taxation increases, and τn and µn increase
as well, bringing the redistributive equilibrium closer to low-skill natives preferences.
Graphically, when γ increases, σ0n goes down and σn will move up on the contract curve towards
σ∗l,n and reach a redistributive equilibrium that features a greater tax-rate and a spending policy
that spends a greater share of tax proceeds on private transfers.
Proposition 1.4: When λnl ≤ Fl, a change in the the size (M) or the skill composition (λ
m
l )
of immigration does not alter the redistributive outcome. When λnl > Fl, µn and τn decrease
with λml . Moreover, µn and τn decrease with M if and only if immigrants are less skilled than
natives on average.
When the spending policy does not finance private transfers, the change in immigrants’ skill
composition or in the size of immigration has no effect on σn. In fact, a larger and / or a less
skilled immigration does not affect natives’ preferences for the public good but only the average
income in the economy and therefore the social value of income redistribution. As discussed
previously, when redistribution does not finance private transfers, this has no effect on the redis-
tributive equilibrium. However, when λnl > Fl, a relatively less skilled immigration implies that
the economy is poorer on average, which reduces the social value of income redistribution, and
τn and µn therefore decrease. In the same fashion, if immigrants are less skilled than natives on
average (λnl < λ
m
l ), the economy becomes poorer as more immigrants enter the country, which
has the same adverse impact on the social value of income redistribution as an increase in λml .
This leads to lower τn and µn in equilibrium. Graphically, an increase in λ
m
l or an increase in
M when λnl < λ
m
l will have the same consequences: σn will shift down and left alongside the
contract curve.
This last proposition resonates with the recent findings of the political economy literature.
More specifically, a large body of works documenting the impact of immigration on welfare
attitudes finds that natives reduce their support for income redistribution in the presence of a
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relatively low-skill immigration (see for instance Alesina et al. (2005, 2018)), and this welfare
retrenchment is often associated in the theoretical literature with two distinct channels. The
first one is cultural: Natives selectively oppose redistribution towards immigrants whom they
perceive as undeserving, which is also referred to as welfare chauvinism. The second channel
is economic, and suggests that natives decrease their support for redistribution when faced
with low-skill immigration as they expect transfers to decrease with the average income in the
economy. Proposition 1.4 above falls into the second category, as I find that both the tax-
rate and the share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers are decreasing (resp. increasing)
with the size of immigration when immigrants are on average less (resp. more) skilled than
natives.
1.3.3 Redistributive equilibrium with foreign voting
I now turn to the impact of foreigners’ enfranchisement on the redistributive equilibrium. I
first provide a graphical example in the policy space (τ, µ). In Figure 1.3, the locus of all
possible redistributive equilibria when foreigners are granted political rights is represented by
the shaded area in blue, where the outer limit of that space extends towards the contract curve of
foreigners as the size of immigrationM increases. More specifically, for a given set of preferences
σn and σm, the policy equilibrium when foreigners do not have political rights coincides with
the preferences of natives σn and moves towards σf - the policy outcome when foreigners are
granted full enfranchisement (w = 1) - along the blue segment as foreigners’ political rights
increase. The slope of this segment is equal to the marginal rate of transformation between τ
and µ with political rights, i.e the relative rate of change between the two policy variables with
w. In the rest of the paper, I normalize natives’ cultural taste for redistribution to ψn = 1 so
that ψm = ψ capture immigrants’ relative cultural preferences for public spending.





























Let σ0(w) = (τ0(w)µ0(w)) be the redistributive policy equilibrium when foreigners have political













1− λnl +Mw(1− λ
m
l )
(1 + αp(w) + wM)(1− Fl)
(1.9)
where αp(w) = αn + wMαm captures the socially weighted taste for the public good in the
economy when foreigners have political rights w.






. The share of government spending financing private transfers µ0 increases










This proposition states the condition under which the enfranchisement of foreign workers will
lead to an increase in the equilibrium tax rate τ0. Intuitively, τ0 will increase with the enfran-
chisement of foreign workers when the average preferred tax rate among foreigners is greater
than the average tax rate preferred by natives. It is also clear from what precedes that the
equilibrium tax rate τ0 is increasing with the share of low-skill workers in the economy and
the cultural taste for the provision of public good α. In relative terms, this implies that the
preferred tax rate of the average immigrant worker τm will be greater than natives’ preferred
tax rate τn when (i) the relative share of low-skill workers in the foreign population and (ii) the
relative taste of foreigners for the public good are sufficiently high, as stated by the inequality
in the first part of the proposition.
Moreover, the impact of migrants’ enfranchisement on the composition of public spending de-
pends on the relative preference for private transfers and the public good between natives and
foreigners. While a relatively greater share of low-skill foreign workers increases the demand for
private transfers and thus increases µ0, relatively stronger preferences for the public good exert
a symmetric downward pressure on the spending policy as the average worker in the franchise
values the public good more. Note that both channels depend positively on λml , and therefore
µ0 increases with w when foreigners’ cultural preferences for the public good ψ are sufficiently
low.
Figure 1.4 graphs the effect of the political rights of foreigners on redistributive policies in the
space (λml , ψ). The red shaded area corresponds to the parameter space over which τ0 is in-
creasing with w, while the grey, hatched area indicates the values of ψ and λml for which the
share of public spending on transfers µ0 is increasing.
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Proposition 2.2: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), the share of tax
proceeds spent on cash transfers µ0 increases with political rights w if foreigners are on average
less skilled than natives (λml > λ
n
l ). Moreover, when ψ ≤ 1, if the equilibrium tax rate τ0 is
increasing with w then µ0 is increasing as well:
dτ0
dw
≥ 0 ⇒ dµ0
dw
≥ 0. When foreigners are more
liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), the equilibrium tax-rate policy τ0 increases with political rights w
if foreigners are on average less skilled than natives (λml > λ
n
l ). Moreover, if µ0 is increasing
with w, then τ0 is increasing as well:
dµ0
dw
≥ 0 ⇒ dτ0
dw
≥ 0.
When foreigners have lower cultural preferences for the public good than natives, they prefer
that the government spends relatively more money on the provision of private transfers, ce-
teris paribus. Also, we know from Proposition 1.2 that a greater share of low-skill workers of
nationality j increases the share of public money spent on private transfers µj preferred by indi-
viduals of nationality j. Therefore, when foreigners are both less skilled than natives and have
intrinsically lower preferences for the public good (ψ < 1), their enfranchisement will always
lead to a weakly greater share of tax proceeds spent on the financing of private transfers µ0.
Also, because a lower taste for the public good decreases the tax-rate τj preferred by workers
of nationality j, a necessary condition for the tax rate τ0 to increase with w is that immigrants
are less-skilled than natives.
A symmetric argument can be made for the case where foreigners value the public good more
than natives (ψ > 1). It suffices then that foreigners are relatively less skilled than natives
(λml > λ
n
l ) in order for the tax-rate policy τ0 to increase with political rights w. Likewise,
because foreigners with a greater taste for the public good than natives prefer to spend fewer
tax proceeds on private transfers, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the equilibrium
policy µ0 to increase with w is that foreigners are relatively less skilled than natives.
Foreigners’ political rights can therefore influence redistribution in the four possible ways de-
picted in Figure 1.4: When the skill level of immigration is high enough ( λml < Gµ and ψ < 1
or λml < Gτ and ψ > 1), the enfranchisement of foreigners decreases both the tax-rate and the
share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers (area (1)). When foreigners have sufficiently
greater taste for the public good ( λml < Gµ and λ
m
l > Gτ ), granting foreigners political rights
lead to an increase in the size of public spending (a greater τ0) and a decrease in the share of
public spending spent on private transfers µ0 (area (2)). When the immigrants are sufficiently
unskilled and the preferences of foreigners for the public good low enough, both the tax rate and
the share of tax proceeds spent on transfers increases when foreigners are enfranchised (area
(3)). Finally, when the skill gap between immigrants and natives is small enough and foreigners
value the public good less than natives, foreigners’ enfranchisement leads to a greater share of
public spending financing private transfers µ0 and a lower tax rate τ0 (area (4)). The thick
black line represents natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement and will be discussed later in
the paper.
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Finally, because natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement depend ultimately on the impact
of political rights on the level of private consumption and public good provision through their
redistributive implications, I characterize the effect of foreigners’ political participation on c
and g. Plugging (1.8) and (1.9) into the expression of ci and g, we obtain the following level of
private consumption and public good provision at the redistributive equilibrium σ0:
ci(σ0) =









1 + wM + αp
(1.11)
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Proposition 2.3: The private consumption ci of natives with skill level i ∈ {l, h} increases
with the political rights of foreigners w if and only if λmi (1 + αn) ≥ λ
n
i (1 + αm). The level of
public good provision g increases with the political rights of foreigners w if and only if αm ≥ αn.
For low-skill natives, the net effect of political rights on private consumption is positive when
private transfers increase with w. Because only low-skill workers receive private transfers, the
political participation of foreigners leads to an increase in the size of these transfers only when
the share of low-skill immigrants λml is sufficiently high. Moreover, the impact of political rights
on redistributive policies depends not only on the skill composition of foreigners but also on
their relative cultural preferences towards public spending. In particular, foreigners choose to
increase the amount of tax proceeds and spend a greater share of those proceeds on public
good provision as ψ increases. Therefore, another condition for low-skill private consumption
and private transfers to increase with w is that foreigners’ cultural preferences towards public
spending are sufficiently low16.
The level of public good provision g will increase with political rights when the average taste for





, from which comes immediately that the effect of w on the provision of public goods
depends on the relative skill composition and the cultural preferences of foreigners. Therefore,
public good provision will increase following foreigners’ enfranchisement when αm ≥ αn, i.e
when immigrants are sufficiently unskilled and their cultural preferences for redistribution are
sufficiently high.
1.4 Attitudes towards political rights
We have seen in the previous section how the political rights of foreigners alter the redistributive
political equilibrium σ and thereby impact natives’ private and public good consumption. I
can now determine under which conditions the enfranchisement of foreigners benefits natives.
Plugging (1.10) and (1.11) into (1.3) gives the following indirect utility function for low and
high-skill natives:
Vl(w) = ln













( Y (1− λnl + (1− λ
m
l )Mw)
(1− λnl + (1− λ
m




1 + wM + αp
)
(1.13)














Lemma 3: Low and high-skill natives have single-peaked preferences in w.
The preferred level of political rights w∗i of a native with skill level i ∈ {l, h} is then obtained
by maximizing Vi over w. The FOC yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Natives have opposite views towards the political rights of foreigners: wl > 0
⇔ wh = 0.
The intuition is simple. In the absence of political rights, because the redistributive policy
outcome σn is Pareto-optimal, the marginal rate of substitution is the same for low-skill and
high-skill natives and there exists no policy deviation from σn that can improve the utility
of both groups. Therefore, natives hold conflicting, income-specific views over w. Fig. 1.5
represents graphically the locus of political redistributive equilibria σ0 for different values of
σm and ψ. Natives will prefer to grant some political rights (w
∗
i > 0) to foreigners when the
redistributive political equilibrium moves from σn into their utility-improving set. When ψ > 1
(Fig. 1.5.a), a first possibility is that foreigners’ preferences are located at σ1m, such that τ0 and
µ0 decrease with w (outcome (1) of Fig. 1.4). The redistributive equilibrium is then located
on the blue segment between σn and σ
1
m in the utility-improving set of high-skill natives. On
the other hand, both σ2m and σ
3
m represent foreign preferences under which foreigners’ polit-
ical rights would benefit low-skill natives at the margin (i.e at w = 0), respectively through
an increase in τ0 and a decrease in µ0 (σ
2
m, outcome (2)) and an increase in both τ0 and µ0
(σ3m, outcome (3)). Fig. 1.5.b represents all possible political outcomes when ψ < 1. The
case where foreigners’ preferences are located at σ1m and σ
3
m have been discussed previously.
σ4m (outcome (4)) corresponds to the fourth possible way in which foreigners’ political rights
impact the redistributive equilibrium: The tax-rate τ0 decreases while the spending policy µ
increases. The graphical example presented here is such that the enfranchisement of foreigners
benefit high-skill natives, but we will see later in the paper that this is not always the case.
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(b): Case where ψ < 1
Proposition 4: Skill i natives grant political rights w∗i > 0 to foreigners if and only if λ
m
i ≥ λi,



















h if and only if ψ ≤ 1.
The first part of Proposition 4 is rather intuitive and simply states that natives prefer to grant
foreigners political rights w∗i > 0 when immigrants with the same skill level as their own make
up a sufficiently high share of the foreign population. For low-skill natives, the redistributive
policy outcome σn is such that the tax-rate and the share of public money spent on private
transfers is too low. Therefore, they would never grant political rights to foreigners when too
many of them are skilled, as their enfranchisement would then lead to lower values of both τ0
and µ0 (see Prop 2.1). Furthermore, because low and high-skill natives have symmetric views
towards enfranchisement, high-skill natives will always grant foreigners political rights when
low-skill natives refuse to do so, and therefore support foreigners’ enfranchisement when immi-
grants are sufficiently skilled.
However, a relatively unskilled or skilled immigration alone is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for the enfranchisement of foreigners because redistributive preferences are also driven
by cultural beliefs ψ. Proposition 4 therefore predicts that the maximum (resp. minimum) skill
level for which low-skill (resp. high-skill) natives are willing to grant foreigners political rights
increases with the share of low-skill (resp. high-skill) foreigners and immigrants’ cultural pref-
erences for redistribution: When foreigners are more liberal towards public spending (ψ ≥ 1),
low-skill natives are then willing to enfranchise them even if their average skill level is greater
than natives’, i.e even if λml < λ
n
l . On the other hand, they will hold more restrictive views
towards the enfranchisement of conservative immigrants, and would only grant them political
rights under the condition that they are strictly less skilled than the native population. High-
skill natives, on the contrary, have symmetric attitudes towards immigrants’ political rights, and
would enfranchise foreigners more easily when those are less supportive of government spend-
ing. This is represented in Fig. 1.4 by the thick black line, which divides the parameter space
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between the values of λml and ψ for which natives prefer to grant political rights to foreigners.
To understand the interaction between the skill level of immigrants and their cultural prefer-
ences behind this last result, I discuss hereafter the impact of foreigners’ political rights on
private consumption and public good provision from low-skill natives’ perspective. The follow-
ing discussion should give the reader sufficient intuition to achieve a symmetric conclusion for
high-skill natives.
First, notice that low-skill natives always oppose enfranchisement when cl and g decrease with w
and always support it when both increase with w. On the other hand, a trade-off between private
and public good consumption arises when either cl or g increases and the other decreases with
w. More specifically, when foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ < 1), this trade-off
is such that private consumption increases and public good provision decreases with w (see
Prop 2.3), and low-skill natives then enfranchise foreigners (w∗l > 0) if and only if the following
inequality is satisfied:
λml (1 + αn)− λ
n








The term on the LHS of (1.14) corresponds to the relative marginal impact (or marginal rate
of transformation) of political rights on private consumption and public good provision, i.e the
ratio of the marginal effect of w on cl over its marginal impact on g at the redistributive policy
equilibrium σn, i.e when foreigners are excluded from the franchise.
17 On the other hand, the
term on the RHS captures natives’ marginal rate of substitution between c and g at σn. The
ratio αl
αn
measures the relative value of a marginal increase in g while λnl corresponds to the
marginal value of private consumption. Because utility is concave in both c and g, the relative
value of an increase in g decreases with low-skill natives’ average taste for the public good
αn and the relative value of private consumption cl decreases with the political weight of skill
low-skill natives λnl . This is because the larger these parameters are, the greater the value of g
and cl will be at σn.
When cl increases and g decreases with w, foreigners’ political participation increases low-skill
natives’ utility through higher private transfers and decreases it through lower public good pro-
vision. Low-skill natives then enfranchise foreigners when the relative marginal impact of w on
cl is sufficiently high with respect to their marginal effect on g
18.
Also, while the share of low-skill immigrants λml does not affect natives’ marginal rate of substi-
tution between cl and g at σn (the RHS of (1.14)), it increases the marginal impact of political
17The numerator is positive because cl increases with w while the denominator is positive as g decreases with
w. See Prop 2.3.
18Analytically, this is the case when the marginal impact of political rights is greater than the marginal rate
of substitution.
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rights on cl and decreases their marginal impact on g
19, which implies that the relative marginal
impact of w on cl with respect to g (the LHS of (1.14)) is increasing with λ
m
l . In particular,
when immigration is less skilled (λml is higher), the marginal impact of political rights on cl
increases with w by (1 + αn)− λ
n
l ψ(αl − αh), where the first term (1 + αn) is positive and cap-
tures the effect of the additional weight of low-skill voters supporting private transfers, while the
second term −λnl ψ(αl − αh) represents the adverse impact on private consumption of foregone
tax proceeds not financing private transfers as a result of a greater taste for the public good
among foreigners: Recall that low-skill workers value the public good more than skilled work-
ers: αl > αh, and therefore a less skilled immigration also has a greater average taste for the
public good. Incidentally, the skill composition λml has a direct effect on the marginal impact
of political rights on g, which decreases by ψ(αl − αh), as foreigners’ average preferences for
the public good increase. Therefore, the fact that low-skill workers value the public good more
than skilled workers lowers the positive marginal impact of w on private consumption cl but
also decreases the adverse marginal impact of w on g when the share of low-skill immigrants
goes up.
Besides, it is easy to check that the share of low-skill immigrants λml has a relatively greater
effect through foreigners’ cultural preferences ψ on the marginal impact of political rights on g
than it has on the marginal impact of political rights cl, since ψ(αl−αh) > λ
n
l ψ(αl−αh). When
cl increases and g decreases, this implies that the relative marginal impact of w will increase
more rapidly with λml for larger values of ψ. In other words, as λ
m
l increases, political rights
become relatively more efficient at increasing private consumption than they are at decreasing
public good provision when ψ is higher, and low-skill natives will support enfranchisement for
lower values of λml .
When ψ > 1, low-skill natives face the opposite trade-off, where private consumption decreases
and public good provision increases with w. They enfranchise foreigners if and only if the
following inequality is satisfied :
λml (1 + αn)− λ
n








Using a symmetric argument as before, a greater ψ then implies that as λml increases, political
rights will be more efficient at increasing public good provision than they are at decreasing
private consumption so that the maximum skill level for which low-skill natives are willing to
grant foreigners political rights increases with ψ.
A more general economic intuition for the previous discussion is that greater cultural taste for
redistribution and a greater share of low-skill immigrants work as complements in low-skill na-
tives’ decision to enfranchise foreigners: For a given skill level of immigration λml , a greater ψ
19The derivative of λml (1 + αn)− λ
n
l (1 + αm) with respect to λ
m
l is (1 + αn)− λ
n
l ψ(αl − αh), which is always
positive when ψ < 1, and the derivative of αn − αm with λ
m
l is −ψ(αl − αh) and always negative.
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leads, ceteris paribus, to greater tax proceeds, which can be used to finance more public good
and / or greater private transfers. On the other hand, a lower ψ leads to lower tax proceeds
and forces a trade-off between the financing of private and public goods. When ψ > 1, the fact
that foreigners have greater cultural taste for redistribution therefore creates a form of redis-
tributive slack by increasing the amount of tax proceeds so that low-skill natives may choose
to enfranchise immigrants even if those are relatively more skilled than natives on average. On
the other hand, when ψ < 1, foreigners’ more conservative views reduces the amount of tax
proceeds, which implies that immigrants must be strictly less skilled than natives for low-skill
natives to benefit from their enfranchisement.
Therefore, in my model, the skill composition of immigrants alone does not explain natives’
attitudes towards foreigners’ political participation. Rather, natives will support the enfran-
chisement of foreigners based on the combined effect of the quality of immigration and the
cultural preferences of foreigners on redistribution. In this regard, Proposition 4 establishes
a simple but original result20. It predicts that when foreigners are relatively liberal towards
public spending, low-skill natives grant political rights to richer immigrants when the aggre-
gate effect of enfranchisement on their level of public and private consumption increases their
economic welfare. Symmetrically, when foreigners are relatively conservative, high-skill natives
enfranchise poorer immigrants when their enfranchisement decreases the size of government
spending so that the utility gains from a lower tax-rate are greater than the cost of decreasing
the provision of public goods.
In what follows, I characterize the willingness of natives to grant political rights to foreigners
by looking at how w∗ varies with the exogenous parameters of the model when the optimization
problem admits an interior solution.
Proposition 5: Both low and high-skill natives’ preferred level of political rights decreases with
the size of immigration M .
In line with recent studies about natives’ attitudes toward foreigners’ political participation
(Mariani, 2013, Stutzer et al., 2019), my model predicts that a larger immigration reduces
natives’ support for political rights. In my model, the size of immigration influences natives’
preferred level of political rights only through the political weight of foreigners. Recall that
because immigration is not endogenous, redistribution is a zero-sum game. Natives therefore
only support the political rights of foreigners insofar as they contribute to bringing the pol-
icy outcome as close as possible to their own preferences. In this regard, the level of political
participation w and the size of immigration M can be regarded as perfect substitutes because
foreigners’ political weight following enfranchisement is simply the product of the size of immi-
gration and their political rights Mw. Since a larger immigration implies that the impact of
20As mentioned in the introduction, these results do not depend on income levels and inequalities and would
therefore hold under the assumption of labour market competition between natives and immigrants.
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foreigners’ enfranchisement on redistribution will be greater for a given level of political rights
w, less political rights are required to influence the equilibrium policy in natives’ most preferred
way when M is larger, and w∗ therefore decreases with M .
Proposition 6: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill natives’
preferred level of political rights w∗l increases with foreigners’ cultural preferences for redistri-
bution ψ. Moreover, w∗h increases with ψ for sufficiently low values of αm, and decreases with
ψ otherwise. When foreigners are more liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives preferred
level of political rights w∗l increases with foreigners’ cultural preferences for redistribution ψ for




First, notice that if both private consumption ci and public good provision g increase with w,
then natives will always grant foreigners full enfranchisement (w∗i = 1). On the contrary, when
both private consumption and public good provision are decreasing with political rights, natives
always oppose enfranchisement and w∗i = 0. Therefore, for any interior solution w
∗ ∈ (0, 1) to
the optimization problem of natives, it must be that either c or g increases while the other
decreases with w, and I will thus focus my attention on these two scenarios in what follows.
Second, notice that an increase in ψ implies that (i) foreigners are in favour of taxing labour
income more because a greater taste for the public good, ceteris paribus, requires higher tax
proceeds, and (ii) foreigners’ valuation of the public good αm w.r.t to private transfers increases.
In what follows, I describe the intuition behind Proposition 6 separately for low-skill natives
and high-skill natives.
When w∗l ∈ (0, 1) and foreigners are relatively conservative (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill natives’ private
consumption cl increases while public good provision g decreases with w (τ0 is decreasing and
µ0 increasing with w). Therefore, a higher ψ implies that a marginal increase in political rights
leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, i.e is such that the tax rate τ0 decreases less with w.
Second, as foreigners’ cultural views on public spending ψ improve, the spending policy µ0
puts relatively more weight on the financing of public good provision and these additional tax
proceeds are spent in a way that is better aligned with low-skill natives’ relative taste for the
public and the private good21. Therefore, by increasing the size of tax proceeds and directing
the use of public funds in a more profitable way, a larger ψ increases the marginal benefit of
political rights for low-skill natives, and w∗l increases with ψ.
When w∗l is interior and foreigners are relatively liberal (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives’ private con-
sumption cl decreases while public good provision g increases with w (τ0 is increasing and µ0
21αm increases with ψ. Therefore, when
dg
dw
< 0 and αm < αn, the gap between low-skill natives’ relative taste
for the public good αl and foreigners’ αm gets smaller as ψ increases, since we have trivially that αl > αn > αm.
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decreasing with w). As before, a higher ψ is such that a marginal increase in political rights in-
creases tax proceeds relatively more (τ0 increases more with w), which benefits low-skill natives.
However, the effect of ψ on the spending policy now depends on foreigners’ relative taste for the
public good αm. As long as αm is lower than αl, the same positive effect as before plays out:
Changes to the spending policy benefit low-skill natives because foreigners’ relative preferences
between both goods gets closer to their own as ψ increases22. Therefore, w∗l increases with ψ.
On the other hand, when ψ increases and foreigners’ valuation of the public good αm is greater
than αl, a marginal increase in w will redistribute tax proceeds according to a spending policy
that is now further away from natives’ relative preferences. An increase in ψ is then profitable
for low-skill natives as long as the positive effect on τ0 dominates the adverse impact on the
spending policy µ0. This is the case when foreigners’ average taste for the public good αm is
sufficiently close to that of low-skill natives αl. However, when αm is too high, the spending
policy channel dominates and w∗l decreases with ψ.
For high-skill natives, a symmetric reasoning applies: When foreigners are relatively liberal
(ψ ≥ 1), private consumption ch decreases while public good provision g increases with political
rights (τ0 increases and µ0 decreases with w). An increase in ψ is such that a marginal increase
in political rights leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, which decrease the marginal bene-
fit of political rights for high-skill natives as their after-tax private consumption ch decreases.
Moreover, the spending policy µ0 puts relatively more weight on the financing of public good
provision and these additional tax proceeds are spent in a way that is even further away from
high-skill natives’ relative taste for the public and the private good23. Therefore, by increasing
the tax rate and spending public funds in a less profitable way, an increase in ψ always decreases
the marginal benefit of political rights for high-skill natives, and w∗h decreases with ψ.
On the contrary, when foreigners are relatively conservative (ψ ≤ 1), private consumption ch
increases while public good provision g decreases with political rights (τ0 decreases and µ0 in-
creases with w). As is the case when ψ ≥ 1, an increase in ψ is such that a marginal increase in
political rights leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, which decreases the marginal benefit of
political rights for high-skill natives. However, these additional tax proceeds may be spent in a
way that is better aligned with high-skill natives’ relative taste for the public and the private
good: In particular, as long as foreigners’ average valuation of the public good αm is lower
than αh, an increase in ψ implies that a marginal increase in w will redistribute tax proceeds
according to a spending policy that is closer to high-skill natives’ preferences24. When this
positive impact dominates the negative tax-rate effect of ψ on the marginal impact of political
rights, an increase in ψ becomes profitable and w∗h increases with ψ.
22The gap between αl and αm gets smaller when ψ increases as long as αm is lower than αl.
23When dg
dw
> 0 and αm > αn, the gap between αh and αm gets bigger as ψ increases since we have trivially
that αh < αn < αm.
24The gap between αh and αm gets smaller as ψ increases whenever αm is lower than αh.
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Proposition 7: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill na-
tives’ preferred level of political rights w∗l increases with the share of low-skill immigrants λ
m
l .
Moreover, w∗h increases with λ
m
l for sufficiently low values of αm, and decreases otherwise.
When foreigners are more liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives preferred level of po-
litical rights w∗l increases with the share of low-skill immigrants λ
m
l for sufficiently low values
of αm, and decreases with λ
m
l otherwise. Moreover, w
∗
h always decreases with λ
m
l . Finally, if
w∗l increases with ψ, then it increases with λ
m
l . If w
∗
h increases with λ
m
l , then it increases with ψ.
The effect of an increase in λml on the marginal impact of political rights is two-fold: The
first channel through which it operates increases the share of immigrants that receive private
transfers and therefore the marginal impact of political rights on the labour income tax and
the size of private transfers. The second channel is comparable to the effect of an increase in
ψ described previously, where foreigners are in favour of taxing labour income more in order to
finance a greater taste for the public good, and their relative valuation of the public good w.r.t
to private transfers increases.
Because the former of these two channels is unambiguously profitable for low-skill natives, only





, and the intuition is the same as in Proposition 6. Low-skill
natives’ preferred level of political rights w∗l therefore increases with λ
m
l as long as foreigners’
average relative taste for the public good αm is sufficiently close to that of low-skill natives αl.
However, because λml also increases the share of immigrants that receive private transfers, the
positive effect of λml on the marginal impact of political rights on τ is greater than when ψ
increases, and the aggregate effect of λml on w
∗
l will remain positive for greater values of αm
and a larger gap between low-skill natives’ and foreigners’ relatives preferences for the public
good αl − αm.
For high-skill natives, the effect of an increase in λml on the share of immigrants that receive
private transfers has a symmetric, negative impact on w∗h. Therefore, w
∗
h may increase with λ
m
l
when αm is lower than αh, although under more restrictive conditions than those of Proposition
6.
The comparative statics presented in Propositions 6 and 7 therefore provide a set of original pre-
dictions about natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’ political rights. I find that low-skill natives’
support for enfranchisement is not monotonically increasing in the share of low-skill immigrants
or the cultural preferences of immigrants for public spending. Because redistribution operates
through two distinct policies - τ and µ - to finance a private and a public good, natives’ relative
taste between both goods is a critical driver of their attitudes towards enfranchisement. More
specifically, when foreigners’ skill composition and economic conservatism are such that their
average relative preference for the public good over the private good is too high with respect
to natives’, a higher share of low-skill immigrants or more pro-redistribution beliefs decrease
the marginal benefit of foreigners’ political rights for low-skill natives: The marginal utility
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cost of spending a higher share of government funds on public goods is too high relative to the
marginal utility gains from immigrants helping to increase the size of tax proceeds. Low-skill
natives thus support lower levels of political participation despite immigrants being more lib-
eral and less skilled than the native population. On the contrary, high-skill natives can support
greater political rights for less skilled foreigners if increasing the share of low-skill immigrants
compensates for relatively conservative views about public spending. The marginal utility cost
of taxing skilled natives’ labour income is then sufficiently low relative to the marginal utility
gains from immigrants helping to spend more on public goods, which can only be financed via
government redistribution. High-skill natives then support higher levels of political participa-
tion even though immigrants are more liberal and less skilled than natives.
In the next and final section of the paper, I test the predictions of the model regarding low-skill
natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’ political rights.
1.5 Empirical analysis
1.5.1 Local voting rights in Switzerland
In this section, I provide empirical support for the model using Swiss municipal data. I choose
Switzerland as a case study because of its unique political institutions. First, Switzerland is a
country where a significant level of financial and political autonomy is delegated to subnational
levels of government, either regional (Canton) or municipal (Communes). Under the laws of
the Federal Constitution, cantons have extensive powers to enact their own legislation and in
particular extend voting rights to foreign nationals in cantonal and municipal elections. In
practice, while most cantons do not enfranchise their foreign residents, between 1990 and 2014,
over 30 regional referenda asked Swiss citizens from 14 different cantons their opinions about
enfranchising foreign residents25. Although most of these referenda were bundled into a process
of broader constitutional revision, a few of them asked citizens specifically it they wanted to
grant political rights to foreign residents. Moreover, due to a high level of decentralization,
local authorities in Switzerland enjoy a significant amount of financial responsibilities: Can-
tons and municipalities are jointly responsible for the implementation and financing of welfare
programmes. While municipalities are statutorily required to provide social assistance to poor
residents subject to a binding minimum standard under the cantonal law, local administrations
nevertheless retain some control over the final level of distributed cash benefits. Municipalities
also have control over various policy areas such as healthcare, primary and secondary education,
environmental issues, order and security, public administration, financial and economic affairs,
to which they allocate the remainder of their budget26. The delegation of substantial financial
responsibilities to local authorities comes with significant tax autonomy: Swiss municipalities
have the ability to collect taxes on personal income and wealth (concurrently with the cantonal
25”Pour la participation politique des etrangers au niveau local”, Adler et al. 2015.
26The range and depth of their responsibilities over these various items also vary across regions.
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and federal authorities) as well as corporate profits, and thus finance a large portion of their
expenditures through their own revenues.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the opinion of Swiss voters regarding local franchise
extension was motivated by economic considerations and in particular the consequences of these
voting rights on the size and composition of local public spending, which according to my model
depends on foreigners’ relative economic position and cultural preferences. Against this back-
drop, foreigners in Switzerland as in many European countries suffer from poorer integration
into the labour market than their native counterparts, resulting in higher unemployment rates
and lower economic status. At the national level, the unemployment rate amongst foreign resi-
dents in 2010 was almost three times as high as among Swiss natives (8, 9% against 3, 3%), and
the poverty rate twice as high (21, 4 against 10, 4%). Moreover, while only one in four people
residing in Switzerland is a foreigner, they represent almost 50% of ”Aide Sociale Economique”
beneficiaries at the national level.27 This pattern holds at the regional level, where foreigners
are overrepresented amongst welfare recipients in all 26 cantons. My computations suggest
that foreigners are also poorer than natives in the vast majority of municipalities.28 Moreover,
Switzerland is a notoriously conservative country when it comes to public spending. According
to several international surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and
the European Social Survey (ESS), support for public spending in most of the countries from
which foreigners emigrated is greater than in Switzerland29.
In light of the context in which these referenda took place, the theoretical perspective adopted
in this paper has several implications. First, according to Proposition 4, low-skill natives will
support foreigners’ enfranchisement when these foreigners are relatively less skilled and hold
more liberal beliefs about public spending than natives, while high-skill natives will oppose it.30
I therefore expect support for the enfranchisement of foreigners to increase with the municipal
share of low-skill natives. In addition, Proposition 6 and 7 predict that low-skill natives’ support
for enfranchisement w∗l will increase with the share of low-skill workers λ
m
l and foreigners’ cul-
tural preferences for public spending ψ on the condition that foreigners’ relative preferences for
the public good αm are sufficiently low. In the notation of the model, αm = ψ[λ
m
l (αl−αh)+αh]
is an increasing function of λml , the share of low-skill foreigners. In Switzerland, the share of
low-skill foreigners as per the definition of my theoretical model is relatively low31, and I there-
fore assume that the previous condition is satisfied. As a result, Proposition 6 implies that an
increase in the municipal share of low-skill foreign-born residents should be associated with in-
27”Aide Social Economique” is the main social assistance scheme in Switzerland.
28Source: Federal Statistical Office, ”Statistique de l’aide sociale (SAS)”. See Appendix and Figure 1.7 for
more information.
29see the Variable section and author’s own calculations in Appendix and Table 1.7 for more detailed evidence
from the ISSP survey module on the role of government.
30This corresponds to the parameter space depicted in the upper-right corner of Figure 1.4 in Section 1.3.3,
where w∗l > 0 and w
∗
h = 0.
31I identify as low-skill workers in the model those individuals who benefit from income redistribution through
publicly funded cash transfers. In practice, only 6% of foreign-born workers receive such transfers in Switzerland.
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creased support for enfranchisement among low-skill natives. Likewise, according to Proposition
7, I expect the support for foreigners’ enfranchisement among low-skill natives to increase when
foreigners residing in the same municipality have more liberal views about the role of govern-
ment in the provision of public goods. In order to examine these predictions, I proxy the share
of low-skill native voters and foreigners using the share of individuals receiving cash transfers in
the population. I also build an index of economic conservatism based on the average preferences
for public spending in immigrants’ origin countries as a measure of pro-redistribution culture
among foreign residents. I then test the following hypotheses:
H1: Municipalities in which a greater share of natives received welfare benefits should be more
supportive of the enfranchisement of foreigners.
H2: Support for foreigners’ enfranchisement should increase more strongly with the share of
natives receiving welfare benefits in municipalities where a greater share of foreigners received
welfare benefits.
H3: Support for foreigners’ enfranchisement should increase more strongly with the share of
natives receiving welfare benefits in municipalities where foreigners had greater cultural prefer-
ences for public spending.
1.5.2 Data
I assemble an original dataset which combines information about municipal scores in six refer-
enda conducted between 2005 and 2014 in the Cantons of Geneva, Bern, Schaffhausen, Zurich,
Luzern, and Vaud32. I also use data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and the regional
statistical offices of various Swiss cantons to collect several economic and political variables
at the municipal level. Data on municipal parliaments were kindly provided by Pr. Andreas
Ladner.
I construct an original measure of foreigners’ relative poverty and cultural preferences for public
spending at the municipal level. To proxy the former, I estimate foreigners’ relative welfare de-
pendency, i.e the difference in the share of welfare-dependent residents in the native and foreign
population. I focus specifically on individuals who receive cash transfers under the ”Aide Sociale
Economique” programme.33 Because this variable is not directly available for foreign residents
at the municipal level, I first extract the share of individuals receiving the ASE transfer for each
nationality at the regional level, and impute the share of welfare recipients at the municipal
32More information about the nature of these referenda is available in Table 1.6.
33The Aide Sociale programme is a means-tested, poverty relief programs to which low-income residents are
eligible when they are not part of any other targeted social insurance or welfare scheme.
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level according to the share of each nationality in the municipal population34.
Following Luttmer (2011), I measure the cultural preferences of foreign residents about the role
of government in the provision of public goods and services based on their country of origin.
Luttmer shows that the birth country’s cultural preferences for redistribution of a European
immigrant is a strong predictor of that immigrants’ individual taste for redistribution, and that
this effect persists for those immigrants who have lived many years, have become citizens, and
have been granted the right to vote in their country of residence. Moreover, he finds that im-
migrants from countries with a greater taste for redistribution are more likely to vote for more
pro-redistribution parties, which gives further credit to the theoretical mechanism identified in
the model whereby low-income natives support the enfranchisement of foreigners insofar as they
hope to secure greater redistribution thanks to their political influence. My variable capturing
cultural preferences is constructed using a two-step process. First, I build an international index
of economic conservatism which captures country-specific preferences for public spending. To
do this, I use survey data from three rounds of the ISSP survey (1996, 2006, and 2016), which
measure attitudes towards the role of government across countries and over time, and extract
the country-specific effect driving individual preferences towards government’s responsibility to
provide jobs and public services. Second, I compute a weighted average of foreigners’ cultural
preferences for redistribution at the municipal level by imputing scores according to the share
of each nationality in the municipal population35.
My final sample contains around 690 municipalities for which descriptive statistics are provided
in Table 1.1.
1.5.3 Empirical strategy
To examine the effect of the share of welfare-dependent natives on the willingness of a munic-
ipality to enfranchise foreigners and how this effect varies with the relative economic position
and cultural preferences of these foreigners, I fit the following model:
yij = αShare welfarei + β Zi + γ Share welfarei × Zi + δXi + µj + ǫij
where yij is the percentage of votes in favour of foreigners’ political rights in municipality i and
canton j, Share welfarei denotes the share of welfare beneficiaries in the municipal resident
34More details on the construction of this variable are available in Appendix.
35More details on the wording of the questions about attitudes towards the role of government and the con-
struction of this variable are available in Appendix. In practice, because not all countries whose nationals have
emigrated to Switzerland are surveyed by the ISSP, my index of cultural preferences for redistribution does not
cover one hundred percent of the foreign population in a municipality. I therefore restrict the final sample to
municipalities in which data on cultural redistributive preferences were available for at least 70% of the municipal
foreign population.
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population, Zi corresponds alternatively to foreigners’ cultural preferences for public spending
or their relative welfare-dependency.36 In the baseline model, I also include a set of control
variables Xi that are likely to influence the result of a referendum on foreign voting rights.
These control variables include the turnout rate and the logarithms of the population and
mean income. Since there also exist non-economic drivers of the preferences of natives toward
foreigners’ political rights, such as religion and ethnicity, I also control for the municipal share
of residents with non-European origins. Finally, I include canton dummies to capture the effect
of regional characteristics such as language or culture and the purpose of the referendum, which
was the direct implementation of foreign voting rights in some cantons but only included the
possibility of opting-in in others.37
1.5.4 Results
Column (1) of Table 1.2 shows the results of the baseline model with controls, excluding for-
eigners’ welfare dependency and economic conservatism as regressors. The coefficient for the
share of welfare recipients in a municipality is positive and significant, and suggests that a
one percent increase in the share of welfare recipients in an average municipality increases the
referendum score by 1.51 percentage points. This result provides support for hypothesis H1
that municipalities with a greater share of welfare-dependent natives are more likely to support
the enfranchisement of foreigners. This effect holds for the fuller specification in column (2),
where I add as explanatory variables the relative welfare dependency and cultural preferences
of foreigners. The coefficient for the cultural preferences of foreigners for public spending is
positive and significant, suggesting that it increases the support for the enfranchisement of
foreign residents within a municipality independently of the share of low-income residents. A
possible explanation behind this coefficient is that cultural preferences for public spending are
correlated with other cultural or social preferences that are likely to positively influence the
willingness of native residents to enfranchise foreigners. Regarding the impact of immigrants’
skill level on the effect of the share of welfare beneficiaries, the coefficient for the interaction
term in column (3) is statistically significant and has the expected positive sign, indicating that
municipalities where the share of welfare recipients is greater support foreigners’ political rights
more strongly when foreigners are relatively poorer. Likewise, the interaction term in column
(4) returns a positive and statistically significant coefficient which indicates that an increase in
the share of welfare beneficiaries will have a stronger positive effect on the support for foreigners’
enfranchisement in municipalities where foreigners have greater preferences for public spending.
This result corroborates hypothesis H3 that low-income natives will be more supportive of the
political integration of foreigners when the latter hold more liberal beliefs about redistribution
and therefore increase the size of the pro-redistribution coalition.
Turning to the control variables, my estimates suggest that richer and more ethnically homoge-
36The share of welfare beneficiaries in the resident population can be regarded as an acceptable measure of
natives’ welfare dependency as long as the relative size of the foreign population is low enough. In my final
sample, foreigners represent on average 14% of the municipal resident population.
37See Table 1.6.
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neous municipalities - in which the total share of non-European population is lower - voted more
in favour of non-citizen enfranchisement. Although not statistically significant in the baseline
regression, the negative coefficient for the share of non-EU residents is in line with the general
intuition that natives usually have more restrictive attitudes towards foreigners with different
ethnic background. To the extent that the mean income reflects the average level of education
in a municipality, the positive income coefficient could be interpreted as less hostile views about
immigration in more educated municipalities independently of the share of welfare recipients,
which represents in fine a small fraction of the population.38
My empirical findings therefore corroborate the predictions of the model. I find that munic-
ipalities where a greater share of people receive welfare transfers are more likely to support
the enfranchisement of foreigners, and that this effect is stronger when foreigners are relatively
poorer and emigrated from countries with more liberal attitudes towards public spending.
1.5.5 Robustness checks
My results are robust to alternative specifications and the inclusion of richer demographic, eco-
nomic, and political control variables. Column (1) of Table 1.3 reports the baseline coefficients
without interaction for a specification with only canton dummies as controls. Although lower
in magnitude, the coefficient for the share of welfare beneficiaries in the total population is still
highly significant. Column (2) offers an alternative measure for the share of low-skill natives,
where the share of welfare recipients is replaced by the unemployment rate at the municipal
level. The coefficient is positive and very significant, suggesting that a one percent increase
in unemployment rate in an average municipality increases the referendum score by 2.7 per-
centage points. Column (3) to (5) report significant coefficients for specifications where I use
the log of the median income and the Gini coefficient as alternative measures of municipal
wealth. Next, I run specifications that include a more comprehensive list of control variables:
I control for demographic characteristics through the relative share of school-aged population
and elders among natives and foreigners, as well as the average age of the municipal resident
population. To refine my measurement of non-economic drivers, I also include the share of
muslim individuals in the resident population and control for violations of the Federal law on
foreigners (LEtr), a legislation that contains measures on immigration of foreign individuals,
family reunification, and integration policy as well as law and order. Moreover, I consider the
possibility that natives’ decision to support foreign voting rights could be influenced by the
perceived impact of political integration on selective migration, for instance if political rights
were to affect the quantity and the quality of immigration by acting as a welfare magnet for
low-skill immigrants. I control for this channel with the net inflows of international immigrants
at the municipal level in the three years prior to the referendum. Finally, I also add a dummy
variable for whether or not the municipality has an elected municipal parliament39. The results
38This result is in line with the evidence in the literature that more educated natives are less hostile to
immigration regardless of redistribution concerns - see for instance Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010).
39In Switzerland, all municipalities elect an executive council but the decisional power when it comes to budget,
tax rates and other investment projects at the city level lies in the hands of a legislative council. While in bigger
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in Column (6) to (8) show that the coefficients remain significant and very close in magnitude
to those reported in the baseline model when I add that full set of controls. Although slightly
lower than in the baseline model (1.38), the coefficient for the share of welfare recipient - Col
(6) - remains strongly significant. Moreover, the interaction coefficients in Column (7) and (8)
suggest that the mediating effect of foreigners’ relative welfare dependency and cultural pref-
erences for public spending hardly varies with more comprehensive controls. These coefficients
are respectively 0.22 and 9.43 against 0.24 and 9.98 in the baseline model, and their level of
statistical significance remains unchanged.
I also test the robustness of the findings to the choice of sample. For example, my results are
robust to using different threshold values of the share of foreigners covered by the index of
economic conservatism preferences (Table 1.4). I also successfully test the baseline regressions
on a subsample that includes only municipalities which voted about foreign municipal voting
rights (thus excluding regional voting rights referenda) or restricted to municipalities where the
share of welfare beneficiaries was strictly greater than 0 (see Table 1.5).
1.6 Conclusion
I propose in this paper a new theoretical framework to explore the consequences of foreigners’
political rights on redistribution policy and natives’ attitudes towards non-citizen enfranchise-
ment. My model is the first to both account for economic and cultural drivers of preferences
for redistribution and distinguish between public spending on private and public goods.
I find that low-skill natives are more likely to grant political rights to foreign residents when
these foreigners are relatively less skilled and have greater cultural preferences for public spend-
ing. More specifically, contrary to the commonly held assumption in the political economy
literature that low-skill natives would only support the enfranchisement of poorer foreigners, I
show that they are willing to enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as these foreigners
have sufficiently liberal beliefs towards public spending. I also establish that the extent of the
political rights that low-skill natives are prepared to grant them is not monotonically increasing
in the share of low-skill foreigners or immigrants’ cultural taste for public expenditure. Rather,
low-skill natives favor greater political integration for less-skilled or more liberal foreigners if
and only if these foreigners’ average relative preferences for the private and the public good are
sufficiently close to their own. I also test empirically some of the predictions of the model using
an original municipality-level dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. In line
with the theoretical intuition of the model, I find that municipalities where a greater share of
natives received social transfers were more likely to support immigrant voting, and that this
effect was stronger where foreigners were poorer and emigrated from countries with stronger
redistributive preferences.
municipalities this council takes the form of an elected municipal parliament, enfranchised citizens can exercise
their right to vote on municipal budgets and policies in municipal assemblies which meet several times a year in
smaller municipalities.
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From a public policy perspective, the paper provides a richer picture of the political preferences
of native and foreign residents, and shows why immigrants’ cultural preferences about public
spending are key to understand the fiscal implications of immigration on both redistribution
and integration policies. It is therefore relevant for public life to help inform future political





Proof of Lemma 1 and 2
Lemma 1 and 2 come immediately from the expression of the FOCs.
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proposition 1.1 comes immediately from observing that τn and µn are respectively increasing
and decreasing with αl, αh, and ψn.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
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Trivial algebra proves that the RHS of (1.24) is increasing with αh when λ
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which is trivially satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Notice that dFl
dγ
≤ 0, from which we have trivially using the chain rule that dτn
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≥ 0. Moreover,




is increasing with Fl, which leads to the same result for µn
under the assumption that λnl > Fl. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
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Proof of Proposition 2.2
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> 0 (which was proved above),
we have indeed that dτ0
dw
> 0 ⇒ dµ0
dw
if ψ < 1. 
The second part of the proof (for ψ > 1) is obtained using a symmetric reasoning.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2.3 is obtained after some trivial algebra on the expression of c and g in (1.10) and
(1.11).
Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3, we must prove that V is strictly quasi-concave in w for both types of natives,
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41I only provide the proof for Vl as a symmetric reasoning can be used to obtain the result for high-skill natives.
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which is unambiguously negative. .
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the strict quasi-concavity of Vi
42, we have that w∗i > 0 if and only if the derivative of Vi
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42As in Lemma 3, we prove the Proposition for low-skill natives only.
43This comes immediately from the expression of (1.23)
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Proof of Proposition 4
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First, we prove that λi = λ
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Proof of Proposition 5
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which gives us a closed form expression of w∗i . It comes immediately from the expression of w
∗
i
in (1.51) that w∗i decreases with M . 
Proof of Proposition 6
I only prove the proposition for low-skill natives.
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which is satisfied when αm is sufficiently small.
Moreover, we have to prove that if ψ < 1, then w∗l is increasing with ψ. Recall that if w
∗
l ∈ (0, 1)
and ψ < 1, then dg
dw
≤ 0, which implies αm < αn.
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where because (1 + αn) ≤ (1 + αn + αl + αlαn) and αn ≤ αl, (1.60) is trivially satisfied. By























A symmetric reasoning allows to prove Proposition 6 for high-skill natives.
Proof of Proposition 7
I only prove the proposition for low-skill natives.
Again, Proposition 6 can be obtained applying the Implicit Function Theorem by calculating
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(1.61)
The sign of this expression has already been discussed in the proof of Prop 6., from which we
have that (1.61) is positive when ψ is sufficiently small. 
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1.7.2 Tables and figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Referendum score (% of yes) 24.34 11.18 2.36 61.6 688
Turnout (%) 42.78 11.11 15.7 77.5 688
Log population 6.98 1.18 3.87 12.86 688
Share of foreigners in tot. pop (%) 14.01 9.45 0 51.2 688
Share of non-EU foreigners (%) 19.1 10.47 0 100 688
Log mean income 10.51 0.35 9.68 12.42 688
Log median income 10.28 0.22 9.14 10.87 688
Gini coefficient 0.47 0.08 0.34 0.9 688
Average age of tot. pop. 40.56 2.5 34.34 49.98 688
Share of Muslims in tot. pop (%) 1.46 1.65 0 16.4 688
Net inflow of for. migrants (% of tot. pop.) 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.31 688
Dummy elders (for. vs natives) 0.03 0.18 0 1 688
Dummy school-aged pop. (for. vs natives) 0.35 0.48 0 1 688
Violations of the law on foreigners (/1000 inhab.) 1.56 4.35 0 50.83 688
Unemployment rate (%) 2.39 1.24 0 7.91 688
Parliament dummy 0.24 0.43 0 1 688
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. 1.73 1.45 0 8.97 688
Share of welfare benef. in foreign pop. (%) 5.64 3 0 15.18 688
Foreigners’ relative welfare dependence 4.52 2.58 -4.07 13.73 688
Foreigners’ cultural pref. for public spending 0.43 0.07 0.19 0.62 688
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Table 1.2: Main results
Yes vote [0,100]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. 1.51∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.41 -3.28∗∗
(0.32) (0.30) (0.43) (1.37)
Foreigners’ relative welfare dependency 0.19 -0.23 0.14
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16)
Foreigners’ cultural pref. for public spending 22.8∗∗∗ 18.4∗∗ 5.59
(7.45) (7.40) (8.38)
Share of welf. benef. in tot. pop. × Foreigners’ RWD 0.24∗∗∗
(0.094)
Share of welf. benef. in tot. pop. × Foreigners’ cultural pref. for PS 9.91∗∗∗
(3.04)
Share of non-EU foreigners in tot. pop. -0.057 -0.13 -0.31∗∗ -0.26∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
Log mean income 3.36∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 5.17∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗
(1.08) (1.19) (1.19) (1.18)
Log population 0.29 0.032 0.051 0.098
(0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Turnout 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
N 688 688 688 688
r2 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60
Sample includes only municipalities in which cultural preferences about redistribution are available through the
index of economic conservatism for at least 70% of the foreign population. Robust standard errors in parentheses.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Additional Robustness Checks
Yes vote [0,100]
Municipal Voting rights only Percentage of welf. benef. > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share welfare benef. 1.75∗∗∗ -0.077 -8.21∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.54 -2.60∗
(0.52) (0.67) (1.37) (0.31) (0.48) (1.47)
Foreigners’ RWD 0.33 -0.30 0.19 0.27 -0.19 0.21
(0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.17) (0.27) (0.17)
Foreigners’ cult. pref. for PS 35.4∗∗∗ 30.6∗∗∗ -2.21 25.6∗∗∗ 22.9∗∗∗ 9.61
(9.24) (9.25) (9.58) (8.05) (7.97) (9.35)
Share welfare benef. × Foreigners’ RWD 0.37∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.12) (0.10)
Share welfare benef. × Foreigners’ cult. pref. for PS 22.8∗∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗
(3.26) (3.25)
N 378 378 378 649 649 649
r2 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.61
Sample includes only municipalities for which cultural preferences about redistribution are available through the
index of economic conservatism for at least > 70% of the foreign population. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include baseline controls and canton fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Variables
Score of ’YES’ vote in referendum: Data on municipal referendum come from cantonal
offices of statistics. The voting rule in all referenda excluded foreigners from participating and
suffrage was limited to Swiss citizens. In practice, voters were asked to vote ”yes” or ”no” to
a political proposal offering to grant foreign residents local voting rights under some residency
requirements. The content of these rights can be found in Table 1.6 below.
Table 1.6: List of referendums
Canton Political rights Jurisdiction Date of referendum
Schaffhausen RV, RE, RBE MUN, CANT 2014
Zurich RV, RE, RBE MUN (opting-in) 2013
Vaud RV, RE, RBE CANT 2011
Luzern RV MUN (opting-in) 2011
Bern RV, RE, RBE MUN (opting-in) 2010
Geneva RV, RE MUN 2005
RV = Right to vote /RE = Right to elect/RBE = Right to be elected.
CANT = Canton level / MUN = Municipal level / opting-in = Possibility for municipalities to opt-in.
Log of mean / median income: Log of mean / median taxable income.
Net inflow of foreign migrants (% of tot. pop.): This variable corresponds to the ratio of
the net migratory balance (immigration - emigration) of international migrants in the three years
prior to the referendum over the total resident population in the year the referendum took place.
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Dummy elders: This dummy takes value 1 when the share of people of 65 years of age or
more is greater in the foreign population than in the native population.
Dummy education: This dummy takes value 1 when the share of school-aged people (between
3 and 16 years of age) is greater in the foreign population than in the native population.
Violations of the law on foreigners : This variable corresponds to the annual number of
registered offences against the law on foreigners (LEtr) per 1’000 inhabitants, averaged over the
three years prior to the referendum.
Municipal share of muslim residents: The share of muslims residents in the total resident
population in 2000.
Municipal share of welfare recipients: The share of individuals in the total resident pop-
ulation receiving the ”Aide Sociale Economique” transfer.
Share of welfare recipients in the resident foreign population: To construct this vari-
able, I use regional census data and several rounds of the ”Statistique de l’aide sociale (SAS)”
survey from the Federal Statistical Office to obtain the share of foreign welfare-beneficiaries
by nationality at the cantonal level, which I store under variable Welfaredeplj , expressed as
the percentage of foreign residents of nationality j receiving financial help through the Aide
Sociale programme in canton l. The share of welfare recipients at the municipal level is then
imputed according to the share of each nationality in the municipal population: For a given
municipality i in canton l, I compute the weighted share of welfare beneficiaries in the foreign





j , where the weight variable w
j
i corresponds to
share of foreigners of nationality j in municipality i.44




is obtained by taking the difference between the share of welfare
recipients in the foreign resident populationWDi and the share of welfare recipients in the total





i = 1. The average share of foreign residents for which such data are
available in my sample is 98% (w̄i > 0.98), with a minimum coverage rate of 85%. Note that the municipal share of
welfare recipients in the total resident population is directly available from federal statistical sources. Therefore,
when my proxy of the municipal share of foreign welfare recipients does not square with those federal data, I
correct for outstanding values by imputing as the share of welfare recipients in the foreign resident population
WDi the maximum possible value according to federal sources. For instance, if my proxy WDi for municipality
i is strictly greater than 0 while official data state that no individual (whether foreigner or native) received cash
transfers in that municipality, then my estimate is replaced with WDi = 0.
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resident population Share welfarei, divided by the inverse of the share of Swiss citizens in the
total resident population Nati.
Foreigners’ cultural preferences for public spending: The data come from various rounds
of the ISSP survey module on the role of government (1996, 2000, 2006) which collected in-
formation for a total of 45 countries across 132,000 individual observations. In each round,
respondents from several countries were asked to what extent they think it is the government’s
responsibility to provide jobs and public services45. In particular, individual respondents were
offered to disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or agree strongly to the
following statements:
45Some countries participated in all rounds of the survey, while other were only surveyed once.
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On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to...
• Provide a job for everyone who wants one ?
• Provide health care for the sick ?
• Provide a decent standard of living for the old ?
• Provide industry with the help it needs to grow ?
• Give financial help to university students from low-income families ?
• Provide decent housing for those who cannot afford it ?
Because these questions do not refer specifically to the government of the country that the
respondent lives in but rather ask about the state’s general responsibility, I believe that they
provide an adequate measure of individual ideological beliefs about redistribution instead of
simply capturing attitudes towards the relative level of public expenditures in the country at
the time the survey was administered. I code respondents’ answers between disagree strongly,
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or agree strongly on a five-point scale and use
the average individual scores across all six items to measure respondents’ general attitudes
towards the role of government as provider of basic public services, which I store under variable
Pref Redi. I then perform the following OLS regression on the full sample of respondents in
order to extract the country-specific effect driving economic conservatism:
Pref Redi = αWi + δt + γj
where Wi is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as age and gender
46, as well as
measures such as income and education that are meant to capture how much the individual
stands to gain or lose from greater public spending. It also includes a variable that controls for
individual trust in politicians, which is likely to influence respondents’ beliefs about the role of
government in the provision of public services. δt is a fixed effect for the date at which the survey
was administered, and captures the possible effect of the international, macro-economic context
on preferences for redistribution. Finally, the dummy variable γj measures the country effect,
i.e the extent to which living in a specific country influences individual economic conservatism.
I choose Switzerland as the reference country in the model and report the list of coefficient γ
for every country in Table 1.7. All but one country (Japan) surveyed by the ISSP appear to
entertain more liberal views than Switzerland about the role of government in the provision
of jobs and public goods. I store these country-specific scores under the variable ̂PrefCultj
to construct a weighted average of foreigners’ attitudes for public spending at the municipal
level. I attribute to every foreign resident from country j the score ̂PrefCultj of her country
46Because the ISSP questionnaire does not distinguish between native and foreign respondents, I cannot sepa-
rate the two and all respondents are therefore included in the sample. I also exclude from the sample individuals
that were younger than 18 at the time of the survey.
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of origin, which captures the average citizen’s beliefs that it is the government’s responsibility
to provide jobs and public services. I then compute the weighted average of foreigners’ relative





̂PrefCultj , where w
j






47Because the list of countries surveyed in the ISSP is not exhaustive, the share of foreign population covered
by my index varies depending on the country of origin of the foreign population across municipalities. Figure
1.9 graphs the distribution of the municipal share of foreigners for which I was able to impute redistributive
preferences
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Note on Figure 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9: The share of welfare beneficiaries is the share of individuals receiving
the Aide Sociale Economique transfer in the resident population. The relative welfare dependency of foreigners
corresponds to the difference between the estimated share of welfare beneficiaries among foreigners and the
share of welfare beneficiaries in the total resident population.
Figure 1.6: Distribution of the share of welfare beneficiaries
Figure 1.7: Distribution of foreigners’ relative welfare dependency
Notes: A positive value on the x-axis means that the share of welfare
beneficiaries is higher among foreigners than among natives.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of foreigners’ average cultural preferences for redistribution
Figure 1.9: Share of foreigners covered by index of red. preferences
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Chapter 2
Establishment and Outsiders: Can
Political Incorrectness and Social
Extremism work as a Signal of
Competence ?1
JEROME GONNOT AND PAUL SEABRIGHT
Abstract
This paper explores why voters might vote for candidates who are outsiders to the political
Establishment, and are willing to tolerate candidate characteristics they dislike. We develop
a model in which these outsiders are perceived as more likely than Establishment candidates
to implement economic policies that are congruent with voters’ interests, and voters have im-
perfect information about candidates’ type. An Establishment candidate seeking election may
therefore choose a conservative social platform for populist reasons - that is, as a way of signal-
ing independence from the interests of the Establishment. This requires that the value of social
policies as signals of future economic policy outweighs their value as signals of future social
policies. This populist strategy is more likely when voters’ trust in economic and social policy
announcements is low, when the cost for candidates of breaking campaign promises once elected
is low, and when there exist few alternative ways for the voters to evaluate the likelihood that
the candidate will implement policies that run counter to the interests of the Establishment.
Using survey data from several European countries, we also successfully test the main predic-
tion of the model that liberal voters are less sensitive to ideological convergence with political
parties, and thus more likely to vote for social outsiders, when they have lower levels of trust
in politicians.
1We are grateful to Maleke Fourati, discussions with whom inspired the idea of the paper and who provided
us with excellent advice. Paul Seabright acknowledges IAST funding from the French National Research Agency
(ANR) under the Investments for the Future (Investissements d’Avenir) program, grant ANR-17-EURE-0010.
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2.1 Introduction
Why might voters vote for political candidates who espouse extreme ideologies that the voters
themselves do not support (such as costly restrictions on personal freedom in the name of reli-
gious law)? One way to understand this is to ask a question about a phenomenon that appears
different but on closer inspection is rather similar. Why might voters belonging to certain eth-
nic or gender groups vote for candidates who behave offensively towards those groups, such as
the 53% of white women and 33% of Latino men who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 US
Presidential election? The conventional answer to both of these questions would be that the
voters who behave in this way are those do not place very much weight on the extreme ideology
or the offensive behavior. Their concerns are different, the argument goes, so that they vote for
the candidate for other reasons, in spite of the unattractive aspects of their platform or their
behavior.
In this paper we propose an alternative view. In certain circumstances, we suggest, voters who
do not personally like an extreme ideology or an offensive kind of behavior may vote for a
candidate because of the ideology or behavior and not in spite of it. Why? The answer is that
sometimes the willingness to display the ideology or behavior is a signal to the voters that the
candidate has other qualities the voters value. Most obviously this may be a signal that the
candidate is not captured by the interests of the Establishment and may therefore be trusted
more than rival candidates to enact policies that run counter to the interests of the Establish-
ment. The implied rule of inference is relatively simple. Economic platforms are cheap talk,
so you should rarely trust what a candidate promises to do. Extreme ideologies, and offensive
behavior even when this is not part of an extreme ideology, are not cheap talk, precisely because
they alienate people that members of the Establishment do not like to alienate. When you see a
candidate display such ideologies or such behavior patterns, their willingness to alienate people
is precisely what makes them attractive, since it increases the likelihood that they will enact
policies that do not favor the Establishment. If your preference for such policies exceeds your
intrinsic dislike of the ideology or the behavior, you should be more inclined to support the
candidate. An article in the New York Times of April 3rd 2018 expressed this point of view
well when it quoted a supporter of Donald Trump as follows:
“Mr. Trump’s most ardent supporters say they appreciate his willingness to criticize the corpo-
rate establishment. ‘He continues to go directly after the companies and not care about political
correctness,’ said Terry Bowman, a former Trump campaign organizer who works at a Ford
Motor parts factory in Ypsilanti, Mich. ‘He says things that a polished politician would never
say. He says things that come directly from the American worker.’”
In this paper, we examine this theory by developing a model where outsider candidates are
perceived as more congruent with (median or representative) voters’ economic interests than
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Establishment candidates. Voters do not trust candidates’ policy announcements and imper-
fectly observe candidates’ type - that is, whether or not a candidate belongs to the Establishment
-. Instead, they infer the type of candidates using social policy announcements as a signal of
their true policy intentions.
We solve our model for an election in which a liberal representative voter chooses between a
conservative outsider and a liberal Establishment candidate. The main trade-off behind her de-
cision weighs the role of social policies as signals of future economic policy against their role as
signals of future social policies. We find that there exists a political demand for social outsiders
when the credibility of economic policy announcement is sufficiently low, despite the preference
of the representative voter for liberal over conservative social policies. However, if candidates’
true social policy preferences are not easily observed, and if the cost of lying for political can-
didates is small, all candidates will claim to be conservative and the claim will lose its value.
A pooling equilibrium then emerges where the likelihood of populist strategies increases when
voters’ trust in economic policy announcement is low; when the credibility of social platforms is
low; when the political cost of reneging on social policy announcements once elected is low; and
when there exist alternative ways for the voters to evaluate the likelihood that the candidate
will implement policies that run counter to the interests of the Establishment.
In an empirical section, we also provide some suggestive evidence for Proposition 1 of the model,
that liberal voters are less sensitive to ideological convergence with political parties, and thus
more likely to vote for social outsiders, when they have lower levels of trust in politicians.
We use the European Social Survey to collect information about individual characteristics and
voting behaviour, and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data to identify social outsider parties.
Focusing our attention on middle-of-the-spectrum voters - i.e, socially moderate voters who do
not espouse the same extreme ideologies as social outsider parties, we show that the negative
effect of social distance is substantially decreased among those with lower levels of trust in
political parties.
Our paper speaks directly to the large scholarship on populism in sociology, history and po-
litical science (see Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) for a general introduction, and Gidron and
Bonikowski (2013) and Kaltwasser et al. (2017) for a recent review). In economics, Dornbusch
and Edwards (1991, 2007) discuss macroeconomic populism in Latin America as a political pro-
gramme that contains non-sustainable policies and beliefs about key elasticities that economists
tend to view as implausible. Rodrik (2018) provides a generic discussion of the recent rise of
populist parties and interprets it in the light of economic theory. Among recent theoretical
works, Acemoglu et al. (2013) develops the idea that populism arises as the consequence of
the capture of the political power and economic policies by the elite. In the same vein, Tella
and MacCulloch (2007) propose a model in which corruption by bureaucrats signals to voters
that the rich elite are not fair, and the voters, who are assumed to directly care about fairness,
react to this information by moving to the left. Before them, Alesina (1998) emphasized how
68
redistributive policies are captured by special interest groups. In addition, a number of recent
empirical works study populism’s origins in specific contexts. Becker et al. (2017) find that
areas with deprivation in terms of education, income and employment were more likely to vote
Leave in the British referendum on the European Union. On the same issue, Colantone and
Stanig (2016) show that globalization in general and import competition from China in particu-
lar are strong correlates of the Brexit vote. Their findings are line with Dorn et al. (2016), who
show in the US context that counties that were most affected by China’s entrance to the WTO
experienced an increase in the likelihood of Trump voting and political polarization. Against
this fast-growing strand of the literature on the trade and immigration origins of populism, one
of the main explanations behind the wave of populist politics in the Western World empha-
sizes voters’ lack of trust towards traditional politics and political parties to provide economic
protection and redistribution (see Muller (2016)). Our paper contributes more specifically to
the empirical literature studying the impact of trust on the demand and supply of populism
(Guiso et al. (2017), Dustmann et al. (2017), Algan et al. (2017), Inglehart and Norris (2016)).
Using individual data on voting in European countries, Guiso et al. (2017) document a link
between economic insecurity and distrust in political parties, voting for populist parties, and
low electoral participation. Dustmann et al. (2017) reach similar results, finding that distrust
in European institutions is largely explained by the poorer economic conditions of the Euro-
area countries and correlates with the populist vote. Algan et al. (2017) study the political
consequences of the Great Recession in Europe, showing that in elections after 2008 the regions
where unemployment rose saw the sharpest decline of trust in institutions and establishment
politics. In contrast, focusing on individual-level variables, Inglehart and Norris (2016) observe
that cultural variables outweigh economic ones in the decision to vote for a populist party1.
We also contribute to the sizable literature on signaling in elections. Formal models that in-
corporate the cost of betrayal and signaling concerns into the platform choice by a politician
date back to Banks (1990) and Harrington (1993). Callander and Wilkie (2007) consider sig-
naling equilibria in elections in which participating politicians have different propensities to lie
to voters about their true preferences. Kartik and McAfee (2007) have a model where some
candidates have character, which voters value in addition to campaign promises, while oth-
ers do not and are strategic, choosing their platform to maximize their probability of getting
elected. As political platforms are used to signal voters about character, strategic candidates
can therefore run on platforms which are different from the one preferred by the median voter.
Developing this idea in the context of populism, Di Tella and Rotemberg (2018) present a
model in which they show that voters can exhibit a preference for incompetent leaders when
they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal instead of bad luck. They gather
evidence from the Trump-Clinton 2016 election and show that on average, subjects primed with
the importance of competence in policy making decrease their support for Trump. A major
similarity of our work with Di Tella and Rotemberg’s is that their paper models the demand
1For a more detailed analysis on the link between cultural values and authoritarianism and populism, see
Norris and Inglehart (2019).
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for incompetent politicians because competent politicians have a higher propensity to betray
them. In our framework, we also hypothesize that social outsiders are less likely to betray
campaign promises of redistribution than Establishment candidates. Our paper also builds on
Acemoglu et al. (2013), who analyze left-wing populism with a two-period model in which an
incumbent, either corrupt or honest, faces reelection concerns, and chooses an economic policy
to signal her type to voters. In the presence of a lobby defending the interest of the rich elite,
politicians have an incentive to implement a policy to the left of that preferred by the median
voter to signal honesty. Populist policies thus emerge as a way for politicians to signal that
they will choose future policies in line with the interests of the median voter. Like Acemoglu
et al. (2013), we assume that politicians need to campaign on platforms that are not those
preferred by the median voter to signal they are not prone to elite capture, which we refer to
as being a member of the Establishment. However, our definition of populism is somewhat
different insofar as we do not regard economic policy platforms as those subject to populist
rhetoric. Instead, we make the assumption that economic policy platforms are cheap talk, and
that voters evaluate the quality of candidates based on their social policy announcement or
personal behaviour, which may act as a signal of candidates’ economic preferences. Politicians
in our framework do not have to compromise between announcing a policy that caters to the
needs of the median voter and one that signals competence. Instead, they choose a social policy
announcement which has superior credibility to any economic policy announcement they might
make. Another fundamental difference between our model and that of Acemoglu et al. (2013)
is that we identify under which conditions populist politics may or may not arise, while their
model assumes that populist strategies necessarily come about as soon as voters believe that
politicians, despite their rhetoric, might have a right-wing agenda.
Finally, we speak to the vast scholarship on the competence of policy makers, including Besley
and Coate (1997)’s study of the ability of citizens entering politics as candidates, as well as
several works on fiscal policy distortions by politicians that want to signal high ability (see
Rogoff and Sibert (1988); Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Alesina et al. (1995)). Because
candidates’ incentives in our model are also influenced by the reputation cost of lying about
campaign promises, this paper is also related to the study of the role played by rewards (Caselli
and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004)) and threats (Dal Bo and Di Tella (2003)) on
the quality of politicians.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents and solves the model. Section 2.3
presents empirical evidence, and Section 2.4 concludes.
70
2.2 Model
There are two political candidates with given social preferences j ∈ {L,C} - liberal or conser-
vative - and given intrinsic type k ∈ {E,O} - meaning they are co-opted into the Establishment
or remain Outsiders. We assume in what follows that an incumbent candidate who is part of
a liberal Establishment faces a conservative Outsider in an election. The candidates compete
to win the vote of a representative voter with utility function U(I, J) = u(I) + v(J), where
I ∈ {R,F} - Redistribution or Laissez-faire - and J ∈ {L,C} are respectively the economic
and social policies implemented by the elected candidate. To simplify the exposition, we let
u(R) = u > 0, U(F ) = 0, v(L) = v > 0, and v(C) = 0. Also, we assume u > v, such
that the representative voter has the following order of preferences over implemented policies:
U(R,L) > U(R,C) > U(F,L) > U(F,C). This simply means that the voter cares more about
the difference in economic outcomes than he cares about the difference in social outcomes.2 To
make it easier to keep track, we refer to candidates as “she” and to the voter as “he”.
We also assume that intrinsic types are not observable, but that the voter knows there are
constraints on what different types of candidate can say and do. These constraints arise from
various features of the political system that we do not model explicitly but that we believe to
be present across a wide range of societies, albeit to different degrees in different societies.
The first constraint is on the relationship between a candidate’s social preferences and her
membership of the Establishment. We assume that the Establishment is hostile to social con-
servatism while being welcoming to economic conservatism (for example, many Establishment
members like being able to accumulate wealth while disliking lifestyle restrictions - on alcohol
consumption, for instance - that prevent them from freely enjoying their wealth). We capture
this with the following stylized assumption: a liberal candidate is aways a member of the Es-
tablishment, while a conservative candidate is an Outsider with probability ρ (and a member
of the Establishment with symmetric probability 1− ρ), with ρ ∈ (0, 1].
To explore the demand for social outsiders, the second constraint captures in a simple man-
ner the idea that social outsiders have a higher likelihood of improving economic outcomes
for voters. The relationship between a candidate’s economic preferences and her type is such
that an Establishment candidate always implements a laissez-faire policy F , while an outsider
implements redistributive policy R with probability θ (and laissez-faire with complementary
probability 1− θ), with θ > 0.
The third constraint is that while economic policy announcements may be largely cheap talk
they are not completely so. A candidate’s true views and intentions about economic policy
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cannot be kept entirely secret but may leak out to voters through the press or through political
gossip of various kinds. We capture this in a stylized way by an assumption that with probabil-
ity ε ∈ [0, 1), candidates are obliged to tell the truth about their economic policy preferences.
With complementary probability 1− ε, economic policy announcements are cheap talk, so that
candidates can announce whatever they believe to be in their interests to announce. We refer
to the variable ε as the “informativeness” of economic policy announcements.
Therefore, both economic and social preferences are correlated with candidates’ intrinsic type.
A liberal candidate has a strictly greater probability of being a member of the Establishment
than a conservative candidate, and an Establishment candidate has a strictly greater probability
of implementing a laissez-faire policy than an outsider.
Candidates receive a benefit B from being elected, and zero otherwise.
2.2.1 Almost cheap talk
In the baseline model, the order of the game is as follows. The representative voter observes
candidates’ social preferences. Then candidates simultaneously announce their economic plat-
forms.3 The voter observes candidates’ economic platforms and votes for his preferred candidate.
If both candidates offer the same expected payoff to the voter, the election is decided by a coin
toss and each candidate wins with probability 12 .
We obtain the following payoff function for the representative voter:






0 if jk = L
ρ if jk = C
Notice that ∀jk ∈ {L,C}, P (win|R, jk) > P (win|F, jk) because U(R|jk) > U(F |jk), where
P (win|Ik, jk) is the probability that candidate with social preference jk wins the election when
announcing Ik. The intuition is trivial: because the representative voter strictly prefers redis-
tribution to laissez-faire and the announced economic policy enters the voter’s expected utility
with strictly positive weight ε, announcing laissez-faire is a strictly dominated strategy.
3We assume hence that there is no need for candidates to announce a social policy as they are expected to
implement their preferred social policy with certainty.
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It is never optimal to announce a laissez-faire economic policy Ik = F , and candidates always










L wins the election if ε > 1− v
ρθu
C wins the election if ε < 1− v
ρθu
The election is tied if ε = 1− v
ρθu
When the outsider premium ρθu
v
is high enough relative to ε, the informativeness of economic
policy announcements, the representative voter prefers the conservative candidate to the liberal
candidate.
The outsider premium depends on two types of consideration. First, the term ρθ indicates how
closely social policy preferences of the candidates are correlated to the economic policies they
will implement: it is the product of ρ which is the probability that a Conservative candidate
is an Outsider, and θ which is the probability that an Outsider implements a a redistributive
policy. Secondly, there is the ratio of u to v which is the relative importance of economic pol-
icy outcomes to social policy outcomes in the preferences of the representative voter. We can
therefore summarize the result in the form of:
Proposition 1: If social policy is sufficiently informative about candidates’ economic prefer-
ences, and economic policy decisions are sufficiently more important than social policy decisions
in the preferences of the representative voter, relative to the informativeness of economic policy
announcements, then a conservative candidate is preferred to a liberal candidate even though
the voter prefers a liberal to a conservative social policy.
Proposition 1 will be the main subject of our empirical section. In that section we will use the
expressed degree of voters’ trust in political parties as a measure of the extent to which they
consider economic policy announcements to be informative about future policy choices.
We extend hereafter our baseline in two ways. First, we explore a version of the model without
social preferences, in which candidates announce an economic policy and signal their type in
the form of personal behavior. Secondly, we assume that voters cannot observe candidates’
social preferences with certainty but only with some positive probability. Candidates run on a
bi-dimensional policy platform and announce an economic policy and a social policy, which they
use to signal their type to the representative voter when social preferences are not observable.
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2.2.2 Signaling through personal behavior
In this model, there are no social preferences. Instead, prior to the election, each candidate
announces simultaneously a unidimensional platform I ∈ {R,F} and sends a signal s in the
form of personal behavior. We define personal behavior as a signal s ∈ {0, 1} that candidates’
choose to send (s = 1) or not (s = 0).4 The signal could be in the form of an expression of
opinions (so-called politically incorrect views may be an example of this, but there are others),
or it could be a way of behaving without cognitive content (such as failure of observe a dress
code or a courtesy norm, for example). What matters is that the signal helps voters to decide
how likely is the candidate to be part of the Establishment, hence which economic policy the
candidate will implement. It does so because Establishment candidates find it more costly to
send the signal than do Outsiders.
The order of the game is as follows. The candidates simultaneously announce their economic
platforms and send their signals. The representative voter then infers a posterior probability φ
about whether the candidate is part of the Establishment, computes an expected payoff based
on this posterior, and votes for the candidate who gives the highest expected platform utility.
If both candidates offer the same expected payoff to the representative voter, the election is
decided by a coin toss and each candidate wins with probability 12 .
The utility of candidate Vk(.) is the function Vk = B − ck(s), where ck is the cost of sending
the signal for a type-k candidate, and B is the rent from being elected (which is common to
all candidates). We set ck(0) = 0 for all k and ck(1) = ck, with cO = 0 < cE < B. Moreover,
we assume that the behavior signal incurs disutility v > 0 to the representative voter - for this
reason we will call the signal a form of “offensive” behavior.
2.2.2.1 Voters’ payoff
Under asymmetric information, the voter cannot observe candidates’ type and his expected
payoff depends on the set of belief µ associated with each signal profile of candidate (sk, sl)
where µ = {φ(0, 0), φ(1, 1), φ(1, 0)} and φ(sk, sl) is the voter’s posterior belief that candidate k
is an outsider given the pair of signals (sk, sl). Assuming that voters hold the prior that the
pool of candidates is equally distributed between outsiders and Establishment candidates - i.e
that the probability that a candidate randomly drawn from the pool of candidates is of either
type is equal to 12 , we define this posterior as:
4The discrete nature of the signal simplifies the setting. The signal could be made continuous, but this would








if sk 6= sl
φ(sk, sl) =
1
2 if sk = sl
(2.2)
We obtain the following expected payoff function for the representative voter:
U(Ik, sk|sk, sl) = εu(Ik) + (1− ε)θφ(sk, sl)u− v(sk) (2.3)
2.2.2.2 Candidates’ strategy
Candidate k chooses platform Ik and signal sk to maximize her expected utility E[Vk(Ik, sk)] =
P (win|Ik, sk)B− ck(sk), where P (win|Ik, sk) is the probability that she wins the election when
announcing Ik and sending signal sk.
Observe that whatever the strategy of the other candidate may be, we have that ∀sk ∈ {0, 1},
P (win|R, sk) > P (win|F, sk) because E[U(R, sk)] > E[U(F, sk)]. The intuition is the same as
in the baseline model. It is never optimal to announce a laissez-faire economic policy Ik = F .
Therefore, candidates always run on the redistributive platform Ik = R.
A strategy decision for candidate k then turns on the signal sk she chooses to send.
2.2.2.3 Equilibrium
We look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in pure strategies and will assume that for any
out-of-equilibrium belief, the following rule applies: φ(1, 0) > 12 . As the cost of sending the
signal is greater for an Establishment candidate, the representative voter holds the following
beliefs about how to interpret deviations from equilibria. Consider an equilibrium in which both
candidates behave in the same way, either because they both send the signal or because neither
sends the signal. A deviation from such an equilibrium would result in one candidate sending
the signal and the other not sending it. In any such situation the representative voter would
believe that the candidate sending the signal would be more likely to be an Outsider than an
Establishment candidate.5
This assumption allows us to prove the following:
5Although somewhat restrictive, this assumption is similar to the D1 (or divinity equilibrium) refinement
as defined by Banks and Sobel (1987) and allows to restrict the set of possible equilibria of the game to more
plausible outcomes.
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• If ε ≥ 1 − v
θu
, there exists a unique and pooling PBE where candidates’ strategies are
(s∗O, s
∗
E) = (0, 0), the payoff of both candidates is equal to
B
2 for any out-of-equilibrium
belief φ(1, 0) ∈ [12 , 1]. Neither candidate chooses to send the signal because signalling
your type to gain credibility on the economic dimension is unnecessary when economic
platform announcements are sufficiently informative.
• If ε < 1− v
θu
:
– if cE >
B




E) = (1, 0) and the payoffs
of the Establishment and outsider candidate are respectively 0 and B. The cost
of sending the signal is too high for the Establishment candidate, both candidates
reveal their type and the representative voter elects the outsider.
– When cE ≤
B
2 , the cost of acting as an outsider is low enough for both candidates.
Then, for any φ(1, 0) ∈ 12 ,




E) = (0, 0) where the
payoff of both candidates is equal to B2 . Although economic platform credibility
is sufficiently cheap talk that the voter prefers to elect an outsider, both candi-
dates choose not to send the signal because the cost of political incorrectness in
the eyes of the voter outweighs its role as a signal of future economic policy.




E) = (1, 1) where the
payoffs of the Establishment and outsider candidate are respectively B2 − cE and
B
2 . The value of the information conveyed by political incorrectness about future
economic intentions outweighs its cost and both candidates choose to send the
signal.
In a political environment where offensive behavior can signal economic preferences in line with
those favored by the representative voter, we can summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 2: If displaying offensive behavior is sufficiently informative about candidates’
economic preferences relative to economic policy announcements (ε < 1− v
θu
), then candidates
have an incentive to use such behavior even though the voter dislikes it. When the cost of dis-
playing this kind of behavior is too high for the Establishment candidate, then only the Outsider
displays offensive behavior, and wins the election with certainty. Moreover, when this cost is
low enough even for a member of the Establishment (cE ≤
B
2 ), then both types of candidates
display this kind of behaviour as long as the role of political incorrectness as a signal of future
economic policy outweighs its cost in the eyes of the representative voter (ε > 1 − v(2φ−1)θu) ,
and refrain from doing so otherwise (ε < 1− v(2φ−1)θu).
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2.2.3 Signalling through social policy
In this version of the model, social preferences are imperfectly observable. The voter learns
about the true social preferences of the candidates with some probability q > 0, in which case
he infers the type of candidates based on their true social preferences. When the voter cannot
observe candidates’ social preferences, he has to infer candidates’ type by forming a posterior
probability based on candidates’ social policy platform announcements s ∈ {L,C}. The nature
of equilibrium will depend on the relative informativeness of social policy announcements and
economic policy announcements.
The order of the game is as follows:
First, candidates announce their platforms (Ik, sk). The representative voter then observes the
true social preferences of candidates with probability q. Based on the information received, the
voter computes his expected payoff and votes for the candidate who offers the highest expected
platform utility. If both candidates offer the same expected payoff to the voter, the election is
decided by a coin toss and each candidate wins with probability 12 .
Each candidate gets rent B if elected, as before.
Running for office is costless per se, but candidates may incur a cost of announcing a social
policy that is different from their true preferred social policy. This cost is two-fold. First, a
candidate of type k incurs a fixed reputational cost lk by lying about her social preferences
if these preferences are subsequently observed. Second, when the voter cannot observe social
preferences, there is a strictly positive probability ξ ∈ [0, 1) that an elected candidate cannot
renege on her campaign promises and has to follow through with her social policy announcement.
This probability can be considered a measure of the ‘social credibility” of candidates. Therefore,
with probability ξ, an elected candidate of type k who lied about her social preference during
the campaign will pay a cost γk of implementing a social policy that is different from her true
preference.
2.2.3.1 The voter’s utility and decision problem
Observe first that both candidates run on a redistributive platform, where the intuition for
this result carries over from the baseline model section. We can thus write the representative
voter’s utility from candidate k’s social policy announcement sk conditional on the information
he receives and candidate k’s social preference jk.
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Under full information, when social preferences are observable, the rep. voter’s utility can be
written as:






0 if jk = L
ρ if jk = C
Therefore, the voter’s decision problem is straightforward. He will vote for candidate k over
candidate l whenever U0(jk) > U





and vote for l otherwise. Following this simple decision rule, we define P 0k as the probability
that the voter votes for candidate k when social preferences are observable.
When social preferences are unobservable, the voter has to infer the type of candidates based
on their announcements. His utility under imperfect information can be written as:
U1[jk|sk] =εu+ (1− ε)ρ(jk)θu+ ξv(sk) + (1− ξ)v(jk) (2.5)
where, because he cannot observe the true social preferences of candidate jk but only her social
platform sk, the rep. voter must infer a posterior probability about the preferred social policy
of candidate k. We define φ(sk, sl) the voter’s posterior belief that candidate k is a conservative
given the pair of policy announcements (sk, sl). Assuming that voters hold the prior that the
pool of candidates is equally distributed between liberals and conservatives - i.e that the proba-
bility that a candidate randomly drawn from the pool of candidates is a liberal or a conservative







if sk 6= sl
φ(sk, sl) =
1
2 if sk = sl
(2.6)
where the ratio P (sk,sl|jk=C)
P (sk,sl|jk=C)+P (sk,sl|jk=L)
is the probability that the conservative candidate an-
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the set of beliefs of the representative voter over all possible strategy profiles played by the
candidates. If no candidate runs either on the conservative or the liberal platform and the
posterior φ(C,L) cannot be derived using Bayes’ rule, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: p > 12
Under this assumption, the representative voter holds the intuitive belief that any deviation
to a liberal platform from an equilibrium in which both candidates announced conservative
platforms is more likely to have come from a liberal candidate, while any deviation to a con-
servative platform from an equilibrium in which both candidates announced liberal platforms
is more likely to have come from a conservative candidate. As in the previous section, this
restriction on the off-the-equilibrium path beliefs is similar to the D1 equilibrium refinement by
Banks and Sobel (1987).
The voter’s expected payoff from electing candidate k conditional on the set of beliefs µ can
then be written as:
U [sk|µ] = φ(sk, sl)U
1[C|sk] + (1− φ(sk, sl))U
1[L|sk] (2.7)
Finally, we define σ(sk, sl, µ) : (sk, sl)× µ ∈ {C,L}
2 × [0, 1]3 −→ σ ∈ [0, 1] as the voting rule of
the representative voter when candidates k and l respectively announce social platforms sk and
sl, where σ represents the probability of voting for candidate k.
2.2.3.2 Candidates’ strategy and payoff
We formally define candidate k’s strategy sk as a type-dependent social platform announcement.
Candidate k’s expected payoff from strategy sk conditional on her opponent’s strategy sl and
the representative voter’s voting rule σ can be written as:
Vk[sk|σ(sk, sl, µ)] = q
[








where Isk 6=jk is the indicator function equal to 1 when candidate k lies about her social policy,
and 0 otherwise.
We now define threshold levels for the two types of candidate to lie about their social policy










. In the rest of the paper, we maintain the
following assumption:
Assumption 2: 0 ≤ ξl < ξc
This assumption implies B− 2 q1−q ll > 0, which makes sure that both candidates have an incen-
tive to lie about their social policy preferences. Also, the expected cost of lying about social
preferences is higher for the liberal than for the conservative candidate6.
2.2.3.3 Equilibrium definition
In what follows, we use the concept of sequentially rational Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Definition: A PBE (sc, sl, σ, µ) corresponds to a strategy profile for both candidates (sc, sl)
(resp. conservative and liberal), and a voting rule σ for the representative voter together with
the set of Bayes’rule compatible beliefs µ such that :
1. The candidates’ strategies (sc, sl) are sequentially rational under the set of beliefs µ and








Vc[s, σ(s, sl, µ(s, sl))]
sl = max
s∈{C,L}
Vl[s, σ(sc, s, µ(sc, s))]
(2.9)
2. The representative voter’s beliefs µ are compatible with Bayes’ rule as defined in (2.6)
and satisfy the intuitive criterion when they are off the equilibrium path and cannot be
derived using Bayes’ rule.
3. The representative voter’s voting rule is sequentially rational given his beliefs µ and can-
didates’s announcements (sc, sl):
σ(sc, sl, µ) solves max
σ∈[0,1]
σU [sc|µ] + (1− σ)U [sl|µ]
6We relax this assumption in the equilibrium analysis section 2.2.3.7.
80
2.2.3.4 Solving the model
There are two quite different regimes in the model: one in which the probability ε that candi-
dates announce their true economic policy preferences is low, and one in which it is high enough
that their announcements act as a significant constraint on what they subsequently do if they
win power.
A) Case where ε ≤ 1− v
ρθu
7.
There are two main implications of the above inequality, which implies a low probability that
economic policy announcements are binding. First, if the voter observes candidates’ social pref-
erences, she will vote for the conservative candidate over the liberal candidate. This is because
social preferences provide a more reliable guide to the candidate’s economic preferences than
anything the candidate actually says.
Second, if the voter does not observe candidates’ social preferences, the incentives for candidates
are to persuade voters that they are of a particular type. The strategy for doing so will depend
in turn on the extent to which candidates are dissuaded from lying about their social prefer-
ences by the possible reputation cost of lying, and by the probability of having to implement
the social policy they have announced rather than the one they would prefer.
When these costs are low, there is little difference in the incentives for the conservative and
liberal candidates, so we should expect to see pooling equilibria. However, which pooling equi-
librium is observed will depend on whether the role of social policy announcements as signals
of likely future economic policy outweighs their role as signals of likely future social policy.
• If ξ ∈ (0, ξl], for any p ∈ [
1
2 , 1],





(2p−1)ρθu , there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where both
candidates announce a conservative platform, the voter randomizes with probability
1
2 between the two candidates and the respective payoff of the liberal and conservative
candidates are 12
[










(2p−1)ρθu , there exists a unique pooling equilibrium where both
candidates announce a liberal platform, the voter randomizes with probability 12
between the two candidates and the respective payoff of the liberal and conservative




B − (1− q)ξγl
]
− qlc.
When social credibility ξ is low enough that the liberal candidate can afford to lie about
her social preferences but the credibility of economic announcements is also very low,
7Analytically, this implies U1[L|C] ≥ U1[C|C] ≥ U1[L|L] ≥ U1[C|L]
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both candidates will claim to be conservative. This is because the role of social policy an-
nouncements as signals of future economic policy outweighs their role as signals of future
social policy.
However, when social credibility is low enough for candidates to lie, but still high enough
for social policy announcements to serve as a more credible signal of future social policy
than of future economic policy, both candidates will claim to be liberals. This is because
the representative voter would still prefer to randomize between two liberal platforms than
two conservative platforms, because of the strictly positive probability with which social
announcements are implemented and the fact that he intrinsically prefers a liberal over a
conservative policy (v > 0).
We now see what happens when social credibility is sufficiently high that candidates no
longer have an incentive to lie.
• If ξ ∈ (ξl, 1], there exists a unique fully revealing separating equilibrium where both
candidates announce their preferred social policy and the representative voter always votes
for the conservative platform, yielding respective payoffs B and 0 for the conservative and
the liberal candidate.
When lying is too costly for the liberal candidate, platform divergence is the only possible
equilibrium and the outsider candidate is elected on a conservative platform.
B) Case where 1− v
ρθu
< ε ≤ 1
In this configuration, the voter will neither vote for a conservative platform when candidates’
social preferences are observable, nor for a candidate announcing a conservative social policy
when another candidate announces a liberal platform. The expected economic benefit from
voting for a conservative outsider to the voter does not outweigh the social loss it incurs. Then,
the only candidate with an incentive to lie about her social policy preferences is the conservative
candidate. She will do so when the level of social credibility ξ is sufficiently low, yielding the
following conditions:
• If ξ ∈ (ξc, 1], there exists a unique separating, fully revealing PBE where both candidates
announce their preferred social policy. The representative voter always vote for the liberal
platform and the respective payoffs are B and 0 for the liberal and the conservative
candidate.
• if ξ ∈ (0, ξc), a unique pooling equilibrium exists where both candidates announce a
liberal platform and the rep. voter randomizes with probability 12 between the two can-
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B − (1− q)ξγc
]
− qlc.
We can summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3:
a) When economic policy announcements are sufficiently uninformative and the political cost
of lying about social preferences is low enough (ξ ∈ (0, ξl]), candidates will pool and announce
a conservative policy as long as the role of social policies as signals of future economic policy
outweighs their role as signals of future social policies and will pool and announce a liberal policy
otherwise.
b) When the credibility of economic policy announcements increases and lying becomes too costly
for the liberal candidate (ξ ∈ (ξl, 1]), truth-telling is the only equilibrium.
c) When social policy conveys little information about economic preferences, there is no demand
for conservative platforms and the liberal Establishment candidate always tells the truth, while
the conservative Outsider lies when the cost of doing so is not too high.
2.2.3.5 Comparative static analysis
Figure 2.1 graphs the different equilibrium outcomes in the (ε, ξ) space.
The area below ε1 represents the subset of the parameter space in which there exists a political
demand for conservative candidates despite the preference of the representative voter for liberal
over conservative social policies. However, if candidates’ true social policy preferences are not
easily observed, and if the cost of lying is small, all candidates will claim to be conservative and
the claim will lose its value.
We first discuss what happens when the cost of lying is low for the liberal candidate (ξ ≤ ξl).
In the bottom left corner of Figure 2.1, a pooling equilibrium (C,C) exists when the repre-
sentative voter decides to vote for a conservative platform in the absence of information. This
happens when the credibility of economic platforms is low enough with respect to the cred-






(2p−1)ρθu ). This result is in line with the empirical findings of Guiso et al. (2017)
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that lower trust levels following the 2008 economic crisis drove party platforms of Establish-
ment candidates to the right. Likewise, in our model, lower levels of political trust may push
Establishment policy platforms on social issues toward conservative positions.
As the credibility of both social and economic announcements increases, the unique PBE of
the game switches from the pooling equilibrium (C,C) to the pooling equilibrium (L,L). This
equilibrium is somewhat surprising as the representative voter would prefer to elect a conser-
vative candidate over a liberal one when the two are running against each other, since ε < ε1.
However, because the representative voter also prefers a liberal social policy to a conservative
social policy, in the absence of informative signal, he prefers a lottery over 2 liberal platforms to
one over 2 conservative platforms, and the equilibrium (L,L) dominates. The intuition behind
this equilibrium is as follows: Even when the representative voter holds the intuitive belief
that any deviation to a conservative platform from an equilibrium in which both candidates
announced liberal platforms is more likely to have come from a conservative candidate, it can
still be a dominant strategy for him to vote for the liberal platform when the relative credibility
of economic announcement vis-à-vis social announcements is high enough. This is because the
value of the information contained in the signal is small enough that the role of social policy
announcements as signals of future economic policy outweighs their role as signals of future
social policy. Therefore, the representative voter prefers a gamble between the outsider and the
Establishment candidate to electing the outsider with certainty.
In the case where there is no demand for outsider candidates (ε ≥ ε1), both candidates announce
their true social preferences when it is too costly for the conservative candidate to lie (ξc ≤ ξ).
The conservative candidate lies and announces a liberal social policy when the expected cost







2.2.3.6 Comment on the relative credibility of economic and social platforms
A more accurate description of the setting in which we expect political outsiders to be successful
would assume that a change in candidates’ policy positions does not involve the same amount
of cognitive dissonance on the economic and social dimensions. While it seems relatively easy
to renege on economic promises regardless of whether or not they are cheap talk because of
the intricate nature of economic problems, it is harder for an elected politician to implement
a policy that runs against her campaign promises when it comes to social matters. Amongst
others, this is so because it is easier to tell whom social policies will benefit, while the welfare
gains from economic reforms are harder to gauge and their beneficiaries certainly harder to
identify. Analytically, we hence believe that our results have more grip under the assumption
that ξ ≥ ε8.
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2.2.3.7 On candidates’ motivation for office and relaxing Assumption 2
Assumption 2 is not only sufficient but also necessary for our results. Indeed, if ξk < 0, then
candidate k no longer has an incentive to lie, regardless of the policy announcement of her
opponent. The intuition is as follows. Lying can only be an equilibrium strategy in a pooling
equilibrium where candidates are elected with probability 12 . Therefore, candidate k has an
incentive to lie only if her expected rent from being in office ( (1−q)B2 ) outweighs the cost of
being caught doing so (qlk). This is equivalent to ξk > 0. If we relax this assumption, then
truth-telling is the only equilibrium, with the liberal candidate winning the election when ε > ε1
and the conservative candidate winning otherwise.
Assumption 2 can be somewhat relaxed, however, if we assume that candidates have a policy
motivation. By this we mean that they care about which social policy will be implemented
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after the election, whether or not they themselves are elected. Building on the design of the
model, it is convenient to define policy utility as the cost γk that candidates have to pay when
the social policy implemented after the election is not their preferred policy, whether because
they have lost the election or because despite being elected they must follow through with their
campaign promises to implement a policy that was not the one they preferred. Using the same
notation as before, the payoff of policy motivated candidate k can be written as:
V ′k[sk|σ(sk, sl, µ)] = q
[
P 0kB − (1− P
0










(1− ξ)γk + ξγkIsl 6=jk
]
]
= Vk[sk|σ(sk, sl, µ)]− q(1− P
0
k )γk − (1− q)(1− σ)
[
(1− ξ)γk + ξγkIsl 6=jk
]
(2.10)
Comparing this with equation (2.8) we can see that the expected payoff of policy motivated







that she incurs from seeing a social policy she dislikes being implemented after
the election. Analytically, this disutility term increases with the probability that candidate
k loses the election when social preferences are not observable, captured by σ. Therefore,
when a candidate arbitrates between lying (sk = jl) and truth-telling (sk = jk), she has an
extra incentive to lie, for this will increase her probability of winning the election from 0 to 12 .











Because 1−q2 γk > 0, the difference in utility between the two strategies is greater for a policy
motivated candidate.
As losing the election becomes more costly, policy motivated candidates have stronger incentives
to use a strategy that increases their probability of winning and are therefore more likely to lie
about their preferences. With policy motivated candidates, our results in Proposition 3 then
hold under the following, less restrictive assumption −1 ≤ ξl < ξc.
We have argued that, when the credibility of politicians’ economic policy announcements is
low, voters may vote for candidates who either promise social policies that the voters do not
want, or behave in ways that the voters do not personally like or admire, because these may
be credible signals that the candidates in question do not belong to the political establishment
and may therefore implement more radical economic policies than the political establishment
would be prepared to accept. Such candidates often fit the description “populist”, and in our
model the description is apt to the extent that candidates who do these things are indeed more
likely than other candidates to be political Outsiders. This does not mean, however, that all
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who behave as populists intend really to implement redistributive economic policies. In our
model, candidates from the Establishment may pretend to be Outsiders, when the costs of lying
are not too high; and even Outsiders may disappoint those who voted for them by failing to
implement redistributive policies.
However, many readers may recognize some of the characteristics of such populist politicians,
including the individual described as “vulgar, almost illiterate, a public liar easily detected....an
actor of genius” who ran successfully for the presidency of the United States on a protectionist,
anti-immigrant platform in ....1936, in the bestselling novel It Can’t Happen Here, by Sinclair
Lewis.
2.3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we attempt to provide some empirical support for the main prediction of our
baseline model, as captured in Proposition 1. In particular, we investigate whether or not
socially moderate voters are less sensitive to ideological convergence with political parties and
thus more likely to vote for social outsiders, when they have lower levels of trust in politics
(which we interpret to mean that they consider announcements about economic policy to be
relatively uninformative).
2.3.1 Data
Our main source of individual data is the European Social Survey (ESS), which maps attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors in Europe. It covers all European countries, though not every country
participates in every wave. Data have been collected every two years, since September 2002, by
face-to-face interviews. We use eight consecutive waves between 2002 and 2016. The question-
naire consists of a core module, constant from round to round, and smaller rotating modules
repeated at intervals on selected topics. We use the core module, which covers a wide range of
social, economic, political, psychological and demographic variables. To identify parties’ policy
positions on both the economic and social dimensions, we rely on the classification proposed
in the CHES Chapel Hill Expert Survey database (2017), which studies party positioning on
European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European
countries. The first survey was conducted in 1999, with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010,
and 2014. Not every country and every party was surveyed in every wave, and we use all rounds
of the survey in order to maximize the reliability of our data.
Measuring voting decisions
The ESS asks people whether they voted in the last parliamentary election in their country
and which party they voted for: “Did you vote in the last [country name] national election in
[month/year?]”. Those answering yes were then asked: “Which party did you vote for in that
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election?” and shown the list of parties. We include in our database only those respondents who
claimed to have voted, and amongst them those who voted for a party that has been surveyed
at least once in the CHES9.
Measuring voters’ characteristics
Trust in traditional politics. In our narrative, social outsiders’ platforms are more likely
to succeed when voters lose faith in politicians. The ESS has several proxies for confidence in
governments and political parties, all on a scale between 0 (no trust) and 10 (full trust). These
indicators tend to be closely correlated and thus hard to tell apart. In analyzing individual
voting behaviour we use trust in political parties, which speaks directly to our model.
Economic and social ideology. A critical feature of the model is that moderate voters choose
to vote for outsiders because of their radical stance on social issues. The ESS contains several
questions related to social beliefs. We choose 6 of them10, and combine these objective measures
into a single composite index of social conservatism SocialCons by taking the first principal
component, rescaled to vary between 0 (least conservative) and 1 (most conservative). More-
over, we construct a measure of how socially conservative every country is for every election
year using the mean value of our social conservatism index across all individuals11. In order
to capture voters’ political preferences on the economic dimension, we use the gincdif variable
of the ESS questionnaire, which codes respondents’ answer to the following question: ”Do you
think the government should reduce differences in income levels?”, which we rescale between 0
and 1 under the name EcoCons, a higher score indicating greater opposition to redistribution
and hence greater economic conservatism12.
Voting sample
The intuition in the model is that people would vote for socially radical candidates because their
policy positions serve as a signal of their economic intentions. Therefore, we limit our sample
9Because several parties are not surveyed in the CHES database and many respondents refused to give the
name of the party they voted for, we are forced to leave out of the analysis a significant share (18%) of voters.
Figure 2.2 in appendix provides information about the share of excluded voters in each country and the list of
parties that are not covered by the CHES dataset.
10These 6 questions are the following: ”Is it important that government is strong and ensures safety?”, ”Do
you agree with the following statement: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish?”,
”To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as most [country]’s
people to come and live here?”, ”Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live
here from other countries?”, ”Is [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to
live here from other countries?”, ”Is it important to to follow traditions and customs handed down by religion or
family?”.
11This index of social conservatism for each country is constructed based on the entire weighted population
sample and not exclusively on the voting population within that sample.
12The ESS features other questions that proxy individual opinions on economic policies and economic conser-
vatism but none is part of the core module which is constant from round to round.
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to middle-of-the-spectrum voters who hold moderate views on social issues and are unlikely to
be drawn to conservative platforms because of ideological convergence. To do so, we rank the
voting population of every country and every election according to their social conservatism
and restrict our analysis to those in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th deciles of the distribution13.
Measuring parties’ characteristics
Social distance. In order to distinguish between outsiders and traditional parties, we construct
a dummy variable to identify radically conservative parties in Europe based on the classification
of the CHES survey. We use the ”galtan” variable, which codes the position of a party in terms
of their views on democratic freedoms and rights, and rescale it to vary between 0 (least conser-
vative) and 1 (most conservative)14. For every party j competing in country c and election t, we
identify as social outsiders those parties that (i) ranked higher that 0.9 on the galtan variable
or (ii) were located at least 2.5 standard deviations to the right from the mean of voters’ social
conservatism distribution15. Because party positions can change over time, some parties were
identified as social outsiders in some elections and as a mainstream party in others. The list of
parties listed at least once as social outsider can be found in Table 2.2 of the Appendix.
Economic distance. We measure parties’ economic conservatism EC using the ”lrecon”
variable, which codes the position of a party in terms of its ideological stance on economic
issues16, and rescale it from 0 to 1.
13We check the validity of our results for narrower brackets as a robustness test.
14A lower score on this variable indicates “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties which favor expanded
personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic
participation, while a higher score is attributed to “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties that often reject these
ideas, value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on
social and cultural issues. A more accurate way of measuring social conservatism could be to use the first principal
component of party positions on issues which we already use for individuals. Those issues are civil liberties and law
and order, multiculturalism, social lifestyle, environmental policies, the rights of ethnic minorities, immigration
policy, and the role of religion in politics. However, these variables were not recorded in every year of the CHES
survey, and using this method would force us to reduce substantially the size of the sample. In any event, our
calculations reveal that when available, the correlation between parties’ PCA score for those items and the galtan
variable is very high (0.93), suggesting that we should not be concerned with the possibility that our measure of
parties’ social conservatism is too far off the mark.
15Although this method unavoidably contains a certain amount of subjective judgement, robustness tests show
that our results hold for looser or more restrictive classifications of social outsiders. Moreover, although our
theoretical setting does not rule out the possibility that social outsiders can exist on the far-left of the social
spectrum, we choose to classify party as social outsiders only when they are sufficiently more conservative than
average. Because our inference mechanism is based on radical social platforms and policy positions that are likely
to be found alienating or offensive, we choose to regard very liberal parties as part of a moderate alternative on
account of their rather inclusive opinions, which are unlikely to clash with the views of socially moderate voters
16In particular, parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy, while
parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: Privatization, lower taxes, less
regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.
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Constructing the social and economic distance variables
For each voter, we then construct party-specific social and economic distance variables based
on the previous measures of conservatism.
For every individual i who voted in country c and election t, we compute the difference be-
tween her social conservatism score SocialConsict and the social score SCjct of every party
j that was running in that same election17. We thus obtain for every voter and every party
the variable δSijct = |SocialConsict − SCjct| that captures the social distance between them.
We repeat the same procedure on the economic dimension and create the distance variable
δEijct = |EcoConsict − ECjct| that captures the distance on the economic dimension between a
voter i and party j with respective economic conservatism EcoConsict and ECjct.
We then introduce a binary choice framework where individual vote choice boils down to choos-
ing between a mainstream and an outsider alternative. Indeed, while our theoretical setting
assumes that both traditional and outsider parties can run on the same platform, elections
almost always give voters the choice between extremely conservative social platforms and more
moderate ones.
To do this, we need to attribute to each alternative a social and economic distance based on
those computed for every single party. A first issue is to capture the social distance between an
individual and the alternative she did not vote for. For instance, if a voter chose to vote for a
social outsider as per our classification, then we are left with several mainstream (liberal) parties
to choose from as the mainstream alternative. In practice, we select as the liberal alternative
the party in the set of all liberal parties with the smallest social distance to the voter. We use
a symmetric method for voters who voted for a liberal party, and repeat the same procedure
for the economic distance variable where because we do not distinguish between economically
extreme parties and moderate ones, our alternative-specific measure of economic distance comes
directly from the party used to create the social distance variable.
For policy dimension P ∈ {E,S} (Economic or Social), we thus define the alternative-specific
variables capturing the distance between a voter i voting for party k and the liberal (resp.
conservative) alternatives δPiLct (resp. δ
P
iCct) as follows:
17For every round of the ESS, individuals were asked about their vote in the latest parliamentary elections,
which sometimes took place as much as 4 years before the survey took place, while the rest of the questions were
asked at the time of survey. This creates a potential limitation insofar as we attempt to explain past vote choices
through current individual characteristics and ideology. We investigate this issue in the robustness section and
control that our results carry over when we include in the analysis only those individuals who voted in the same
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δPikct if k ∈ C
δPilct, where l = argmin
j∈C
δSijct if k /∈ C
(2.13)
where L (resp. C) denotes the liberal (resp. conservative) alternative choice set, and party
j belongs to C if it was identified as a social outsider as per the classification detailed in the
previous section.
Note on the reliability of voting data in the ESS
Obviously, the voting choices reported in the ESS do not necessarily correspond to what people
actually did. Guiso et al. (2017) point out that the correlation between ESS votes for populist
parties conditional on participation and actual voting is only 65%. Given the high correlation
between socially conservative and populist platforms, our results may suffer from a similar bias.
Figure 2.3 of the appendix describes the share of ESS interviewees who reported to have voted
for social outsiders in each country, both within the entire voting population and the sub-sample
of ”middle-of-the-spectrum”, socially moderate voters on which we run our analysis.
2.3.2 Empirical strategy
We propose a simple framework to empirically model people’s voting choices. Individuals who
participate in elections have to decide whether to vote for a political outsider or for a mainstream
party18. To estimate the relationship between social distance and trust, we use a conditional
logit model with alternative-variant regressors (the social and economic distance variables) in
which the probability that voter i will vote for alternative k ∈ L,C can be written as:19












We omit alternative-invariant explanatory variables such as education, income, age, gender and
other individual characteristics as they are very likely to influence voters’ decision to vote for po-
litical outsiders through social and economic conservatism. Another way of putting this is that
we are not interested here in testing hypotheses about why voters are socially or economically
conservative. We want to take their degree of social and economic conservatism as given and
18We leave abstention outside the scope of this paper.
19We have omitted the country-election specific subindices c and t to simplify the notation.
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see what voting strategy this leads voters to adopt when faced with different party alternatives.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.1 indicates that voters are more likely to vote for political alternatives that are closer
to their own views on both the social and economic dimensions. Moreover, as expected, the
negative effect of social distance is substantially decreased among those with lower levels of
trust in political parties: The adverse impact of social distance on the probability to vote for a
political alternative is more than twice as large for voters who have complete trust in political
parties than among voters who do not trust political parties at all. These findings corroborate
the intuition in the model that moderate voters who trust political parties less may turn to
socially radical candidates because their policy positions serve as a signal of their economic
intentions.
We do not find that the effect of distrust is large enough to lead moderate voters with low levels
of trust in political parties to prefer, on average, parties whose social policies are more distant
from their own preferences to parties whose policies are closer. However, this statement holds
true for the mean preferences of moderate voters, and is quite compatible with the existence of
some moderate voters whose preferences may indeed take that form. At all events, the evidence
provides clear support for the view that conservative social preferences are not as off-putting as
might be expected to moderate voters when those moderate voters have low levels of trust in
political parties.
The supplementary tables in section 2.5.3 contain the various robustness tests based on voter
coverage in each country, the definition of socially moderate voters, the time lag between the
date respondents were surveyed and when they voted, and using alternative measures of politi-
cal trust and social outsiders.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore why voters might vote for political candidates who espouse extreme
ideologies that the voters themselves do not support. In particular, we argue that, when the
credibility of politicians’ economic policy announcements is low, voters may vote for candidates
who either promise social policies that the voters do not want, or behave in ways that the voters
do not personally like or admire, because these may be credible signals that the candidates in
question do not belong to the political establishment and may therefore implement more radical
economic policies than the political establishment would be prepared to accept. Such candidates
often fit the description “populist”, and in our model the description is apt to the extent that
radically conservative candidates are indeed more likely than other candidates to be political
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Outsiders.
The main message of the paper is that populist behaviour should be most common when voters’
trust in economic policy announcement is low; when the credibility of social platforms is low;
when the political cost of reneging on social policy announcements once elected is low; and
when there exist alternative ways for voters to evaluate the likelihood that the candidate will
implement policies that run counter to the interests of the Establishment.
This does not mean, however, that all who behave as populists are really outsiders to the po-
litical Establishment or intend to implement redistributive economic policies. In our model,
candidates from the Establishment may pretend to be Outsiders, when the costs of lying are
not too high; and even Outsiders may disappoint those who voted for them by failing to imple-
ment redistributive policies. In the empirical section of the paper, we provide some support for
the main prediction of the model that liberal voters are less sensitive to ideological convergence
with political parties and therefore more likely to vote for social outsiders when they have lower
levels of trust in politicians.
An interesting question for future research would be to test the ”supply side” of our results,
and in particular the prediction that socially radical platforms should be most common when
there is little opportunity for politicians to make credible announcements about economic pol-
icy. We should therefore expect new parties, parties facing unprecedented economic crises and
challenges, and parties that have recently had a change of leadership, to be more likely to show
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2 , we must show that there exists a unique pooling equilibrium which depends on
the relative credibility of social and economic platforms. First, note that it is straightforward
that a separating equilibrium cannot exist as the candidate not sending the signal would always
have an incentive to deviate and send the signal, increasing her payoff doing so.
Let (0, 0) be the no-signal strategy profile played by both candidates. The election is then tied
and the payoff of both candidates is B2 . These strategies are then sequentially rational for the
candidates provided that neither of them could increase their payoff by sending the signal. A
necessary condition for either candidate to increase their payoff when deviating to s = 1 requires
that they get elected with probability 1, which would yield respectively a payoff of B− cE >
B
2
and B > B2 for the Establishment and outsider candidates.
Therefore, the set of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs φ(1, 0) which satisfies the no-deviation
constraint is such that the rep. voter always prefers to vote for the candidate not sending the
signal whenever both strategies s = 0 and s = 1 are played. Under our assumption that φ > 12 ,
this is equivalent to
U [R, 1|(1, 0)] < U [R, 0|(1, 0)] (2.15)









Then, we have that the strategy profile (0, 0) is a PBE of the game under the set of compatible
belief φ whenever ε > 1− v(2φ−1)θu .
A symmetric argument allows to prove that this equilibrium is unique, and that the pooling
equilibrium (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium on the parameter space where ε < 1− v(2φ−1)θu . .
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2 , it can be shown trivially that the separating equilibrium (1, 0) is PBE equilib-
rium of the game. Indeed, both strategies are played in equilibrium, with φ(1, 0) = 1, the rep.
voter elects the outsider which sends the signal, and the outsider and Establishment payoffs are
respectively B and 0, where the Establishment candidate has no incentive to send the signal
since lying is too costly for her.
Also, because sending the signal is a strictly dominated strategy for the Establishment candi-
date, the strategy profile (1, 1) is never an equilibrium, and we are left to check that (0, 0) does
not survive the intuitive criterion.
We know from what precedes that (0, 0) can be a PBE as long as the belief of the rep. voter off
the equilibrium path φ(1, 0) is such that φ <
1+ v
(1−ε)θu
2 . However, when cE >
B
2 , we also have
that strategy s = 1 is equilibrium dominated for the Establishment candidate under any belief
φ(0, 1). Indeed, for any action taken by the rep. voter upon observing the signal, the Estab-
lishment candidate will always be worse-off than under the (0, 0) equilibrium if he chooses to
deviate and send the signal20. Therefore, upon observing signal s = 1, the representative voter
cannot put positive probability weight on the Establishment type and his out-of-equilibrium
belief φ(1, 0) must be equal to 1. Then, because the representative voter prefers to elect an
Outsider candidate when ε < 1 − v
θu
, he will vote for the candidate sending the signal, which
implies that the outsider candidate would be strictly better-off if she sends the signal than under
a (0, 0) equilibrium. The pooling equilibrium therefore does not survive the intuitive criterion,
and (1, 0) is the unique eq. of the game. 
Case where ε ≥ 1− v
θu
Note that when ε ≥ 1− v
θu
, an Establishment candidate is preferred to an Outsider sending the
signal s and a separating eq. thus cannot exist because the outsider is always better off choosing
not to send no signal. Moreover, we have shown before that a pooling equilibrium will exist
where no signal is announced whenever (2.18) is satisfied, and both candidates send the signal
otherwise. Yet, in the absence of demand for political outsiders, we have that ε ≥ 1− v
θu
, which
implies v(1−ε)θu > 1 and
1+ v
(1−ε)θu
2 > 1. By definition, φ(0, 1) ≤ 1, and (2.18) holds for any be-
lief φ(0, 1) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, a pooling no-signal equilibrium is the unique PBE of the game. 
Proposition 3
Case where ε ≤ 1− v
ρθu
We start with the case where ε ≤ 1− v
ρθu
and there is demand for political outsiders.
95
Subcase where ξ ∈ (0, ξl]
When ξ ∈ (0, ξl) and both candidates can afford to lie about their social preferences, we must
show that there exists a unique pooling equilibrium which depends on the relative credibility of
social and economic platforms.
First, it is straightforward to see that truth-telling can never be an equilibrium as the liberal
candidate always has an incentive to deviate to a conservative platform and tie the election,
increasing her payoff doing so.
Let (L,L) be the strategies played by both players. When both candidates play L, the election is







These strategies are sequentially rational provided that neither of them could increase her pay-
off by deviating to a C platform. For neither type k ∈ {l, c} to deviate, it must be that
Vk[L|σ(L,L, µ(L,L)] ≥ Vk[C|σ(C,L, µ(C,L)].
We first establish that the former constraint is binding for the conservative candidate: Note
that the liberal would increase her payoff only if she were to get elected with probability 1
(σ(C,L, µ(C,L) = 1), which would yield a payoff of B− (1− q)ξγl− qll >
B
2 . At the same time,
the conservative candidate would increase her payoff running on a conservative platform if she
gets elected with probability at least equal to 12 (σ(C,L, µ(C,L) =
1






B − (1− q)ξγc
]
− qlc.
Therefore, the set of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs φ(C,L) = p which satisfies the no-deviation
constraint are such that the rep. voter strictly prefers to vote for a liberal candidate upon
observing (C,L), i.e s.t σ(C,L, µ(C,L) = 0. Under our assumption that p > 12 , this is equivalent
to
U [C|C,L] < U [L|C,L] (2.19)
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Therefore, under the assumption that p > 12 , we have that the strategy profile (L,L) is sequen-






is a PBE of the game.
A symmetric argument allows to prove that this equilibrium is unique, and that (C,C) is the







Subcase where ξ ∈ (ξl, 1]
When ξ ∈ (ξl, 1], it can be shown trivially that truth-telling (C,L) is an equilibrium of the
game. Indeed, all strategies are played in equilibrium, with φ(C,L) = 1, and the liberal and
conservative payoffs are respectively Vl[L|σ(C,L, µ(C,L)] = 0 and Vc[C|σ(L,L, µ(L,L)] = B.
Also, because lying is too costly for the liberal candidate, she has no incentive to deviate to C,
and (C,L) is therefore a PBE.
Because announcing C is a strictly dominated strategy for the liberal candidate, we are left to
check that (L,L) does not survive the intuitive criterion: When ξ > ξl, we have that strategy
s = C is equilibrium dominated for the liberal candidate under any belief p. Indeed, for any ac-
tion (voting rule) taken by the rep. voter upon observing a C platform, the liberal candidate will
always be worse-off than under the (L,L) equilibrium if he chooses to deviate to C21. Therefore,
upon observing platform C, the representative voter cannot put positive probability weight on
the liberal type and his out-of-equilibrium belief φ(C,L) must be such that p = 1. Also, because
the representative voter prefers to elect a conservative candidate (recall that ε ≤ 1 − v
ρθu
), he
will vote with certainty for the candidate deviating to a C platform. This implies that the
conservative candidate would be strictly better-off by deviating from a liberal platform L to a
conservative platform C under an (L,L) equilibrium, and that the pooling equilibrium (L,L)
does not survive the intuitive criterion. 
Case where 1− v
ρθu
< ε ≤ 1
Let’s know look at the parameter space where (1 − v
ρθu
< ε ≤ 1) when there exists no signal
that will convince the representative voter to vote for a conservative candidate and a liberal
candidate is therefore always preferred to a conservative one.
Subcase where ξ ∈ (ξc, 1]
If ξ ∈ (ξc, 1], it comes immediately that no pooling equilibrium can exist because lying about
their preferences is too costly for both candidates. It is also trivial to check that truth-
telling is an equilibrium. Indeed, when both candidates announce their preferred social policy,
φ(C,L) = 1, and the voting rule of the rep. voter is σ(C,L, µ(C,L) = 0, from which we obtain
equilibrium payoffs Vl[L|σ(C,L, µ(C,L)] = B and Vc[C|σ(L,L, µ(L,L)] = 0. Also, because ly-
ing is too costly for the conservative candidate, she has no incentive to deviate to L, and (C,L)
is therefore a PBE.
21Even if the rep. voter were to elect a liberal candidate running on a conservative platform with certainty,
the candidate’s payoff would be strictly lower than under the pooling liberal equilibrium: ξ > ξl ⇒ For any
µ ∈ [0, 1]3, Vl[L|σ(L,L, µ(L,L)] > Vl[C|σ(C,L, µ(C,L)]
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Subcase where ξ ∈ (0, ξc]
If ξ ∈ (0, ξc], we have to prove that (L,L) is the only equilibrium. First, notice that (C,L) (truth-
telling) cannot be an equilibrium because the cost of lying for the conservative candidate is low
enough so that she has an incentive to lie and increase her payoff from Vc[C|σ(C,L, µ(C,L)] = 0




B − (1 − q)ξγc
]
− qlc > 0. Second, the rep. voter’s beliefs off the
equilibrium path that are compatible with this equilibrium must be such that no candidates has
an incentive to deviate to C. From what precedes, we know that the no-deviation condition will
be satisfied for beliefs φ(C,L) = p such that the rep. voter will prefer to vote for a conservative
over a liberal platform, which is equivalent to
U [C|C,L] < U [L|C,L] (2.23)
⇐⇒ (2p− 1)
[
(1− ε)ρθu− v] < 2(1− p)ξv (2.24)
When there is no demand for political outsiders, we have that 1 − v
ρθu
< ε ≤ 1, which implies
(2p− 1)
[
(1− ε)ρθu− v] < 0 under our assumption that p > 12 . Hence, (2.24) is always satisfied.
By a symmetric argument, it is trivial to show that there exists no off-the-equilibrum-path
beliefs p such that (C,C) is sequentially rational, and therefore (L,L) is the only PBE of the
game when 1− v
ρθu
< ε ≤ 1 and ξ ∈ (0, ξc].
2.5.2 Tables and figures
Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Gov. ensures safety 7.11 2.43 0 10
Gay rights 2.59 2.82 0 10
Accept immig. from different ethnic back. 4.56 2.9 0 10
Follow traditions 6.58 2.68 0 10
Immig. make country worse place to live 4.88 2.24 0 10
Immig. undermine country’s culture 4.13 2.48 0 10
Voter’s social conservatism (PCA) 4.81 1.74 0 10
Trust in political parties 4.01 2.27 0 10
Social distance 1.96 1.51 0 8.93
Economic distance 3.01 2.05 0 9.91
Source: All variables were standardized on a 0-10 scale for comparability. A higher score
indicates more conservative views. N=95047.
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Table 2.3: Main results
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -7.19∗∗∗ -6.96∗∗∗ -4.55∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.21)
Economic distance -1.76∗∗∗ -1.71∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.092)
Social distance × Trust -0.71∗∗∗
(0.055)
Number of cases 38300 38300 38300
χ2 4230.2 4157.7 4113.3
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
Figures
Figure 2.2: Share of voters left-out
Notes: Reported share of voters left out of the analysis because they refused to give the name
of the party they voted for or because that party was not covered in the CHES database.
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Figure 2.3: Reported share of votes for social outsiders by countries
Notes: Reported vote shares across all ESS rounds (2002 - 2016). The outstanding share
of voters for conservative parties in Turkey are driven by the lack of mainstream party
coverage in the CHES data, the high-non response rate among voters when asked about
the party they voted for, and the fact that the main political party and governing force in
Turkey, the AKP, is very socially conservative and therefore identified as a social outsider
in our model. Our results do not change significantly if Turkey is excluded from the sample.
2.5.3 Supplementary tables
Table 2.4: Sub-sample of countries with voter coverage over 80%
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -9.47∗∗∗ -9.04∗∗∗ -6.62∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.19) (0.41)
Economic distance -1.78∗∗∗ -1.82∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
Social distance × Trust -0.65∗∗∗
(0.10)
Number of cases 25860 25860 25860
χ2 2315.3 2282.5 2331.5
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. The sample includes countries
where at least 80% of voters voted for a party that was covered by the CHES
survey. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
101
Table 2.5: Sub-sample of voters with more moderate views
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -7.37∗∗∗ -7.14∗∗∗ -4.69∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.30)
Economic distance -1.77∗∗∗ -1.72∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.12)
Social distance × Trust -0.72∗∗∗
(0.081)
Number of cases 19156 19156 19156
χ2 2047.1 2095.9 2055.3
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. The sample includes individu-
als in the 5th and 6th of the social conservatism distribution. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
Table 2.6: Sub-sample of voters who voted on year of ESS survey
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -9.36∗∗∗ -9.05∗∗∗ -7.11∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.26) (0.72)
Economic distance -3.56∗∗∗ -3.63∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22)
Social distance × Trust -0.41∗∗
(0.13)
Number of cases 21750 21631 18962
χ2 1571.8 1246.9 1194.0
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. The sample includes only
individuals who voted the year preceding, the same year, or the year after
they were surveyed by the ESS. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
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Table 2.7: Main results, trust in politicians
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -7.19∗∗∗ -6.96∗∗∗ -4.41∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.20)
Economic distance -1.76∗∗∗ -1.71∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.092)
Social distance × Trust -0.76∗∗∗
(0.053)
Number of cases 38300 38300 38239
χ2 4230.2 4157.7 4142.9
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. The regressions are the same
as in the baseline model but use trust in politicians instead of trust in political
parties as a measure of political trust. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
Table 2.8: Main results, alternative def. for social outsiders
(1) (2) (3)
Social distance -7.52∗∗∗ -7.43∗∗∗ -5.23∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.24)
Economic distance -0.99∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.098)
Social distance × Trust -0.65∗∗∗
(0.063)
Number of cases 31150 31150 31150
χ2 3752.2 3697.4 3673.8
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual (case) level.
Sampling design and population weights used. The regressions are the same
as in baseline model defining social outsiders as parties that (i) ranked higher
that 0.9 on the galtan variable or (ii) located at least 3 standard deviations
to the right from the mean of voters’ social conservatism distribution. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
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Chapter 3
A Cross-Country Exploration of




This paper documents the evolution of a range of political preferences among first-generation
immigrants in Western Europe. The overall aim is to study to what extent and at what pace
immigrants adapt to the political norms that prevail in their host countries. I use a cross-
national research strategy to compare and analyze attitudes of foreign-born individuals in 16
European countries and find strong empirical support for assimilation over time: On average,
the opinion gap between natives and immigrants’ political preferences on redistribution, gay
rights, EU unification, immigration policies, and trust level in national governments is reduced
by 40% within 20 years of residence in the destination country. I also provide evidence that most
of this assimilation is driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, and that convergence
in political preferences varies significantly across immigrants’ economic and cultural background
as well as with the size of the immigrant group from their country of origin. Finally, I show
that a substantial part of assimilation on gay rights, immigration and political trust is driven
by acculturation at the national level where immigrants with longer tenure tend to adapt more
to the political preferences of natives in their destination country. These findings shed new light
on the timing and magnitude of the political assimilation of first-generation immigrants, with
potentially important implications for the political economy of immigration policy.
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3.1 Introduction
Modern European countries are witnessing an especially vivid political and social debate about
immigrants’ assimilation and integration into receiving societies. As policymakers of tradition-
ally ”immigrant” countries are struggling to integrate already sizable foreign-born populations
into the economic, political, and social fabric of the state, the recent refugee crisis has increased
concerns among public opinion and the political pressures associated with immigration flows.
The COVID-19 pandemic notwithstanding, dealing with the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity
associated with immigration is therefore one of the most important challenges that European
governments are facing, not least because immigrants’ political preferences can significantly
alter the design and the political economy of public policies in their host society. To gain
a complete understanding of the policy impact of foreign-born populations, and in particular
whether or not immigrant voters represent a distinctly different political bloc from their native
counterparts, scholars need to address a number of issues. What are the patterns of political
assimilation? How do they differ across immigrants of different social, religious, and ethnic
backgrounds? How do they differ across host societies and integration policies? What are the
implications and consequences for economic and electoral outcomes and public policy? How
can institutions help accommodate the political integration of immigrants? The purpose of this
paper is to provide a modest but original contribution to this debate by studying the dynamics
of the opinion gap between immigrants and natives’ political preferences.
Previous literature stresses the important role of cultural transmission in shaping individual
preferences. Immigrants often take cultural values with them from their countries of origin,
and these cultural and preferential traits translate into specific behaviors that have a wide-
ranging, substantial and persistent impact on immigrants’ integration. Transmitted culture is
a long-lived component of preferences for redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Hammar,
2020), family and social values such as fertility and female labour force participation (Fernandez
and Fogli, 2006), living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007), economic behaviour (Guiso et al., 2006;
Tabellini et al., 2010; Henrich, 2000), political and civic participation (Alesina and Giuliano,
2011; Aleksynska, 2011), trust (Algan and Cahuc, 2010), electoral choices (Just et al., 2010),
tax morale (Kountouris, 2013), or environmental preferences (Litina et al. 2016). Another
strand of the large scholarship on immigrants’ integration documents the symmetric influence
of receiving societies on the attitudes of immigrants and their children at destination. Although
assimilation patterns remain highly heterogeneous across destination and origin countries, one
of the general findings in this field is that immigrants’ attitudes tend to converge with those
of native born individuals. In America, immigrants have been found to assimilate with respect
to earnings and labour markets (Borjas, 1995; Uhlendorff and Zimmermann, 2006; Hu, 2000),
occupational mobility (Chiswick et al., 2005; Green, 1999), participation in welfare programs
(Borjas, 2002; Riphahn, 2014), fertility choices (Blau, 1992; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), or
cultural assimilation at large (Abramitzky et al., 2016; Giavazzi et al. 2019). In Europe, sev-
eral contributions highlight the convergence to the norm of foreign-born residents in social and
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economic outcomes (Algan et al., 2012), interpersonal trust (Dinesen et al., 2010), civic partic-
ipation (Aleksynska, 2011), gender roles (Breidahl et al., 2016) and social relations (De Palo et
al., 2007). At the same time, immigrants’ political views on welfare assistance (Dancygier et
al., 2006; Reeskens et al., 2015; Schmidt-Catran et al., 2017), political satisfaction and trust in
institutions (Maxwell, 2010) are also subject to the influence of European host societies.
In my reading, the previous works provide an essential yet incomplete picture of immigrants’
assimilation. While all recognize that the amount of time that immigrants spend in their host
country is one of the major factors of integration, with few exceptions, mostly in the US con-
text, these studies focus on intergenerational differences between immigrants and natives and
adopt a static framework which fails to address the dynamics of assimilation patterns. Instead,
I propose in this paper to track the evolution of first-generation immigrants’ preferences over
time and provide a chronological account that is more appropriate to study assimilation and
ultimately explore the consequences of immigrants’ political participation on policy and elec-
toral outcomes1. Moreover, focusing on intergenerational differences is not necessarily the most
intuitive way of thinking about integration. For instance, first-generation immigrants who em-
igrated to their country of residence at an early age have hardly been exposed to the culture
and institutions of their country of origin prior to relocating. In fact, for many of them, the
only channel of cultural transmission from their origin country is likely to be parental influence.
These ”early” migrants also benefit from increased contact with their host society through
schooling and education, which is likely to play a critical part in their socialization process. In
this regard, one could expect their integration to be closer to that of second-generation immi-
grant than a fellow first-generation immigrant who came to live in that same country at the age
of 50.
My study therefore treats political assimilation as a dynamic phenomenon. Using data from
several rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), I examine the distance and convergence
in preferences between natives and foreign-born immigrants in 16 European countries on the
following political issues: Redistribution, gay rights, EU unification, immigration policy, and
political trust.
I first investigate whether or not immigrants have the same distribution of preferences as com-
parably situated natives, and whether this distribution varies with the time spent in the host
country.2 On average, I find that immigrants are slightly more conservative than natives in
1On this subject, see Aleksynska (2011), whose results show that immigrants’ political involvement in the
political life of their receiving societies increases with the duration of stay and therefore calls for a dynamic
approach to the study of immigrants’ political integration.
2It is worth noting that the ESS has not been designed to include or oversample immigrants, which might
increase the potential for bias in the general analysis. However, previous studies have shown that the ESS
sampling method is reliable when it comes to reflect the actual structure of the population between foreign-born
and native residents and the actual origin countries of the foreign-born immigrants (Castles and Miller, 2003; De
Rooij, 2012). Also, I do not have, for example, panel data on immigrants before and after migration, nor do I have
data on their socioeconomic characteristics while still in their sending countries, and therefore the categorization
of immigrants by duration of stay is not free from composition concerns. In particular, if cross-country migration
decisions are correlated with political preferences, my results could suffer from a self-selection bias. This issue
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terms of welfare preferences. They also hold more restrictive views on gay rights, show greater
levels of trust in national parliaments and are more supportive of EU unification and open
immigration policies. For all political issues but redistribution, the dynamic analysis reveals a
gradual disappearance of migrants’ original preference patterns, suggesting assimilation through
a natural process where they gain access to the same socio-economic opportunities and cultural
traits as natives of the host country. Spending 20 years in the destination country - the average
tenure of first-generation immigrants in the study - therefore reduces the opinion gap by as
much as 40% in matters of immigration, political trust, gay rights and attitudes towards the
European Union. In contrast, immigrants’ support for redistribution coincide with those of
natives after only 5 to 10 years in the destination country.
Next, I build on the segmented assimilation theory (Gordon, 1964; Portes and Zhou, 1994) and
look for variations in assimilation patterns across immigrants’ background and community size.
My intuition is two-fold. First, migrants’ origin country and community size at destination
may create or remove specific barriers to integration which are associated with lagged or incom-
plete political assimilation. Second, the economic approach to cultural integration emphasizes
the importance of individual incentives and of the opportunity costs associated with different
integration patterns (see Lazear, 1999; Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001, 2010; Konya, 2005).
Immigrants may therefore form endogenous preferences about assimilation based on whether
assimilation increases their chances in the host country, which are themselves determined by
immigrants’ cultural or economic background as well as the size of their social networks. My
results show that these characteristics play an important part in shaping both the size of the
preference gap and the speed of assimilation. Assimilation is almost exclusively driven by immi-
grants from non-developed countries, while Western migrants have closer preferences to natives
upon arrival and show no sign of convergence whatsoever. Moreover, cultural legacy and reli-
gious beliefs strongly influence assimilation: Muslim immigrants hold political opinions that are
consistently further away from those of natives than other immigrants, and their views on gay
rights remain much more conservative over time. I also find that immigrants that are better
equipped to integrate economically and socially - either through language proficiency or access
to larger social networks - and for whom the relative value of cultural and political assimilation
is relatively lower are much less likely to assimilate than other immigrants.
In the last part of the paper, I examine immigrants’ gradual adoption of country-specific cultural
norms and conventions. I find that the average political preference in an immigrant’s destination
country has a large and significant effect on her own preference. Moreover, this effect is greater
among immigrants with longer tenure for political preferences on gay rights, immigration, and
trust in national parliaments, suggesting acculturation to country-specific norms.
This paper is directly related to the empirical research that analyzes the political preferences
of immigrants in their host environment. Within this literature, the issue of preferences for
redistribution has probably received the most attention. Dancygier et al. (2006) show that
will be further discussed in the robustness section of the paper.
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immigrants are no more likely to support increased social spending or redistributive measures
than natives and find support for hypotheses highlighting selection effects and the impact of
the immigration regime. Reeskens et al. (2015) analyse the 2008 ”Welfare Attitudes” module
of the European Social Survey and find that differences in welfare opinions are primarily ex-
plained by the more disadvantaged position of immigrants in society. Moreover, their results
suggest that immigrants’ views on welfare closely follow those of the non-migrant population of
the country they are living in, suggesting strong social integration at the opinion level. Using
German longitudinal survey, the findings of Schmidt-Catran et al. (2017) are also consistent
with the claim that immigrants’ welfare preferences are subject to a socializing effect of the
host countries. Turning to political trust, Maxwell (2010) finds that first-generation immi-
grants have more positive attitudes to national governments in Europe while native-origin and
second-generation migrant-origin individuals have similar political trust and satisfaction scores.
He interprets these outcomes as a sign that political expectations about the government are
highly determined by integration factors related to the stages of migration, and in particular
the influence of first-generation migrants’ experience of undemocratic regimes in their home
country. Using the same data, Algan et al. (2012) documents that the gap in political trust
level between first-generation immigrants and natives is exclusively driven by foreign-born indi-
viduals with less than 20 years of residence, while second-generation immigrants hold actually
more negative opinions of national parliaments. The present study is also related to Roeder’s
contribution (2018) on immigrants’ attitudes toward homosexuality, in which she finds that
immigrants in Europe hold overall more negative attitudes than natives, and provides evidence
of both intra and inter-generational acculturation of these attitudes with declining importance
of origin country context. Finally, a recent paper by Giavazzi et al. (2019) contains a com-
prehensive analysis of the values and beliefs of different generations of US immigrants. They
find that attitudes towards politics and redistribution, sexuality, abortion, religious values show
a lower degree of convergence to the prevailing norm than attitudes towards cooperation such
as trustworthiness, helpfulness and fairness. Because my paper attempts to characterize the
political force that immigrants potentially represent, it also speaks to the literature on immi-
grants’ voting behaviour and electoral participation. Within this literature, my approach builds
on Aleksynska (2011), which documents that immigrants actively participate in the life of the
receiving societies, increasingly so with the duration of stay, but that the speed of assimilation
is different for immigrant groups with different background and origin countries.
My contribution to the study of immigrants’ political preferences is innovative in several re-
spects. First, while most existing contributions study the persistence of cultural traits or the
convergence in preferences from one generation of immigrants to the next, I focus on a dynamic
analysis of first-generation immigrants. I am therefore able to provide a more detailed picture
of the speed of political assimilation and quantify the size of the preference gap between im-
migrants and natives at the time of migration and its evolution over time. Also, I study the
differences between natives and immigrants in preferences over national immigration policies
and EU sentiment, which, to the best of my knowledge, have not yet been studied in the litera-
ture, at least in the European context. Third, I present the first large-scale, cross-country study
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on the intra-generational acculturation of immigrants’ political preferences using European data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data used in the anal-
ysis. Section 3.3 outlines the estimation strategy and examines results. The last section con-
cludes.
3.2 Data description
I use 5 rounds of the European Social Survey (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018) and focus on West-
ern European, OECD member states. I also restrict the sample to respondents who were older
than 16 and younger than 100 years old at the time of the interview and distinguish between
natives and first-generation immigrants. Natives are identified as respondents born in their
country of residence with parents also born in their country of residence to avoid the poten-
tially confounding effects of second-generation immigrants, who are excluded from the model.
First-generation immigrants are drawn among individuals born outside of their country of res-
idence, and for whom at least one parent was not born in their country of residence. I decide
to leave out immigrants born in a foreign country but with both parents born in their current
country of residence as members of this group are very likely to be influenced by their parents’
cultural origins and therefore not suited for the exploration of the assimilation hypothesis. To
capture immigrants’ duration of stay in their destination country, I use information provided
by the survey from the 2010 round onwards: All foreign-born respondents in the sample are
asked about the year they first came to live in their host country. I use the difference between
the year respondents were surveyed and the year they claimed to have arrived in the country as
a measure of the years of residence spent at destination3. Foreign-born whose country of origin
and year of arrival in the destination country are not specified are excluded from the analysis.
This leads to an overall sample size of 127,000 observations, of which 12,000 first-generation
immigrants and 115,000 natives in 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. Table 3.1 and 3.2 of the Appendix contain the description of this
sample.
Individual political and policy preferences on five different issues are measured through an ordi-
nal scale. The first one is redistribution. I use respondents’ opinion to the following statement:
”The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, to which respon-
dents are asked if they strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree
strongly. I recode this question on an ascending 4-point scale in the following way: 0 from
strongly disagree to 4 for strongly agree4. Using an identical scale, the second variable captures
political attitudes to homosexuality through respondents’ opinion about the following state-
3The distribution of immigrants’ tenure at destination is presented in Figure 3.1.
4While the 2008 and 2016 ESS rounds have specific modules on welfare preferences, I choose to use the only
question capturing policy preferences for redistribution that is present in all rounds of the survey to maximize
the number of first-generation immigrants in the sample.
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ment ”Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. I use the same
rescaling method as for redistribution to construct the associated dependent variable. Third,
I investigate attitudes towards European Union through respondents’ position about greater
unification of the EU from 0 - ”Unification already gone too far” to 10 - ”Unification must
go further”. Fourth, I look at migrants’ attitudes to immigration policy through respondents’
opinion about the following statement on a 0-3 scale: ”To what extent do you think [country]
should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live
here”5. Last, I study trust in political institutions using respondents’ level of trust in their
residence country’s parliament, on a scale from 0 - ”No trust at all” to 10 - ”Complete trust”.
Table 3.3 and 3.4 summarize the distribution of political preferences for foreign-born and native
individuals. Although differences between them are modest in absolute terms, these descriptive
statistics suggest that immigrants are slightly more opposed to redistribution and gay rights
than Western European natives. They also show markedly higher levels of trust in national
parliaments and support for EU unification, and are in favour of more open immigration policies.
Among immigrants, those with longer duration at destination have views that are significantly
closer to natives as opposed to immigrants with shorter duration, which suggests assimilation
with natives at the political level.
3.3 Empirical analysis
First, I report a descriptive analysis of the patterns of convergence in political attitudes between
natives and first-generation immigrants in Western Europe. This provides an initial indication
of the extent to which immigrants adapt to the political preferences of natives and the speed at
which convergence in attitudes takes place. Second, I investigate whether migrants’ background
and community size matter for political integration. Third, I ran a multivariate analysis limited
to immigrants, in which I examine the effect of natives’ average preferences on each political
issue on immigrants’ own political views in the same country.
3.3.1 The opinion gap in political attitudes between migrants and natives
The point of departure of my analysis is the differences in political preferences between im-
migrants and native-born. I therefore adopt the following specification over the full sample of
natives and immigrants:
Prefijt = α+ β0Firstgeni + β1Resyearsi + γXi + µj + µt + ǫijt (3.1)
5The ESS asks in every round several other questions about individuals’ perception of the level of immigration,
with mentions to migrants’ relative economic position and place of origin. In practice, individual answers to these
questions are strongly correlated, and I therefore choose the most neutral of these statements as the reference
variable.
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where the dependent variable Pref is the preference of individual i surveyed in country j and
ESS round t on a specific political issue. My main independent variables are the dummy vari-
able Firstgen, which takes value 1 if the respondent is foreign-born, and 0 otherwise, and the
continuous variable Res years, which captures the duration of stay of an immigrant in his or
her host country6. In all regressions, I control in vector X for several individual socio-economic
characteristics such as gender, age, whether or not the respondent is married, years of edu-
cation, the respondent’s assessment of his or her financial situation, the size of the household,
individual employment status, whether or not the respondent is a member of an ethnic minority,
and religiosity, education level and work status of the respondent’s partner, household’s income
level (based on the income distribution in the residence country) and primary source of income,
as well as past unemployment experience. I also include a full set of dummy variables for the
country of residence and ESS survey round.
Table 3.6 presents the results of this baseline regression. They confirm the intuition from
the descriptive statistics in Table 3.4. On average, there is a significant opinion gap between
first-generation migrants and natives across all five political variables. After controlling for
socio-economic individual characteristics, first-generation migrants are slightly more opposed
to redistribution, have more conservative views towards gay rights, are more supportive of EU
unification and open immigration policies, and possess higher levels of trust in their host coun-
try’s parliament than natives. These differences vary however in magnitudes. The average
gap in preferences for redistribution (column 2) is very small and corresponds to 0.05 standard
deviation. Ceteris paribus, the marginal effect of being born in a foreign country on attitudes
to redistribution is therefore equivalent to moving up from the 5th to the 6th decile of the in-
come distribution7. This coefficient is however significant at the 1% level, indicating that upon
arrival, migrants coming to live in Western Europe hold generally slightly more conservative
views towards redistribution. Contrary to the welfare magnet hypothesis which posits that
immigrants are benefit tourists who migrate to take advantage of generous welfare services in
the destination country, I therefore observe no support for such a claim, in line with the pre-
vious literature (Dancygier, 2006; Algan et al., 2012). Instead, because immigrants represent
a self-selected group of people that are willing to uproot themselves to migrate and are often
characterized as risk-averse, they may be more likely to believe in effort and individualism and
show greater reluctance to state provided financial assistance.
On the other hand, migration status is one, if not the strongest individual predictor of other
political attitudes. The opinion gap between natives and immigrants on homosexuality, EU,
immigration, and political trust all ranges between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviation. On gay
rights, immigrants have much more restrictive views than natives, which is not surprising if
one considers that most of the migrants in the sample come from non-developed, more socially
6This variable is coded 0 for natives. It therefore applies only to immigrants and is thus effectively an
interaction term.
7The coefficient - not reported here - associated with individual household income decile rank in model (2) is
-0.043.
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conservative countries. This effect is equivalent to 1.6 times the effect of gender on attitudes
to gay rights, and amounts to a 0.365 gap on a 0− 10 scale - while men score on average 0.22
lower than women on that same issue. Turning to attitudes to EU unification, the marginal
effect of being born in a foreign country is almost twice as large as that of living in an urban
area8 and is matched in size only by respondents’ perception of their household’s income. To
the extent that political attitudes towards EU unification reflects political beliefs about interna-
tionalism, it comes as no surprise that first-generation migrants who travelled across borders to
come and live in Europe are more enthusiastic about European integration. Likewise, because
first-generation immigrants experienced the hardship of leaving their home country to go and
settle abroad, they are also significantly more in favour of allowing more immigrants to come
and live in their destination country: The positive effect of being foreign-born in column 11 is
equivalent to having completed 4 additional years of education. Finally, immigrants score 0.6
point higher than natives when asked about their level of trust in national parliaments. Ceteris
paribus, this opinion gap corresponds to the difference that exists between individuals at the
bottom and at the top of the income distribution. A possible explanation for this substantial
gap is that many migrants leave their home country because they are in some way unsatisfied
with the existing political regimes. Poor economic outcomes, conflict, political repression or
other forms of discrimination are among the several motives for which immigrants may hold
particularly negative views about the government of their origin country. At the same time,
existing research has documented that first-generation migrants are more optimistic and posi-
tive about the government of the country where they have self-consciously chosen to emigrate
in hopes of improving their lives (Roder et al, 2012; Maxwell, 2010), and therefore place greater
faith in their destination country’s political institutions.
As a second step, I turn to assimilation by studying the effect of time spent in the destination
country. Controlling for immigrants’ duration of stay in the host country gives more informa-
tion on the timing and structure of the preference gaps. When this regressor is included in
the analysis, the coefficient associated with being a first-generation immigrants captures the
difference in preferences between natives and freshly arrived immigrants. My results show that
the years of residence have a significant and negative effect on the gap between natives and
first-generation migrants for all political preferences. While these changes remain modest in
absolute terms - in the order of a tenth of a standard deviation -, the effect is quite sizable
in relative terms: Spending 20 years - the average residence time of migrants in our sample -
reduces the initial preference gap by as much as 40% in matters of redistribution, gay rights
and immigration policy and up to 50% for political trust and attitudes to EU unification. For
a better grasp of these mechanisms, I analyze the effect of residence time by breaking the first-
generation immigrant sample into cohorts and report graphically the results of the following
estimation:
8The corresponding coefficient in column 8 is 0.381, while individuals living in rural areas score 0.2 unit lower
than urban dwellers in the same model.
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Prefijt = β0 + βk
∑
k
Cohortki + γXi + µj + µt + ǫijt (3.2)
where X contains the same individual control variables as model (3.1)9. I break down the im-
migrants sample into 7 time cohorts, and let Cohortk be the dummy variable that takes value
1 if an individual belongs to cohort k, and 0 otherwise10.
The blue lines in the graphs of Figure 3.2 show a strong convergence of political attitudes over
time between natives and all first-generation immigrants. With the exception of redistributive
preferences, where a statistically significant opinion gap remains between natives and immi-
grants with more than 45 years spent at destination, it is very modest in size and orders of
magnitude smaller than the existing gap between immigrants upon arrival and natives. An-
other interesting feature of these results is the pace at which convergence in attitudes takes
place.
My findings show a very flexible adjustment of redistributive preferences, where immigrants’
support for redistribution coincides with those of natives after only 5 to 10 years in the desti-
nation country. As discussed previously, immigrants’ welfare preferences are relatively close to
natives’ upon arrival, and a possible explanation for this swift convergence is that immigrants’
access to welfare services improves significantly after a few years of residence in their destination
country when they obtain legal permanent residency and are therefore entitled to the same ben-
efits as natives11. This interpretation is also in line with the findings of Renema et al. (2019)
that immigrants are indeed more supportive of spending on welfare to which they perceived
they have greater access, and consistent with the contributory nature of many welfare schemes
such as unemployment benefits or social security which require individuals to have participated
for some years before they can benefit from them.
In contrast, it takes 20 years before any statistically significant change in immigrants’ relative
attitudes towards gay rights shows up. Political opinions about gay rights have arguably fewer
self-interested motives and greater religious and cultural roots than the other political outcomes
studied in this paper, which could explain why immigrants’ policy preferences take a long time
to change.12
Surprisingly, I find that foreign-born attitudes towards immigration become more negative over-
9While being important in predicting political preferences, household income level is missing for almost one
fifth of the sample, for both immigrants and native-born. In regressions similar to model (1) without the income
variable, coefficients retain their significance, and most of them change only marginally in magnitude. I therefore
omit income decile rank in model (2) and all further estimations.
10The number of observations for each cohort is available in Table 3.3.
11According to many, permanent residency outweighs citizenship as the relevant eligibility criterion for accessing
welfare benefits in Europe (see for instance Guiraudon, 2002; or Koopmans, 2010).
12This of course assumes away the sexual orientation of respondents, which is not reported in the survey.
However, given that sexual orientation is relatively stable, we shall not be concerned with the possibility that
migrants’ sexual orientation change over time to coincide with that of natives. This pattern could also result
from the fact that the ESS question about gay rights is the only dependent variable that does not explicitly refer
to the current situation in the host country, leading respondents to express views that are less directly influenced
by national contexts.
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time and converge to those of natives. Rather than showing solidarity with future potential
migrants, they appear to be subject to a club effect as their support for immigration starts to
decrease sharply after 10 years in the destination country once their position has become less
vulnerable13.
Finally, the bottom graphs in Figure 3.2 reveal that the opinion gap in trust in national par-
liaments and attitudes to EU unification is also reduced significantly over time. Whether it
is driven by cultural changes or the slow updating of the quality of government and the role
played by the European Union is still unclear at this stage. However, political assimilation
of attitudes to domestic and international institutions exhibit different trajectories: While no
significant difference remains between immigrants and natives after 20 years in terms of support
of EU unification, it takes over 45 years before foreign-born individuals’ level of trust in national
parliaments is the same as natives’.
Before moving further into the analysis, I run the previous regressions excluding immigrants
who came to live in their country of residence under the age of 15.14 The reason is two fold.
First, as already mentioned in the introduction, immigrants who came to live at an early age in
their country of residence are not only much less exposed to the culture and institutions of their
country of origin prior to relocating, but also have increased contact with native society through
schooling and education, which is likely to play a critical part in their assimilation15. Second,
because the ESS surveys individuals aged 15 and older, the distribution of the number of years
spent in the country of residence is heavily skewed to the left among these migrants compared
to those who came to live at an adult age. This could lead to a compositional bias if those
migrants arrived at an early age are only represented in older cohorts (i.e among immigrants
that have spent more time in the host country). If these migrants have views that are closer to
natives, this would in turn artificially increases convergence in attitudes. The red line in each
graph of Figure 3.2 shows that this convergence bias exists but remains very modest in size.
The general trend observed for the full sample of immigrants holds when I reduce the sample to
those who came to live in their country of residence at an adult age. Convergence in political
attitudes is only slightly weaker among these late migrants on matters of homosexuality and
EU unification, indicating that some of the most assimilated immigrants have been excluded
from the analysis. Besides, there is no significant difference in political orientations whether
early migrants are excluded from the sample or not in terms of political trust. The pattern for
redistribution preferences for the full sample and the late sample are also remarkably similar,
and age at arrival matters little in the pace and extent to which migrants’ preferences over
immigration policy converge with natives’ views.
13Although immigrants can face deportation, those who have lived more than 5 to 10 years are in general well
settled in their host country and unlikely to face such deportation threats.
14These migrants represent around 25% of the entire first-generation migrant sample.
15In fact, for an overwhelming majority among them, the only channel of transmission of culture from their
origin country is parental influence.
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3.3.2 Differences in assimilation patterns across immigrant groups
The main objective of this section is to provide a more complete picture of assimilation by
looking at patterns of convergence across immigrants with different backgrounds. To do that,
I build on the segmented assimilation literature and look for systematic variation across differ-
ent sub-groups of immigrants. Because political and economic factors at the origin can affect
significantly the way immigrants assimilate (Borjas, 1987), I first split the immigrant sample
into sub-samples of developed and non-developed countries of origin16. This division poten-
tially reflects the costs of integration, considering that Western migrants have an economic,
political, social and cultural background that is closer to Western European natives17. Another
significant barrier to integration is racial and ethnic discrimination. Contemporary non-white
migrants in Europe may face intense discrimination even after living in the host country for
a very long time. This discrimination creates numerous social, economic, and political prob-
lems for integration. Because the ESS does not ask about respondent’s ethnicity, I use religion
instead and more specifically Islam - the most stigmatized religion in Europe -. Building on
previous evidence highlighting potentially different assimilation patterns for Muslim immigrants
(Constant et al., 2006; Bisin et al., 2008), I split the sample between immigrants with Muslim
religious denomination and immigrants with none or all other religious belonging. I also look
at whether the convergence in political attitudes is stronger for first-generation migrants whose
country of origin shared a common language with their destination country. Because linguistic
and colonial ties can be regarded as a vector of cultural transmission, I expect immigrants who
possess those traits to hold political opinions that are closer to those of Western European18.
Finally, I investigate the effect of the size of immigrant communities on the political assimilation
of their members. On the one hand, immigrants’ local context and contact with co-ethnics may
shape their political preferences through network effects that help them adjust to their new
environment. For instance, economists have found that information about the welfare state and
its benefits can be spread through networks and social chains. In particular, increased neighbor-
hood contact with co-ethnics with above-average welfare participation rates may raise individual
welfare use (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000; Borjas and Hilton, 1996), which may
in turn increase support for government redistribution. In this regard, bigger immigrant com-
munity can facilitate assimilation. In contrast, another strand of the economics literature on
cultural transmission argues that a bigger community size decreases immigrants’ incentives to
integrate. The underlying trade-off weighs cultural against economic incentives, which posits
that there exists a large enough critical mass of immigrants that if the group maintains its
distinct culture then, for any immigrant, the cost of switching culture outweighs the benefits
16The list of developed countries includes EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, the USA, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Israel. All other countries are treated as non-developed.
17A further distinction was made between migrants originating from democratic countries VS those coming from
non-democratic countries at the time of migration. Due to the high correlation between economic development
and the level of democracy, the results were very similar to the analysis conducted on the developed and non-
developed samples and are therefore not reported here.
18Data on language proximity comes from the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter-
nationales).
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of increased interaction. To the extent that political preferences have an important cultural
component, one could expect foreign-born that belong to bigger communities to assimilate less
because they have more limited benefits from such assimilation. Following previous studies on
community behavior (see Card et al., 2008; Munshi, 2013; Advani et al., 2015; Giavazzi et al.,
2019), I split the immigrant sample based on community size. For each foreign-born individual,
I compute the share of immigrants from the same origin country living in his or her destination
country, and distinguish between those for whom this community represents less or more than
1% of the destination country’s total population.19
Average opinion gaps are reported in Table 3.7. Taken together, they suggest that immigrants
from more developed countries, non-Muslim migrants, and migrants who originate from a coun-
try that shares a common language with their destination country have political preferences
that are closer to natives on matters of homosexuality, EU, and political trust. Because pol-
itics in developed countries is a relatively homogeneous set that includes democracy and free
market institutions since the beginning of the post-WWII era, individuals from these countries
are arguably more familiar with the functioning of parliamentary democracies, therefore show-
ing more similar levels of trust in parliaments to natives than immigrants from non-developed
countries. Also, individuals in developed countries usually have more liberal attitudes to ho-
mosexuality, and it is not surprising that their views are not significantly different from those
of native-born Western Europeans. Finally, because 85% of migrants from developed countries
in the sample are EU citizens, their attitudes towards EU unification are obviously closer to
those of fellow EU-citizen, Western European native-born. Turning to the opinion gap across
religious sub-groups, most of Muslim immigrants come from countries ruled by undemocratic
political regimes, sometimes where political institutions have collapsed or failed so badly that
they represent one of the main reasons why immigrants chose to emigrate in the first place.
As a result, immigrants’ preferences continue to be influenced by the quality of government
and institutions in their origin country even when living in their host country, which leads to
relatively better opinions about Western political institutions, either national - country parlia-
ments - or international - the European Union -. It is also very intuitive that these migrants
hold significantly more conservative views on gay rights if one considers that Islam strongly pro-
hibits homosexuality. Moreover, Table 3.7 indicates that immigrants who come from a country
that shares a common language with their destination country are also more likely to hold
preferences that are close to European natives. This is reflected for instance by the coefficients
on preferences about redistribution and gay rights, as well as the coefficients associated with
immigrants’ perception of political institutions, both domestic and European. Finally, no clear
patterns emerge for immigrants that belong to larger communities and networks. The opinion
gaps for redistributive preferences are remarkably similar, and while immigrants with larger
19I use 2010 national Census data provided by the OECD International Migration Database. I group immigrants
from Czech Republic, Slovakia and former Czechoslovakia into a single group. Moreover, I also exclude from the
analysis immigrants whose country of birth is listed as USSR because the ESS does not report which of the
former soviet states these immigrants came from.
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communities retain significantly higher levels of trust in national parliaments, they are in con-
trast much closer to natives in terms of support for EU unification, and their views are on
average not statistically different from other immigrants on gay rights and immigration.
I now replicate the dynamic analysis of model 3.2 on the sub-groups of immigrants.20 Figure
3.3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively contains the results of this analysis for immigrants subgroups based
on economic development, religion, language, and community size.
First, no significant differences exist between the various sub-groups of migrants under study
at the time of arrival on preferences for redistribution. While migrants belonging to smaller
communities and those who do not share a common language with their destination country
appear less supportive of redistribution upon arrival, the confidence interval of their respective
sub-groups is too large to draw any conclusions about their relative preferences that would
pass the test of statistical significance. No distinctive pattern of assimilation therefore emerges
for any of the subgroups under consideration, and the evidence points towards an assimilation
process where migrants’ cultural and social background plays a relatively small part.
Policy preferences on gay rights paint a very different picture. Upon arrival, immigrants from
developed countries exhibit no significant differences with natives, and this gap remains statisti-
cally insignificant over time (see Figure 3.3). This suggests that immigrants from non-developed
countries are the main group driving the general convergence on attitudes to gay rights. Across
religious sub-groups, a striking pattern emerges from Fig. 4. Muslim foreign-born are not only
significantly more opposed to gay people living their life as they wish than non-Muslim first-
generation migrants, but they also show no sign of assimilation. While the views of non-Muslim
migrants slowly catch up to natives’, those of Muslim immigrants remain about 1 point lower
on a 0-4 scale throughout.
On political trust in national parliaments, immigrants coming from a developed country assim-
ilate faster but this is mostly the product of smaller initial differences at the time of migration.
Moreover, because Muslim migrants are more likely to suffer from discrimination, one would
expect that they show lower levels of trust in government as a result. Yet, my findings point
in the opposite direction. Although some convergence with natives is taking place, they exhibit
consistently higher levels of trust in political institutions than other immigrants, at least 1 point
higher on the 0-10 scale regardless of the number of years spent in their destination country.
On the other hand, non-Muslim immigrants assimilate completely after 35 years of residence.
As outlined previously, a plausible explanation is that Muslim immigrants judge the quality
of government and political institutions based on the previous experience of their home states,
which are often ruled by undemocratic regimes. A similar pattern is also visible when we turn
to community size. Immigrants from smaller communities strongly assimilate while the relative
level of trust in national parliaments changes little among immigrants living among numerous
co-ethnics.
On immigration policies, Figure 3.3 reveals that the preferences of immigrants from devel-
20Because the number of observations in each sub-group is smaller than in the full sample used in model 2, the
number of cohorts is reduced from 7 to 5 groups.
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oped countries are relatively closer to those of natives upon arrival but never close the gap
with them21. On the other hand, immigrants from less developed countries are significantly
more supportive of immigration at the time of migration but this support decreases over time
to the point where they hardly show any differences with natives after 35 years, driving the
general convergence in attitudes observed in Figure 3.2. A possible intuition behind these pat-
terns of convergence is the different nature of migration for individuals from developed and
non-developed countries. Indeed, immigrants from developed countries are less subject to re-
emigration,22 which could explain why their opinion on border control and immigration policy
remain more liberal than those of other foreign-born residents. Attitudes towards EU unification
confirms the previous intuition. Although their views are significantly closer to those of natives
upon arrival, migrants from developed countries show no sign of assimilation while support for
EU unification decreases significantly among immigrants coming from non-developed countries.
On a more general level, the heterogeneity across different subgroups of immigrants provides
valuable insight on the drivers of political assimilation.
Upon arrival, immigrants from developed countries, non-Muslim immigrants, and immigrants
sharing a common language hold political views that are closer to those of natives than other
immigrants, which highlight the role played by cultural proximity.23
Moreover, the dynamic analysis provides empirical support for the economic models of cultural
integration with endogenous preferences. As suggested previously, the difference in convergence
patterns between immigrants from developed and non-developed countries can be explained
by group-specific incentives to assimilate. First, immigrants from developed countries have a
lower intended duration of stay in their residence country and a higher propensity among the
former to re-emigrate, which reduce the relative value of integration. Second, origin country
characteristics make it more costly for migrants from non-developed countries to return to their
home state and more difficult to reverse the migration, which in turn enhance their assimilation
process (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996).
I also find that immigrants that are part of a community that represents less than 1% of the
destination country’s population start assimilating sooner than other immigrants. In particular,
my findings indicate that the general reduction in the opinion gap observed after 20 years spent
in the destination country in section 3.3.1 is driven almost exclusively by those immigrants be-
longing to smaller communities24. To a lesser extent, slower convergence in political preferences
21The fact that immigrants from developed countries are less supportive of open immigration policies than
migrants from non-developed countries upon arrival can be explained by the fact that many of them come from
countries with a large share of foreigner residents where immigration policy itself is a contentious issue.
22See for instance Bratsberg et al. (2007), who show that the retention rate of immigrants from OECD countries
is below 30% while that for immigrants from non-Western countries is above 75%.
23Although the present analysis does not allow to disentangle elements of preferences that reflect the current
economic and institutional environment from those that reflect culture, it does not affect the general conclusion
that cultural background matters for political assimilation.
24Because of the scarcity of historical data on immigrants’ birth country, the relative size of immigrant com-
munities is measured in 2010. My proxy of community size is therefore potentially problematic for immigrants
who migrated a long time ago, when the number of immigrants from the same country of origin was significantly
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is observed among immigrants whose country of origin shares a common language with their
destination country. Because language proficiency and access to larger social networks increase
immigrants’ chances in the host country, it is possible that this slower convergence reflects the
lower relative value of cultural and political assimilation for these immigrants.25
3.3.3 The role of host societies
The previous section suggests that immigrants’ institutional, cultural, and religious background
as well as the size of their community are important drivers of the preference gap with natives
and potentially reflect the cost and benefit structure of assimilation. In this section, I inves-
tigate a different aspect of the key mechanisms driving assimilation. In light of the fact that
the political assimilation of foreign-born immigrants is almost exclusively driven by individuals
from non-developed countries outside Europe, I ask the following question: Does assimilation
result from destination country effects and immigrants’ gradual adoption of country-specific
cultural norms and conventions, or do migrants adjust to a set of institutions and opportunity
structures that are not specific to their country of residence, but rather the product of Western
Europe’s cultural, political and economic heritage, such as free-market economies, democratic
institutions, multicultural societies, and general distrust in modern-day democratic politics,
both domestically and at the European level? To answer this question, I look at the role played
by destination country-specific culture and institutions through acculturation, i.e. the tendency
of immigrants to adapt over time to the political preferences of natives in their destination
country.
Because of the limited number of countries in the study, using a regression such as (3.1) on
the immigrant sample and including measures of national mean political preferences and other
institutional and economic characteristics at the country level is problematic. If included one at
a time, these measures will capture all other unobserved country effects, and their own effect will
not be identified. If, instead, they are included into regressions together, the problem is their
high collinearity and limited variation. To tackle this issue, I adopt the two-stage methodology
formalized by Card and Krueger (1992), and applied to studying culture transmission by Blau
(1992), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), and Aleksynska (2011). In the first stage, I estimate the
following regression for immigrants with destination country fixed effects:
different than in 2010. However, the birth country composition of foreign-born populations in the sample is
highly correlated overtime. Because my measure of community size depends ultimately on the relative size of
these populations, this reduces the risk of misallocation between small and big immigrant communities. Also,
the main difference in assimilation across communities regards immigrants with shorter tenure - i.e less than 20
years since migration -, for which the 2010 Census data is a more accurate proxy of the actual composition of
the foreign-born population than for immigrants with longer tenure.
25The literature has found that language proficiency has a positive effect on employment probabilities of
immigrants (see Dustmann et al. (2003), and that migrant networks can lead to better economic prospects when
the corresponding community is well-established (Colussi, 2015; Beaman, 2012).
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Prefijtk = α+ γXi + δjtk + ǫijtk (3.3)
To make sure that I am able to isolate the effect of national political culture on immigrants’
preferences, the X vector includes all individual controls from model (3.1), as well as several
migrant-specific additional controls that are likely to influence political opinions. In particular,
I know from what precedes that cross-national differences in immigrants’ attitudes could orig-
inate from composition effects, especially in terms of the origin and religion of immigrants. I
therefore include a categorical variable to control for the region of origin of immigrants26 as well
as a full set of dummy variable controlling for religious affiliation. I also control for whether
migrants have the citizenship of their country of residence, and whether they possess EU citi-
zenship or not.
Coefficient δjtk captures destination country effects that are both time and cohort specific.
These regressions are estimated separately for each survey round t because of the country-
specific shocks on political preferences between 2010 and 2018.27 Also, to capture the differen-
tiated effect of destination country preferences on immigrants with more or less residence time,
I split the immigrants sample into 2 cohorts using the median tenure among immigrants. The
subindex k distinguishes between migrants that have lived less or more than 15 years in the
destination country. I also restrict the sample to country-year pairs for which I have at least 25
observations in each sub-group of immigrants28.
In the second stage, the vectors of coefficients on destination country effects δ are regressed on
destination country variables in a pooled regression with all survey rounds, in order to explain
ceteris paribus differences in political preferences:
δjtk = β0 + β1kPref jt + β2Cjt + µt + ǫjtk (3.4)
where δ is the coefficient on the dummy variable for cohort k, destination country j in survey
round t estimated from equation (3.3), Pref jt are natives’ average political preferences in year
t and Cjt are destination country variables that include time-specific destination country per
capita GDP and share of foreign-born population29. Regressions are estimated by weighted least
26These groups are Africa, South Asia, East Asia, MENA, Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries, South-
ern Europe, and South America and the Caribbean. A detailed list of immigrants by country of birth is available
in Table 3.10.
27Prominent examples of major international events that had country-specific political consequences include
the 2008 economic and financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, or Brexit.
28Immigrants from Finland (rounds 2010, 2014, 2016), Italy (2012), Norway (2016), and Portugal (2014, 2016)
were therefore excluded from the analysis because too few migrants were surveyed to permit meaningful analysis.
Estimating baseline model (1) with the resulting sample yields very similar results to the original one.
29Natives’ mean score in country j and round t on a given political issue is computed using the average across
native respondents, weighted by design weights.
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squares, with first-stage inverse sampling variances of the estimated effects serving as weights30.
Coefficient β1k then captures the cohort-specific marginal effect of natives’ mean political pref-
erences as predictor of immigrants political preferences in the destination country.31
Before discussing the results of model (3.3) and (3.4), I provide in Table 3.8 a preliminary es-
timation on the full sample of immigrants - i.e where all immigrants are pooled into a unique
time cohort -. Panel A provides an example of coefficients on destination-country fixed effect δ
from the first-stage regression in the 2012 ESS round. Panel B summarizes second-stage results
for the full sample of immigrants based on first-stage destination country coefficients pooled
across survey rounds. For each political preference, the first specification presents the results
including only a measure of natives’ mean political preferences as explanatory variables while
the second specification presents the results when destination country per capita GDP and the
share of foreign-born population are added. In the absence of controls, the mean preference
variable is positive and highly significant for all political items, and the R2 values are sizable,
indicating that variation in destination country mean political preferences explains an impor-
tant proportion of the variation in the coefficients that captures immigrants’ country-specific
preferences. Moreover, regressions with controls show that among destination country vari-
ables, natives’ mean political preferences remain extremely important in explaining first-stage
destination-country fixed effects.
In the next table (Table 3.9), I run the analysis corresponding to model 3.3 and 3.4 where I dis-
tinguish between immigrants with respectively less and more than 15 years of residence in their
destination country. I find that the explanatory power of natives’ mean political preferences
increases significantly with tenure for three of the five dependent variables. The coefficient is
more than twice as large for attitudes to gay rights, and a sizable, although less spectacular gap,
exists for preferences on immigration policies (1.7 times larger) and trust in national parliaments
(1.2 times larger). These differences suggest that an acculturation of immigrants’ preferences to
country-specific norms takes place on these issues. The acculturation of immigrants’ preferences
on social issues such as homosexuality and immigration is not surprising and reflects the diver-
sity of opinions in Western Europe, which are themselves the product of cultural and religious
traditions and immigration history32. On the other hand, acculturation of political trust may
seem counter-intuitive at first since little variation exists across Western Europe democracies in
terms of political regimes. It is however consistent with the cultural theories on political trust,
which hypothesize that trust in political institutions originates outside the political sphere in
long-standing and deeply seated cultural beliefs about people.33
30This allows to control for possible within country correlation of regression errors in the first-stage.
31The results are robust to using the mean tenure (20 years of residence) as a threshold and to the inclusion
of country-year survey rounds with less than 25 immigrant observations.
32For instance, while all European countries have received an increasing number of immigrants in the past
decade, Scandinavian and Northern European countries are historically regarded as immigration countries,
whereas Southern European states such as Portugal, Italy, and Spain are mostly considered as emigration coun-
tries.
33see Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993), and the findings of Dinesen et al. (2010), who show that an intergenera-
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In contrast, Table 3.9 indicates that no acculturation takes place in the long-run for preferences
over redistribution and attitudes to EU unification. The explanatory power of natives’ mean
political preferences on immigrants’ support for redistribution increases slightly with tenure,
but this increase is far from significant. In line with the interpretation suggested in section
3.3.1, this result lends support to the idea of a flexible adjustment of immigrants’ attitudes to
redistribution, where foreigners gain access to welfare services and face the same opportunity
structures as native-born individuals after a few years of residence in their destination country.
Thus, I hypothesize that natives’ attitudes towards redistribution may predict cross-national
differences in immigrants’ attitudes through self-selection rather than changes in cultural val-
ues in the long run. Moreover, the strong assimilation of preferences towards EU unification
observed in Section 3.3.1 does not seem to be driven by country-specific attitudes. The coef-
ficient associated with natives’ mean preferences is slightly lower for immigrants with longer
tenure and the difference between both cohorts is nowhere near statistical significance. Two
distinct channels can potentially explain this result. First, it is likely that the perception of
EU institutions as whole influences immigrants’ political attitudes about greater unification. In
this context, international political institutions are often regarded as responsible for individual
economic outcomes, and assimilation could then simply reflect the general distrust in traditional
political institutions that has accompanied the rise of populism and anti-EU rhetoric in West-
ern Europe over the past 20 years. A second possibility is that over time, migrants develop an
attachment to their country of residence which, in turn, favors nationalistic feelings and more
hostile views towards the EU, regardless of their destination country.
This last section documents the long-term acculturation of immigrants’ political preferences
about gay rights, immigration, and political trust to country-specific norms and conventions.
I shall stress that in the current framework, it is not possible to claim with certainty that
this acculturation is driven by an actual shift in cultural beliefs. Indeed, while cross-country
differences suggest that political preferences may have an important cultural component, they
are also determined by contextual and institutional determinants. For instance, I would expect
differences in political preferences to be influenced by economic, political, or social aspects of the
environment and reflected in the national policies associated with each of these preferences. If
this is the case, I cannot rule out the possibility that migrants slowly update information about
the current context in their destination country, and that my estimates are simply picking up
this slow updating rather than the true effect of cultural changes. Unfortunately, testing the
role played by each of these mechanism is not possible with the ESS data. It therefore remains
an important question but one that lies outside the scope of this paper.
tional acculturation of trust takes place among non-western foreign-born individuals upon migrating to Western
Europe
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3.3.4 Robustness to self-selection bias
A primary concern when examining the preferences of immigrants is selection. Cross-country
migration decisions are clearly non-random, and my primary issue here regards out-migration
and the possibility that migrants with preferences closer to natives stay longer in their coun-
try of residence, which would bias my results. In fact, in a recent report, the OECD (2008)
estimates that, depending on the countries and time periods considered, 20 to 50 percent of
immigrants leave their host country within the first five years after arrival. In 2011, for some
of the countries under consideration in this study, foreign-born outflows stood respectively at a
ratio of 41 percent, 64 percent, and 76 percent for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain.
In the case of Europe, close to 50 percent of the original arrival cohort has left the destination
country ten years after arrival. If temporary migrants are negatively self-selected with respect
to their opinion gap with natives, the tenure effect that I identify in the general analysis would
reflect this self-selection mechanism rather than political assimilation.
Ideally, I would have longitudinal data to control for these cohort effects. In the absence of
such data, I turn to the existing literature on temporary migration. This literature identifies
several individual characteristics of return migrants in Europe which indicate that we should
not be too concerned with the possibility that the previous results are driven by self-selection
of less integrated foreign-born individuals into return migration. First, immigrants from poorer
countries outside Europe are less likely to depart. For instance, in Norway, although the av-
erage re-emigration rate after five years is about 50%, the retention rate of immigrants from
OECD countries is below 30% while that of immigrants from non-Western countries is above
75% (Bratsberg et al., 2007). Likewise, in Sweden, the probability that an immigrant will leave
the country is lower amongst immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe (Nekby, 2006).
Against this backdrop, my analysis shows that convergence in political attitudes is primarily
driven by immigrants from non-developed countries, which are therefore the least subject to
return migration. If self-selection was indeed driving the results, I would estimate a compar-
atively stronger assimilation effect among Western-born immigrants, who are relatively more
likely to re-emigrate than migrants from less developed countries. Second, the return rate in
OECD countries after five years is not much higher than the return rate after three years among
working-age immigrants, suggesting that immigrants who leave their country of destination do
so relatively shortly after arrival. This result is largely explained by the fact that, in many
European countries, an immigrant can obtain a long-term residence permit after five years of
residence, or even take out the nationality of the host country. More generally, the longer a
migrant stays in the host country, the less likely he or she is to return home or emigrate to a
third country (OECD, 2008; Nekby, 2006). In contrast, my findings indicate that the conver-
gence of immigrants and natives’ political preferences goes on for several decades after the time
of migration and is therefore not particularly prone to selection effects that may occur dur-
ing the first years of residence in the host country34. Finally, the re-emigration rate of highly
34This, in turn, would be problematic if most of the assimilation took place between the first and second
cohorts of our sample, i.e between immigrants with less than 5 years of residence and those with 6 to 10 years of
residence. One exception is redistributive preferences, for which I cannot exclude that the interpretation of the
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skilled immigrants is above the average (OECD, 2008), and immigrants with higher earnings
have shorter intended stay: Data from the US New Immigrant Survey (NIS) and the German
Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) have shown that working-age immigrants with higher level of
education were significantly less likely to report an intention to stay permanently than their
less educated counterparts, suggesting that immigrants’ plans to return differ along the distri-
bution of pre-migration education (see Dustmann, 2003). I ran separate analyses for low and
high educated migrants, and found that while high-educated migrants converge more rapidly to
natives’ views on matters of homosexuality, trust, and immigration, assimilation remains strong
and statistically significant among low-skill migrants, indicating that my general effect is not
primarily driven by the self-selection of more skilled migrants into return migration.
3.4 Conclusion
As the proportion of immigrants is growing in developed countries, they increasingly influence
the scope, shape, and directions of the political life of receiving communities. This paper doc-
uments the political assimilation of immigrants and therefore contributes to the understanding
of the potential political and electoral consequences of these demographic changes. It presents a
descriptive analysis of first-generation immigrants’ political preferences on redistribution, homo-
sexuality, immigration, political trust and attitudes to EU unification, and builds on assimilation
theory and economic models of cultural transmission to inform the interpretation of the results.
For all political outcomes with the exception of redistribution, I find that immigrants hold
on average much different views from natives, and that migration status has a greater effect
on these preferences than any other individual traits I am able to control for. In particular,
foreign-born immigrants hold more restrictive views on gay rights but show greater levels of
trust in national parliaments and are more supportive of EU unification and open immigration
policies. Moreover, I find strong empirical support in favour of assimilation: The preference
gap between immigrants and natives gradually closes over time as immigrants’ preferences con-
verge to the norm, and the residual difference in preferences for immigrants with the longest
tenure is negligible. In contrast, at the time of migration, immigrants are only slightly more
conservative than European natives, and these differences disappear after only a few years in the
destination country. My findings also suggest that differences in migrants’ religious, linguistic
and economic background play an important role in shaping both the size of the preference gap
with natives and the speed of assimilation. Political assimilation is almost exclusively driven
by immigrants from non-developed countries, and religious beliefs play an important part in
this assimilation process. Muslim immigrants hold political opinions that are consistently more
distant from those of natives than non-religious immigrants or immigrants who belong to an-
other religious denomination, and remain much more conservative than natives on the issue of
gay rights over time. I also find that immigrants with greater language proficiency or access to
results may suffer from this bias.
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larger social networks are less likely to assimilate, suggesting that immigrants may form endoge-
nous preferences about the relative value of cultural and political assimilation, in line with the
economic literature on cultural transmission. Finally, I show that assimilation of preferences
on gay rights, immigration policy and trust in national parliaments is driven by acculturation
to country-specific norms, while the convergence patterns of attitudes to EU unification in the
long run cannot be explained by national specificities.
Throughout the analysis, the nature of political preferences appears to have a significant impact
on the way immigrants assimilate beside individual characteristics and host countries’ environ-
ment. On the one hand, they reflect the economic and social integration of immigrants and their
access to the same opportunities as natives. At the same time, they also have large cultural un-
derpinnings, which traditionally take longer to evolve. In the current setting, I cannot however
disentangle the role played by each of these channels. More research in this direction is necessary.
From a policy perspective, my study informs the design of naturalization and citizenship poli-
cies, which are, with very few exceptions, the only way to become eligible to vote in national
elections in Western Europe. By providing a detailed account of the chronological changes in
political preferences between natives and first-generation immigrants, this paper helps policy
makers in receiving countries to estimate how the conditions and timing of access to natural-
ization and citizenship can affect the consequences of foreign-born residents on electoral and
political outcomes.35
Last, this paper and the extant literature have documented the influence of European political
norms on the preferences of first-generation immigrants from outside Europe. One may ask
symmetrically whether immigrants who bring with them the culture of their origin country
are in a position to influence natives at destination. Tabellini and Giuliano (2020) go some
way towards answering this question and find that immigration left its footprint on American
ideology via cultural transmission at the time of the New Deal. This paper neither intends to,
nor can provide an answer to this question in the European context. However, whether such
influence and transformation of existing societies are indeed taking place is an important issue
for further research.
35In practice, second-generation immigrants born in Western Europe are de facto eligible to naturalization
before they reach the age of voting, both in jus soli countries and those with a mixed citizenship regime. The
consequences of immigrants’ political integration are therefore directly and substantially impacted by citizenship
policies through the size and composition of the foreign-born population that they add to the franchise.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Tables and figures
Table 3.1: Sample statistics, Destination countries
Destination country Total number Native-born Foreign-born as Percent of foreign- Number of
of obs. % of sample % of sample born with over ESS rounds
20 yrs. of residence
Austria 7,734 89.67 10.33 55.07 4
Belgium 8,223 86.87 13.13 42.04 5
Denmark 4,486 93.89 6.11 53.65 3
Finland 9,441 97.22 2.78 22.52 5
France 8,785 90.27 9.73 64.56 5
Germany 13,243 90.11 9.89 53.66 5
Greece 2,429 91.68 8.32 24.75 1
Ireland 11,346 87.75 12.25 19.06 5
Italy 5,291 94.37 5.63 30.54 3
Netherlands 8,364 91.98 8.02 60.51 5
Norway 6,895 93.62 6.38 37.27 5
Portugal 6,212 95.64 4.36 33.58 4
Spain 6,929 91.15 8.85 15.17 4
Sweden 6,237 88.26 11.74 60.11 4
Switzerland 6,782 74.3 25.7 52.21 5
United Kingdom 9,940 90.96 9.04 39.82 5
Average 7,646 90.49 9.52 41.5
Table 3.2: Dependent variables
Redistribution Gay rights Political trust EU attitudes Immigration
Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born Scale Natives Foreign-born
0 2.42 % 2.76 % 0 2.24 % 6.66 % 0 8.96 % 5.64 % 0 7.25 % 6.17 % 0 6.72 % 2.74 %
1 11.15 % 11.62 % 1 4.14 % 7.77 % 1 4.18 % 2.83 % 1 4.27 % 3.36 % 1 22.32 % 16.03 %
2 14.79 % 15.76 % 2 8.66 % 12 % 2 7.4 % 5.47 % 2 7.62 % 6.51 % 2 49.27 % 52.88 %
3 44.13 % 44.7 % 3 38.18 % 36.47 % 3 10.44 % 8.33 % 3 10.26 % 7.88 % 3 21.68 % 28.35 %
4 27.51 % 25.16 % 4 46.78 % 37.6 % 4 10.64 % 8.47 % 4 9.89 % 7.56 %
5 17.79 % 19.66 % 5 23.33 % 23 %
6 13.04 % 12.55 % 6 10.21 % 10.2 %
7 13.69 % 15.44 % 7 10.52 % 11.69 %
8 9.52 % 12.77 % 8 9.03 % 11.62 %
9 2.78 % 4.64 % 9 3.01 % 4.53 %
10 1.55 % 4.2 % 10 4.62 % 7.47 %
Notes: Cross-tabulations account for survey design and population weights. The categories for all dependent variables have been reordered to run from
conservative to liberal or negative to positive attitudes.
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Table 3.4: Political preferences - Natives and first-generation immigrants
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
(0-4) (0-4) (0-10) (0-3) (0-10)
Natives 2.86 3.26 5.09 1.90 4.41
Foreign-born 2.82 2.83 5.53 2.08 5.21
Of which
- Less than 20 years of residency 2.80 2.78 5.86 2.14 5.41
- More than 20 years of residency 2.86 2.88 5.12 2.00 4.96
Source: Own calculations based on the ESS using survey design and population weights. For all dependent
variables, the table presents the weighted average. T-tests show that differences in mean values are
significant at 1% between foreign-born and natives, and between foreign-born individuals with less than
20 years and more than 20 years of residency.
127
Table 3.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Individual characteristics (Full sample)
Foreign-born 0.1 0.3 0 1 122337
Age 50.02 18.45 16 100 122337
Male 0.48 0.5 0 1 122337
Married 0.48 0.5 0 1 122337
Years of education completed 12.93 4.29 0 54 122337
Lives in rural area 0.39 0.49 0 1 122337
Log household size 0.8 0.53 0 2.94 122337
In the labour force and employed 0.53 0.5 0 1 122337
Concerns about hh income 1.84 0.82 1 4 122337
Religiosity (0-10) scale 4.47 3.02 0 10 122337
Member of ethnic minority 0.04 0.19 0 1 122337
Income level (decile rank) 5.32 2.78 1 10 102413
Ever unemployed and seeking work for over 3 months 0.28 0.45 0 1 122337
Partner doing last 7 days: paid work 0.35 0.48 0 1 122337
EU citizen 0.97 0.17 0 1 122337
Citizen of host country 0.95 0.22 0 1 122322
Main source of income:
- Wage and salaries 0.57 0.5 0 1 122337
- Self-employed 0.07 0.26 0 1 122337
- Pensions 0.27 0.44 0 1 122337
- Unemployment benefits 0.03 0.17 0 1 122337
- Social benefits 0.04 0.19 0 1 122337
- Investments 0.01 0.08 0 1 122337
- Other sources of inc. 0.01 0.12 0 1 122337
Political attitudes:
Redistribution 2.83 1.03 0 4 120908
Gay rights 3.2 0.96 0 4 120716
Trust in national parliament 4.79 2.53 0 10 120109
EU unification 4.92 2.59 0 10 89709
Support for immig. 1.88 0.82 0 3 120033
Individual characteristics (Immig. sample)
Years of residence in host country 21.73 16.93 1 89 11839
Developed origin country 0.3 0.46 0 1 11839
Muslim 0.16 0.37 0 1 11778
Common official language 0.31 0.46 0 1 11746
Community size (% of birth country group in tot pop.) 0.32 0.47 0 1 11839
Country characteristics
Log of gdp 10.47 0.38 9.71 11.16 16
Unemployment (%) 9.18 4.77 3.85 23.08 16
Share of foreign-born (%) 8.91 4.67 3.58 23.32 16
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Table 3.6: Opinion Gap between First-Generation Immigrants and Natives
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Foreign born -0.004 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.048) (0.054) (0.085)
Yrs in country 0.003∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 102073 102073 102073 101957 101957 101957 78194 78194 78194
r2 0.046 0.091 0.092 0.059 0.166 0.168 0.063 0.103 0.104
Immigration Trust
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Foreign born 0.119∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.039) (0.044) (0.069)
Yrs in country -0.004∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 101329 101329 101329 101487 101487 101487
r2 0.087 0.160 0.161 0.095 0.161 0.163
Individual controls include age, gender, marital status, years of education, whether the respondent lives in a rural
or urban area, household size, employment status of the respondent and the respondent’s partner, household’s
income level (decile rank), primary income source, past unemployment experience, respondent’s feelings about
household’s income, religiosity, whether the respondent is a self-declared member of an ethnic minority. All
regressions include dummies for country of residence and ESS survey round and account for survey design and
population weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.7: Opinion Gap and Immigrants’ Background
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust Immig. obs.
Origin: Non-developed -0.0423∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 8,318
(0.0184) (0.0201) (0.0574) (0.0136) (0.0469)
Origin: Developed 0.0334 0.0175 0.360∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 3,521
(0.0289) (0.0249) (0.0885) (0.0193) (0.0683)
Non-muslim -0.0313∗ -0.291∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 9,900
(0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0531) (0.0122) (0.0421)
Muslim 0.0153 -0.893∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1,878
(0.0381) (0.0455) (0.111) (0.0282) (0.102)
No common language -0.0495∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 8,150
(0.0190) (0.0205) (0.0624) (0.0141) (0.0490)
Common language 0.00628 -0.304∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 3,596
(0.0286) (0.0306) (0.0779) (0.0197) (0.0686)
Small community -0.0209 -0.364∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 8,084
(0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0576) (0.0133) (0.0464)
Large community -0.0289 -0.410∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 3,755
(0.0281) (0.0312) (0.0826) (0.0206) (0.0690)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Each cell represents a separate regression, in which column heading denotes the independent variable, and
row heading denotes the sub-sample of migrants included in the regression with the native-born sample.
The coefficients are reported for the foreign-born dummy variable. The last column indicates the number of
migrants in each sub-group. All regressions include dummies for country of residence and ESS survey round
and account for survey design and population weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗
p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.8: The Role of Destination Countries
Panel A: Example of a first stage regression (2012 survey round, full sample)
Redistribution Homosexuality Trust EU attitudes Immigration
Belgium 0.131 -0.459∗∗∗ 0.173 0.513 0.152
(0.167) (0.171) (0.325) (0.384) (0.114)
Denmark -0.324∗ -0.390∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗
(0.189) (0.175) (0.409) (0.461) (0.125)
Finland 0.025 -0.859∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.656 0.092
(0.279) (0.301) (0.509) (0.534) (0.173)
France 0.385∗∗ -0.586∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -0.031 0.190∗
(0.181) (0.168) (0.357) (0.384) (0.115)
Germany 0.436∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ 0.040 0.506 0.509∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.149) (0.313) (0.378) (0.108)
Ireland 0.399∗∗ -0.109 -1.679∗∗∗ -0.500 -0.072
(0.198) (0.159) (0.389) (0.450) (0.146)
Norway -0.138 -0.410∗∗ 0.870∗∗ -0.091 0.452∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.174) (0.368) (0.405) (0.128)
Portugal 0.357∗ -0.349 -1.366∗∗∗ 1.107 0.315
(0.184) (0.243) (0.526) (0.789) (0.226)
Spain 0.501∗∗ -0.303 -1.538∗∗∗ 1.469∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(0.199) (0.189) (0.474) (0.480) (0.158)
Sweden 0.600∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ 0.611∗ 0.209 0.519∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.145) (0.320) (0.376) (0.107)
Switzerland 0.361∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 0.117 0.286∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.150) (0.293) (0.356) (0.105)
United Kingdom 0.254 -0.438∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗ -0.037
(0.173) (0.158) (0.356) (0.391) (0.120)
Obs. 2301 2307 2176 2193 2288
r2 0.108 0.226 0.206 0.088 0.124
Regressions account for survey design weights and include the full set of controls from model 1 as well as
region of origin, religious affiliation, citizenship of residence country and EU citizenship. Omitted residence
country for this and all other first-stage regressions: Netherlands. Austria and Greece were not surveyed
by the ESS in 2012. Italy is excluded from the analysis in 2012 because too few migrants were surveyed to
permit meaningful analysis.
Panel B: Second stage regression (full-sample)
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
Natives’ pref. 0.734∗∗∗0.655∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗0.553∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗0.613∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗0.328∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗0.754∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.069) (0.103) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.063) (0.068) (0.041) (0.049)
log GDP -0.269∗∗ -0.182 -0.841∗ -0.116 -0.073
(0.110) (0.139) (0.438) (0.108) (0.293)
Share of for. 0.009∗∗ 0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.004) (0.010)
Obs. 56 56 56 56 43 43 56 56 56 56
r2 0.783 0.812 0.455 0.477 0.516 0.576 0.356 0.408 0.895 0.912
All regressions include year dummy variables. Dependent variable: Corresponding destination country fixed
effect from the first-stage. Estimation method: weighted least squares; with first-stage inverse sampling variances
of the estimated fixed effects as weights. Missing country-year pairs: Finland (2010, 2014, 2016), Italy (2012),
Norway (2016), Portugal (2014, 2016) ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
131
Table 3.9: Acculturation to Destination Country’s Political Preferences
Redistribution Homosexuality EU attitudes Immigration Trust
Tenure Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than
15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs 15 yrs
Natives’ mean pref. 0.594∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗a 0.672∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗b 0.697∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗b
(0.130) (0.104) (0.150) (0.124) (0.136) (0.119) (0.088) (0.070) (0.099) (0.082)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 56 56 56 56 56 56 43 43 56 56
r2 0.581 0.581 0.383 0.383 0.593 0.593 0.424 0.424 0.842 0.842
All regressions include year dummy variables and control for log of GDP and foreign population. Dependent variable: Cohort-specific destination country
fixed effect from first-stage. Estimation method: weighted least squares; with first-stage inverse sampling variances of the estimated fixed effects as weights.
For each dependent variable, coefficients for both cohort are estimated in a single regression. a: T-test for difference in coefficients between cohorts is
significant at the 5% level. b: T-test for difference in coefficients between cohorts is significant at the 10% level. Missing country-year pairs: Finland (2010,
2014, 2016), Italy (2012), Norway (2016), Portugal (2014, 2016) ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.10: Immigrants - Country of origin
Country of origin Obs. Country of origin Obs. Country of origin Obs.
AE 1 GN 22 NO 52
AF 72 GP 2 NP 19
AG 1 GQ 7 NZ 14
AL 214 GR 61 PA 2
AM 30 GT 4 PE 77
AN 4 GW 12 PF 1
AO 71 GY 7 PG 1
AR 73 HK 9 PH 94
AS 1 HN 7 PK 178
AT 125 HR 141 PL 899
AU 30 HT 6 PR 2
AW 10 HU 118 PS 7
AX 2 ID 73 PT 303
AZ 5 IE 105 PY 13
BA 279 IL 14 RE 6
BD 33 IM 1 RO 471
BE 74 IN 307 RS 160
BF 6 IO 1 RU 224
BG 100 IQ 144 RW 21
BI 9 IR 141 SA 9
BJ 6 IS 21 SC 1
BN 3 IT 411 SD 13
BO 37 JE 1 SE 97
BQ 4 JM 38 SG 5
BR 222 JO 6 SI 34
BW 1 JP 31 SK 56
BY 19 KE 39 SL 8
CA 26 KG 21 SN 47
CD 51 KH 8 SO 78
CF 5 KM 5 SR 80
CG 41 KP 4 ST 8
CH 43 KR 17 SV 6
CI 34 KW 6 SX 1
CL 58 KZ 125 SY 93
CM 31 LA 5 RS 16
CN 92 LB 53 TD 4
CO 81 LC 3 TG 14
CR 2 LI 2 TH 68
CU 28 LK 65 TJ 7
CV 63 LR 2 TL 2
CW 25 LS 1 TM 2
CY 4 LT 98 TN 99
CZ (Rep.) 94 LU 8 TR 473
CZ 24 LV 62 TT 4
DE 777 LY 4 TW 3
DJ 3 MA 468 TZ 12
DK 71 MD 34 TL 2
DM 3 ME 7 UA 87
DO 39 MG 20 UG 10
DZ 198 MK 95 US 144
EC 77 ML 8 USSR 241
EE 81 MM 1 UY 14
EG 45 MN 3 UZ 13
ER 28 MO 2 VE 42
ES 51 MQ 4 VN 63
ET 23 MR 4 XK 141
FI 128 MT 3 YE 1
FO 8 MU 17 YT 2
FR 342 MW 2 YG 75
GA 7 MX 32 ZA 68
GB 562 MY 22 ZM 4
GD 3 MZ 23 ZW 34
GE 21 NE 4
GF 1 NG 105
GH 38 NI 4
GL 4 NL 204
GM 11 NO 52
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Tenure in destination country (First-generation immigrants)
Figure 3.2: Convergence in political attitudes: Full sample
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Figure 3.3: Convergence in attitudes: Developed vs non-developed
Figure 3.4: Convergence in attitudes: Religion
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Figure 3.5: Convergence in attitudes: Common language
Figure 3.6: Convergence in political attitudes: Community size
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nomics/Revue canadienne d’économique 46.2 (2013), pp. 656–688.
[95] Borja Martinovic, Frank van Tubergen, and Ineke Maas. “Changes in immigrants’ social
integration during the stay in the host country: The case of non-western immigrants in
the Netherlands”. In: Social Science Research 38.4 (Dec. 2009), pp. 870–882.
[96] Rahsaan Maxwell. “Evaluating Migrant Integration: Political Attitudes across Genera-
tions in Europe ¡sup/¿”. In: International Migration Review 44.1 (Mar. 2010), pp. 25–
52.
[97] Rahsaan Maxwell. “Trust in government among British Muslims: the importance of
migration status”. In: Political Behavior 32.1 (2010), pp. 89–109.
142
[98] Anna Maria Mayda. “Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of in-
dividual attitudes toward immigrants”. In: The review of Economics and Statistics 88.3
(2006), pp. 510–530.
[99] Karin Mayr. “Immigration and income redistribution: a political economy analysis”. In:
Public Choice 131.1-2 (2007), pp. 101–116.
[100] Jacques Melitz and Farid Toubal. “Native language, spoken language, translation and
trade”. In: Journal of International Economics 93.2 (July 2014), pp. 351–363.
[101] Allan H Meltzer and Scott F Richard. “A rational theory of the size of government”. In:
Journal of political Economy 89.5 (1981), pp. 914–927.
[102] Matthias Messner and Mattias K Polborn. “Paying politicians”. In: Journal of Public
Economics 88.12 (2004), pp. 2423–2445.
[103] Simone Moriconi, Giovanni Peri, and Riccardo Turati. “Immigration and voting for
redistribution: Evidence from European elections”. In: Labour Economics 61 (2019),
p. 101765.
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